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ABSTRACT
This thesis is concerned with the foundations of statistics and 
how they interact with the practical needs of finite population sampling 
theory. The current competing foundations are critically examined and 
compared. New foundations, which are a generalisation of the Bayesian 
foundations, are presented. They are applied to populations of random 
variables which are independently generated from Bernoulli, multiple 
B ernoulli, Poisson, norm al, rec tan g u la r, Laplace and gam m a 
distributions. The case of multiple linear regression is treated with and 
w ithout the assumption of normal errors. Populations of independent 
variables of no particular parametric form are also treated under various 
assum ptions which reflect realistic situations which occur in survey 
sampling. These include situations analogous to simple random sampling, , 
stratification, w ithin stratum  ratio estim ation, across stra tum  ratio 
estim ation, probability proportional to size sampling and m ultistage 
sampling. Multistage sampling is examined in the case of methodology 
used in designing the monthly Labour Force Survey run by the Australian 
Bureau of Statistics.
The foundations presented here are compared with the current 
established  foundations. The occurrence and im pact of in te rna l 
inconsistencies in these foundations is one criterion for comparison. 
Further criteria are their versatility to cope with varied situations, their 
practicality and their intuitive appeal.
HOW TO READ THIS THESIS
The diagram on the next page gives an idea of the 
interdependence between chapters. Chapter 15 however has been written so 
that it can be read at the outset in order to get a rough idea of where the 
thesis is going. Chapters 5 to 13 contain the difficult mathematical 
development. They consist mainly of theorems, the proofs of which need not 
be read in order to understand subsequent chapters. Chapters 5 to 12 are 
logically in parallel as they are different developments of the approach 
formulated in chapter 3. Chapters 5 and 9 contain the most important 
results and are the longest and most difficult chapters to read. The 
appendix to chapter 5 examines a related problem of the estimation of 
higher order moments of estimators derived from simple random samples 
and is not essential to the main ideas of this thesis. Chapter 13 applies 
some previous results to practical sampling situations. Chapters 14 and 15 
are discussion and appraisal.
This thesis is concerned with two areas of statistics: Bayesian 
statistics and finite population sampling theory. Since few statisticians are 
intimately involved in both areas an attempt has been made in chapters 1 
and 2 to make the thesis, at least in principle, self contained by giving any 
necessary background knowledge as well as outlining the issues of 
contention.
Notation is introduced informally in chapters 1 and 2. All such 
notation is defined again, more concisely, on the first pages of chapters 3 
and 4. Any further notation is given in the chapters where it is specifically 
needed and it is required only for the chapter in which it is given.
Proofs rely heavily on the process of mathematical induction.
vi.
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1CHAPTER 1 
BACKGROUND
1.1 Introduction
That part of the statistical world which concerns itself with the 
foundations of statistics is a maelstrom of conflicting views. A casual 
observer can be taken aback by the intensity and aggression in the 
discussions accompanying some controversial papers. This section covers 
this background, from the point of view of a sta tistic ian  prim arily 
concerned with finite population sampling theory. It is not comprehensive, 
rather it focusses on highlighting concepts relevant to the theory developed 
in la ter chapters.
The disagreements between competing foundations of statistical 
inference are essentially disagreements between probabilistic concepts. 
Thus the foundations of statistics will not be distinguished from the 
foundations of probability. There is no conflict about the mathematics of 
probability. Rather, the conflict arises from the conceptual aspects of 
probability concerned with its application and interpretation.
1.2 A Search for Truth ?
The development of the foundations of probability theory can, 
perhaps simplistically, be considered to be a search for the correct 
foundations of probability. In spite of all the differences of opinion between 
statisticians of different persuasions, there often appears to be a feeling of 
unity in the search for the ultimate answers, a feeling tha t in the end all 
factions will be in agreement, as one viewpoint proves, by overwhelming 
evidence, to be the correct viewpoint.
On the other hand, the search can be viewed as a reaction to
2practical needs: that the form probability theory takes is by necessity 
determined by these needs rather than by the intellectual insights of the 
scholars of the day. From this point of view, there may be different correct 
foundations, depending on the particular application.
Hacking, in The Emergence Of Probability, suggests the latter 
view. Probability, as a mathematical science, emerged suddenly in the 
mid-seventeenth century. Hacking conjectures that its sudden prominence 
was due to a combination of the elimination of constraints as well as an 
emergence of needs. Significant constraints were: an obsession with 
predeterminism, piety and lack of an efficient system of numeration. When 
it did appear, it did so simultaneously in many different forms, fitting the 
many identified needs: "Huyghens wrote chiefly on aleatory problems. 
Leibniz began in an epistemological way, concerned with degrees of proof 
in law....The Port Royal Logic ...ends with a discussion of reasonable belief 
and credibility. Graunt’s Observations .... is entirely dedicated to 
demography and the analysis of stable frequencies....Hudde and de Witt 
were doing the first actuarial science." (Hacking, 1975).
In particular, the notion of the duality of the concept of probability 
was immediately realised. One conceptualisation of probability is in the 
behaviour of long term frequencies of stochastic processes. Another is in 
quantifying one's beliefs. This duality is arguably the greatest single factor 
contributing to the confusion and disagreement between probabilists, and it 
exists to this day.
Consider the following simple example. A gambling house 
operating a roulette table will be interested in the probabilities of outcomes. 
Since such a house will be operating over a long period of time, its interest 
lies in long term frequencies of each outcome. If it determines that the 
probability of green 0 coming up is 1/37, this means that in the long run, 
the proportion of green 0's that occur will tend towards 1/37. If a customer
3enters with the intention of placing his life savings on one spin of the 
wheel, he will not have any concern with long term frequencies as his 
interest is in the single spin. If he determines that the probability of a green 
0 is 1/37, this is a quantification of his beliefs, a concept which need not be 
defined or justified in terms of long term frequencies.
While these two interpretations of the word probability exemplify 
the interpretations which will be considered in detail here, they are not the 
only ones. Consider a bookmaker putting odds on a horserace. He is not 
concerned with long term frequencies of the outcome of hypothetical 
reruns' of a race. Neither is he greatly concerned with his personal beliefs 
of each horse's chance of winning. His concern is usually in operating a 
'Dutch book' where the odds are such that with the bets made, he will 
make a profit no matter what the outcome of the race.
Consider also the esoteric worlds of quantum mechanical 
probability (see Houston,1959, for a good introductory description) or the 
more recently developing study of 'ordered randomness' inherent in 
chaotic systems (Crutchfield et al, 1986).
These examples emphasise that it is not immediately evident that 
there is only one ultimately correct theory of probability. To put it another 
way, if one theory does emerge as the sole correct theory, it must be able to 
accomodate all of these different applications.
While this duality was immediately realised when probability 
emerged in the seventeenth century, Hacking argues that there is less 
appreciation of this fact among the statisticians of today, "...this labour of 
distinguishing kinds of probability has been curiously idle. Most people 
who in the course of their work use probability, pay no attention to the 
distinctions". It must be remembered that statisticians effectively involved 
in the current debate form a very small minority. This lack of interest in 
alternative foundations is only natural since for different applications of
4statistics, large and efficient bodies of knowledge based on different 
foundations have developed. Hacking also implies th a t champions of a 
particu lar philosophy are now, if  anything, less to le ran t of other 
philosophies. "Extremists of one school or another argue vigorously that 
the distinction is a sham, for there is only one kind of probability."
Why then does this conflict persist? Why do the different camps 
have there own accumulated literature seemingly insulated from the 
wisdom of other camps? It would seem to be because there is simply no 
framework yet devised which satisfies the practical and conceptual needs 
of all the different areas of statistics. While this is supportive of Hacking's 
beliefs th a t there is no correct solution, it may be because no framework 
has been developed sufficiently far to gain the confidence of the bulk of 
statisticians in the major areas of statistical application. This is the belief 
of the author and this thesis represents an attem pt to help resolve the 
correct foundations to statistics. -
1.8 The Controversy in Finite Population Sampling Theory
The debate over the foundations of statistics is by and large 
between Bayesians and frequentists. (A discussion of the Bayesian 
approach is left to section 1.8). However, w ithin the realm  of finite 
population sampling theory (which will be referred to in this thesis simply 
as 'sampling theory') it is primarily between adherents of the design based 
foundations and the superpopulation  approach. (While the Bayesian 
approach also involves a superpopulation, in the context of this thesis 
'superpopulation approach' will be taken to refer to the frequentist 
application of a superpopulation). The la tter is a more recent innovation 
and while currently  having only m inority support, i t  is gaining 
prominence. For an informative review of the problems in the foundations 
of survey sampling see Smith (1976).
5In design based sampling theory the randomisation introduced by 
the sampling scheme is considered to be the sole source of probabilistic 
behaviour of the data. This is known as the randomisation principle. The 
properties of a random sample are considered in relation to the population 
of all possible samples. In doing so one can make quite sophisticated 
statements about the behaviour of sample outcomes: expectations, 
confidence intervals, approximate normality and so on, in the following 
manner.
Suppose there is a finite population of N units. Associated with 
each unit is an unknown value y^ . From this population a random sample 
s of size n is selected. Suppose the quantity of interest is T, the population 
total of the yj. The prefix p- will be used to denote design based concepts. If 
T* = T*(s) is an estimator of T then the p-expectation of T* is defined by
EPT* = X p(s).T*(s) (1.1)
'  S €  A
where p(s) is the probability of selecting the sample s and A is the set of all 
possible samples. The p-variance of T* is defined by
varp(T*) = X p^ T*(s) - EpT*)2 (1.2)
S €
The estimator T* is defined to be a p-unbiased estimator for T if EpT* = T. 
Similarly the estimator varp(T*) is defined to be a p-unbiased estimator for 
varp(T*) if Epvarp(T*) = varp(T*).
Consider the case where s is a simple random sample without 
replacement (SRSWOR). Then is the set of all groups of n distinct 
population elements, of which there are NCn. Each has p(s) = (NCn)-1. Direct 
evaluation then shows that
T  = Nys (1.3)
is a p-unbiased estimator of T and
6varp(T) (1.4)
is a p-unbiased estimator for varp(T').
In the superpopulation approach, selection probabilities are 
considered irrelevant once the sample is taken. Inference is instead 
conditioned on the observed sample. Randomisation is introduced by 
considering the population to be a random realisation from an infinitely 
large collection of possible populations, the superpopulation. The properties 
of the population are considered in relation to this superpopulation.
The prefix will be used to denote superpopulation based 
concepts. The ^-expectation and ^-variance of an estimator T* are 
determined by the form in which the superpopulation is modelled. For 
example the superpopulation model analogous to the design based 
SRSWOR scheme is the following:
E^Yj = p (unknown) (1.5)
var^(Yj) = a2 (unknown) (1.6)
Yj,Yk independent j*k. (1.7)
From this the ^-expectation of T' is found by
E^r = (N/n).2le3 EjiYj
= Np by (1.5). (1.8)
An estimator T* is defined to be a ^-unbiased estimator for T if E^T* = E^T. 
It can easily be shown by (1.5) that E^T = Np, so that T' is a ^-unbiased 
estimator for T.
If T* is a ^-unbiased estimator of T,then the ^-variance of T* is 
defined to be var^(T*-T) and the estimator var^(T*-T) is defined to be a 
^-unbiased estimator for vars(T*-T) if E^vär^(T*—T) = var^(T*-T). It can 
be shown that for (1.5M1.7),
var^(T-T) = (N2/n).(l-n/N).o2 (1.9)
and that the estimator given by equation (1.4) has ^-expectation equal to the
7expression in (1.9) so that it is a ^-unbiased estimator for var^(T*-T).
Observe that the finite population total T is considered to be a 
random variable. Observe furthermore that the for ye s are random 
variables, even after selection has taken place. Thus the superpopulation 
approach conditions on s but not on the sample values {ypes}.
Royall (1970, 1971) was one of many to rediscover the super­
population approach, but his development of it went much further than 
others. For a broad discussion of this framework the reader is referred to 
Cassel, Sämdal and Wretman (1977) and Royall (1983).
Many doubts about the design based approach have emerged over 
the years. It has been found to have many counter-intuitive consequences 
(Lahiri, 1968). On a more abstract level, Godambe (1955) showed that there 
is no unique minimum variance linear unbiased estimate within the class 
of linear estimates under the design based approach. To some extent the 
superpopulation approach has emerged as an alternative viewpoint which 
overcomes these problems. Its principle of conditioning on s is in direct 
contrast to the randomisation principle, so that the two approaches 
represent widely differing philosophies.
The variance estimator of the ratio estimator has, through initial 
investigations by Royall (1970, 1971) and Royall and Cumberland (1978, 
1981), become a test case with which to debate the two approaches. The case 
for the design based approach has been backed by Hansen, Madow and 
Tepping (1983). This example will now be considered at length as it 
highlights issues which relate in principle to all estimators.
Suppose that associated with the i ^  population unit there is an 
auxiliary variable Xj whose values are known for all N population units. 
Suppose also that a SRSWOR of size n is taken. The ratio estimator of T is 
T" = xr, where r = s^V^ie s*i x population total of the x^ . This
is an approximately p-unbiased estimator of T. The conventional estimator
8of the p—variance of T" is 
varp(T")
Cyt -  f .xj)2 
n - 1 (1 .10)
Royall (1971) pointed out the following property of (1.10). When a random 
sample contains units with large Xj values then a large estimate of 
p-variance results. However it is just such a sample which, under the 
assumptions which make T" a sensible estimator, yields a good estimate of 
T. Similarly, if the Xj are small a bad estimate of T results, along with a low 
estimate of p-variance. Thus for a particular realisation, not only is the 
formula (1.10) irrelevant, but it reflects precisely the opposite of what it 
should. The superpopulation model which yields T" as the ^-unbiased  
estimator of T is
E^Yj = ßxj (ß unknown) 
var^(Yj) = o 2Xj ( a2 unknown)
4
and (1.7). This gives
var (T-T”)
x(x-xs)
n —1
ies
(yt -  r.Xj)
(1 .11)
(1 .12)
(1.13)
where xs = sXj. The expression (1.13) is large when xs is small, and 
small when xs is large, properly reflecting the accuracy of the estimate.
This was analysed at length in two subsequent papers (Royall and 
Cumberland, 1978, 1981). The debate culminated in a paper by Hansen, 
Madow and Tepping (1983) which is essentially a response to the papers of 
Royall and Cumberland.
A curious aspect of this debate arises because both approaches are 
frequentist. As explained above, the superpopulation approach does not 
condition on the sample outcome ys = {yjdes}. Instead, ys is treated as a 
random variable even after selection. It therefore follows that the 
conceptual inadequacies which Royall points out are inherent in the design 
based approach are also embedded in the superpopulation approach.
9Arguably, the randomisation process which generates a population is 
irre levan t once the population exists ju s t as the sample selection 
random isation  is irre lev an t once the sam ple is selected. (The 
superpopulation approach, however, goes a long way to reducing the 
impact of the resulting conflicts with common sense). It is not new 
knowledge th a t the superpopulation approach shares these conceptual 
difficulties, and is subject to the same type of paradoxes, yet this is not 
explicitly brought out.
Consider the following example. Let me first stress, as Efron 
(1978) puts it: "The examples are artificially simple for the sake of humane 
presentation, but readers should be assured that real data are susceptible 
to the same disagreements". Suppose there is a Bernoulli population of size 
N=3. An SRSWOR of size n=2 is drawn and the sample values {0,1} are 
observed. It is required to estimate T and compute an estimate of the 
variance of-this estimator.
The design based approach gives the p-unbiased estimators of 
equations (1.3) and (1.4). This sample yields T'= 1.5 and varp(T') = 3/4. 
However, given the sample data, there are only two possible populations, 
{0,0,1} and {0,1,1}, ignoring ordering. The error of T' is either +1/2 or —1/2. 
In either case, the squared error is 1/4. However, the variance estimator 
(1.4) gives an expected squared error of 3/4.
The superpopulation based model analogous to this design based 
scheme is the model:
E^Yj = 7i (1.14)
var^(Yj) = 7t(l—it) (1.15)
and (1.7), where k  is the unknown Bernoulli proportion. This yields T' as 
the ^-unbiased estim ator for T and the expression given by (1.4) as the 
^ -u n b iased  estim ato r of var^(T '-T ). Thus in  th is instance, the 
superpopulation approach suffers from the same conflict with common
10
sense as the design based approach.
Presumably the design based adherents cannot use this as a 
counterattack as it would mean acknowledgement of the criticisms against 
their own foundations.
Another point of interest is that the superpopulation approach is 
actually the more natural extension, to finite populations, of frequentist 
techniques. It is therefore rather curious tha t it  is viewed as the radical 
approach with support from only a minority of sampling theorists. This is 
partly for historical reasons as the design based approach was developed 
for finite population sampling fairly independently of the rest of statistics.
1.4 Special Characteristics of Finite Population 
Sampling Theory
Foundational controversies in the context of finite population 
sampling theory are ra ther unusual because they are so dominated by 
frequen tist approaches, w ith Bayesian methods very much in the 
background. What is so different about sampling theory tha t this occurs? It 
will be argued here th a t certain characteristics of finite population 
sampling makes the frequentist approach particularly appealing.
Firstly, the very fact of having a well defined finite list of 
population units allows a probability structure based solely on random 
selection from th a t list. This is appealing as the statistician can exert 
complete control over the random process. This gives the design based 
approach the distinct advantage of apparent objectivity.
Secondly, finite population samples can often be large, with a 
large num ber of strata. (A stratum  is a subset of the population. For 
example, in a survey of business establishments, stra ta  can be defined 
according to the sector of the economy in which the business operates and 
by the number of employees). When this is so, the application of theoretical
11
properties based on repeated selections can feel more natural, for the 
following reasons. The units in sample can be visualised as repeated 
selections of samples of size one. The samples drawn from each stratum 
can also be visualised as repeated samples. Surveys are often run 
repeatedly over a long period of time so that any particular sample outcome 
is one of a long string of outcomes. In these wrays it is intuitively easier to 
accept the properties of repeated selections as being relevant.
Consider again the estimator of variance of the ratio estimator. If, 
in a particular stratum, a sample with an unusually large x§ happens to 
be drawn, it does not particularly matter because this will quite likely be 
cancelled out by other strata where a disproportionately small xs is drawn. 
That is, over a large number of strata a central limit effect can occur.
Thirdly, an effect of taking large samples is that there is less need 
to utilise every bit of prior knowledge. A large sample design and 
estimation scheme can be intricately constructed so that it utilises most of 
the available prior knowledge. Combined with the effects of the sheer size of 
the sample, there can be negligible further gains from conditioning on the 
realised y^  in sample. This is one of the great strengths of both the design 
based and superpopulation approachs. Once the complexities of the sample 
design are mastered, the simplicity of the mathematics of random selection 
(either from the population or the superpopulation) allows estimation 
techniques which are often elegant and straightforward. (There are notable 
exceptions to this, for example with probability-proportional-to-size 
sampling: see Royall (1971) and the ensuing discussion with Koop (1971)). 
In running a large and complex survey, such practical considerations can 
outweigh theoretical considerations.
Finally, the quantities of interest in most finite population 
sampling situations are such that design based estimation is more 
natural. Statistical inference generally is concerned with underlying
12
causal effects, such as whether smoking causes cancer. Then a model has 
to be used, with the model parameters quantifying the causal effects. 
Survey samples, on the other hand, are usually concerned with actual 
population characteristics, for example the incidence of cancer in a 
particular population in a particular year. Since a model is therefore not 
actually needed, then by Occam's razor it will be preferable to not have a 
model at all, all else being equal. This is easily achieved by the designed 
based approach.
While the first points indicate why frequentist methods may have 
been more likely to develop, they are not substantial supporting arguments. 
However, the two final characteristics, that it can be impractical to utilise 
every bit of prior knowledge and that a model can be superfluous, are 
substantial. These need to be addressed by any competing foundations.
1.5 Robustness
It is fairly unanimously agreed that robustness against incorrect 
modelling assumptions is an essential requirement of any inferential 
scheme.
A great strength of the design based approach is that it is quite 
robust, when properly applied. Such methods use models in designing a 
sampling scheme but then abandon them at the estimation and inferential 
stage. The stochastic behaviour of the models is replaced by that of 
randomisation. In this way it is felt that protection from model dependence 
is achieved, since model failure will not invalidate the estimators, for 
sufficiently large samples. For example, p-unbiasedness is not affected by 
model failure. The fallacy of this argument is that model dependence, 
instead of manifesting itself as a risk of explicit model failure, is replaced 
by the risk of an inefficient estimator. The risk of ^-bias is replaced by the 
risk of high p-variance. If a sample is designed on the basis of an incorrect
13
model, there will be an inefficient design and the fact that an estimator is 
p-unbiased will not alleviate this fact.
Initially it appeared that the superpopulation approach was 
questionable because of its model dependence. However, the papers of 
Royall and Cumberland (1978, 1981) clearly showed that this is not a 
problem. Indeed, much of the more recent literature on superpopulation 
techniques is primarily concerned with robustness against model failure, 
for example Chambers (1986).
Robustness techniques are not within the scope of this thesis.
1.6 The Role of Randomisation
Design based theory considers that randomisation plays an 
essential part in providing insurance against model failure. Royall has 
repeatedly pointed out that it is balance that gives protection rather than 
randomisation. Royall and Herson (1973) and Scott, Brewer and Ho (1978) 
consider the effects of balance on robustness. Balance is quite difficult to 
define precisely since it means different things in different situations. The 
following rough definition will be sufficient here: a sample is balanced on x 
if the histogram of the x^  in s in some sense 'looks like' the histogram of 
the Xj of the population.
For example, the optimal sample in the case of the model (1.7), 
(1.11) and (1.12) will be the one which maximises xs as this minimises the 
^-variance given by equation (1.13). However, if the model fails, then the 
^-bias can be considerable, swamping the ^—variance. This risk can be 
overcome by balancing the sample on the x-values. However, approximate 
balance will generally be provide by randomisation. For this reason it is a 
debateable point wrhat actually provides the protection.
This exemplifies a phenomenon which occurs when comparing 
the approaches, that when applied with common sense both schemes yield
14
designs and estimators which are arithmetically similar. The arguments 
which still persist are more philosophical: does balance or randomisation 
ultimately provide the essential ingredient which ensures validity. This 
convergence of applied solutions suggests that there may ultimately be a set 
of foundations on which the different factions can agree.
Hansen et al (1983) raise important points which make 
randomisation highly desirable. Randomisation seems to be essential, but 
not for the primary reason of statistical validity, rather as a working 
practicality. Consider a large and complex survey being run by a 
government department. There is nothing in principle to stop even a 
complex design being effectively based on a purposive sample, provided it is 
taken with care. It needs to be balanced in a comprehensive way by, for 
example, balancing on different features of the x^ . This will provide 
robustness against different forms of model breakdown. Also, if there are 
variables of interest other than yj, such balancing will provide good 
estimates for all the different variables. Balancing needs to be performed so 
that no systematic biases creep in.
Randomisation is a rough and ready way to do this. While 
purposive sampling can in principle achieve this, it can have real costs 
attached. In a survey with perhaps thousands of strata, dozens of y^  
variables, and several Xj variables, a point is reached where cost efficiency 
is lost by not randomly selecting within strata. This is not only because of 
the clerical difficulty of such a task but also because the returns in 
improved accuracy would be small. Prior knowledge is used extensively to 
determine sample design and estimation formulae, and with a large 
number of strata the prior knowledge left over within strata is quite small. 
Put another way, if the extra cost involved in choosing a purposive balanced 
sample was instead spent on increasing the sample size, a greater 
accuracy—per—unit-cost would be achieved.
15
Hansen et al (1983) also point out that "the acceptability and face 
validity of results that can be supported without having to defend 
assumptions....is often vital when....results are to be used for important 
public-policy actions or by opposing factions with different interests when 
the stakes are high." In certain situations this reason alone is enough to 
require randomisation. Putting all esoteric considerations aside, the 
instinctive feeling that only randomisation can ensure fairness is a strong 
motivator and provides a basis of operations that non-statisticians can 
agree upon.
Thus the two reasons for randomisation in large complex surveys 
are practicality and demonstrable impartiality.
These opinions agree broadly, if not completely, with those of 
Royall (1976b). Bayesians have also been concerned with the role of 
randomisation. Ericson (1969a) for example comes to similar conclusions.
1.7 Fiducialism, Overt and Covert
The previous sections have outlined the disagreements between 
competing frequentist approaches to sampling theory. As mentioned 
before, in broader statistical applications disagreements are more typically 
between frequentists and Bayesians. However, there is another important 
statistical philosophy, the principles of which can add clarification to the 
debate, specifically when we consider the interpretation of confidence 
intervals.
Efron (1978) summed up the overall situation by saying "The two 
main factions in this philosophical battle, the Bayesians and the 
frequentists, have alternated dominance several times, with the 
frequentists currently holding an uneasy upper hand. A smaller third 
party, perhaps best called the Fisherians, snipes away at both sides." But 
this does not completely explain the importance of the Fisherian approach,
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also known as fiducialism. It is unavoidably tied up with the practicality of 
making inferences within frequentist frameworks.
A fundamental aspect of the fiducial approach can be understood 
best by example. Suppose we have the following frequentist confidence 
interval for unknown ]p: Prob(y-1.96aA/n < p < y+1.96a/Vn) = .95, where y is 
a realised sample mean and a is known. This statement is saying that if 
the sample selection was repeated many times, with the resulting y placed 
into the inequalities, then 95% of the time the inequality would be true. It is 
a statement about the stochastic behaviour of y over repeated samples. 
This, however, is not what users want. Their interest is in making a 
stochastic statement about the value of p. The fiducial approach provides a 
formal mechamism for doing this by, quite simply, interpreting such a 
confidence interval as a statement about p, that given a realised y there is a 
95% chance that the value of p is such that the inequality holds.
Great efforts have been made to develop the fiducial framework, 
for examples Fraser (1961) and Wilkinson (1977), but it has failed to gain 
much acceptance. While the fundamental principle of fiducialism is very 
compelling, it turns out that when it is formalised there develops a large 
quantity of conceptual baggage. For example, it does not conform to the 
Kolmogorov axioms of probability. It also generates logical paradoxes. 
While the paradoxes always appear to be resolvable, it is at the expense of 
creating further paradoxes and a general decrease in elegance and 
intuitive appeal. In short, the view taken here, in accordance with the 
significant majority, is that formal fiducial foundations simply do not 
work.
Consider now the frequentist interpretation of confidence 
intervals. Hansen et al (1983), in their defense of design-based foundations, 
make the following ambiguous statement: "...probability-sampling 
methods provide a confidence interval for the population characteristic
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being estimated, and that for large enough samples the confidence interval 
is valid and short enough to provide as precise statements as desired about 
the value being estimated " (italics are my own). This epitomises the 
inevitable dilemma. For most practical applications, it is the likely value of 
the quantity being estimated that is of concern. When confronted with 
frequentist estimators, the user is forced into making a fiducial 
interpretation of some sort about the quantity being estimated, for the only 
formal statements that can be made concern the variability of estimates 
over repeated trials. When the authors say that the confidence interval 
provides a statement about the value being estimated, it is difficult to deny 
that this requires interpreting the confidence interval as a statement about 
the uncertainty of the estimated quantity. The frequentist framework 
passes the fiducial buck to the user and in doing so avoids the explicit 
occurence of conceptual problems.
For this reason the frequentist foundations to finite population 
sampling theory are arguably inadequate. While conceptual conflicts are 
initially avoided, they rise up later in applications, for example the ratio 
estimator discussed above.
1.8 Tike Bayesian Approach to Sampling Theory
We begin with a brief reminder of Bayesian principles. Consider a 
random variable Yj which has density function fXy^ I 0) which depends upon 
the parameter vector 9. This 9 is generally unknown and any prior 
knowledge concerning its likely value is quantified by a prior density 
function f(9) for 9. If a sample ys is observed, this prior for 9 is updated to 
the posterior density function for 9 via Bayes' theorem:
fl9|ys) = fiys|Ö).fl9) /  Jflys|9).fl9) dg (1.16)
One can then produce the predictive distribution for further unobserved Yj
by
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fljj|ys) = J flyjlö)-ftöjys) de (i.i7)
Ericson (1969a) set out the following groundwork for the 
application of Bayesian methods to finite populations. Essentially it differs 
from most infinite population applications by the extra step of determining 
predictive distributions of quantities such as T after the posterior density of 
9 is determined. A useful model is to consider each Yj to be independent 
conditional on the population parameter 9. Then the conditional density of 
the population vector of y-values, Y> given 9 is Il^fiy^lg) so that the joint 
prior for Y is
N
fly) = [ n f ly i |9 ) .f l9 ) .d 9  (1.18)
'  § i=1
If a sample y s is observed then fig) is updated to f(9|ys) and the joint 
posterior of y is then
fly|y3) = J ftyi|0).ff9|ys).d0 (1.19)
e i«ss
assuming the elements of s in y match ys. It is then a matter of making 
transformations of random variables to determine such things as f(T|ys).
From this it is clear that Bayesian methods can be applied to finite 
populations without any conceptual difficulties. The development is purely 
mechanical. Since Ericson’s paper, Bayesian methods have been applied to 
some specific aspects of sampling theory. For examples, Malec and 
Sedransk (1985) consider multistage cluster sampling; Chiu and Sedransk 
(1986) consider the imputing of missing values; Rao and Ghangurde (1972) 
consider optimization; Hoadley (1969) considers categorical data; and 
Ghosh and Meeden (1986) look at empirical Bayes estimation.
Nevertheless, Bayesianism has not really gained wide acceptance 
by finite population sampling statisticians. This is due partly to the sheer 
momentum behind the well established frequentist methodology. The 
author believes that it is also because there are certain inadequacies in the
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Bayesian approach: it is difficult to formulate priors which both reflect 
realistic situations and a t the same time do not violate im portant 
theoretical principles. This thesis presents a modification of the Bayesian 
approach which attem pts to overcome these difficulties and make the 
approach more viable in  practice. The next chapter describes these 
difficulties in detail and outlines the basic philosophy which will be 
pursued to try and overcome them.
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CHAPTER 2 
MOTIVATION
2.1 Vague Prior Knowledge
An aspect of Bayesian inference which is of crucial importance to 
this thesis is the Bayesian formulation of vague prior knowledge, and in 
particular the problems this seems to cause. These problems are well 
known and discussions can be found in Dawid, Stone and Zidek(1973), 
Bemardo(1979), Efron(1978), Wilkinson(1977) and Novick(1969). Vague 
prior knowledge is not a well defined concept. Indeed, this thesis will seek 
to give it a precise definition in particular situations with specific aims. At 
this point it will only be said that, in the Bayesian context, it refers to a 
prior density function f(0) which in some intuitive sense reflects the fact 
that little or nothing is known about 0. Such a prior will typically be wide 
and flat.
This concept is of particular relevance in the finite population 
context when there is very fine stratification. In such a situation, within a 
stratum there is very little information with which to distinguish between 
units.
As a preliminary, there is a central concept in Bayesian statistics 
that is often used in the representation of vague prior knowledge: 
exchangeability. This was introduced by deFinetti (1964). The random 
variables Y = {Y ,^...,Y|sj} are exchangeable if all N! permutations of Y 
have the same joint density function as Y- Exchangeability is a 
representation of inability to distinguish between population units or, 
equivalently, uninformativeness of labels. It can be considered as the 
subjective probability analogue to simple random sampling. A large class 
of important formulations of vague prior knowledge involve exchangeable
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distributions, for example those given by (1.18) and (1.19).
Bayesian formulations of vague prior knowledge generally involve 
the use of improper priors. Improper priors are desirable because they 
look uninformative, for example, the uniform distribution on IR. Their 
main strength, however, is that they can lead to relatively tractable and 
intuitively appealing results. They can be chosen so that they lead to 
posterior densities which are both proper and very simple in form. For 
example Lindley and Smith (1972) use it in their three-staged multivariate 
linear model, as do Malec and Sedransk (1985) in a related development. 
Lindley later denounced the use of improper priors (Lindley, 1973). 
Nevertheless, in the case of a large and complex survey, 'hand fitting' a 
proper prior to every stratum is not really a practical solution and cannot 
be considered a realistic alternative to current frequentist techniques.
Improper priors have their own problems. First and foremost, 
they violate Kolmogorov's axioms. In spite of their paradoxes, frequentist 
methods work well in most practical situations. Therefore, an essential 
element in motivating applied statisticians to accept the Bayesian approach 
is that of conceptual elegance. There seems little gain in eliminating 
paradoxes only to replace them with probability densities that don't 
integrate to one.
Secondly, an effect known as the marginalisation paradox can 
arise. Suppose a joint improper prior f(0) is specified for the parameter 0. 
After observing ys, say, the posterior f(0|ys) is obtained. If 0 = (0^,...,0p) 
with p>l then the marginal posterior density for 0  ^ can be found by 
integrating out 02>...,0p> yielding fI0-jJys). It turns out that there may be no 
prior for 9^  at all, proper or improper, which yields f(0;|Jys) as the posterior 
density function. This is the marginalisation paradox. It means that 
improper priors violate the fundamental principle of Bayesian inference: 
that all knowledge concerning unknown quantities can be represented in
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the  form of a  p rior probability  function. This effect was firs t described by 
Stone and Dawid (1972) and  investigated fu rther by Dawid, Stone and Zidek 
(1973). Sudderth  (1980) showed th a t the  paradox does not occur when proper 
finitely additive priors are  used.
The following exam ple is due to Dawid, Stone and  Zidek (1973). 
Suppose th a t  Y = (Y ^,...,Y r ) a re  in d ep en d en t random  v ariab les  w ith  
density  functions
where c*l is known, k can take the values {l,2,...,r—1} and r\ is unknown. If 
the prior chosen for (tj,k) is «= 7r(K)dTi where 7t(l) + ... + 7t(r—1) = 1 then it 
follows that
w here = x^/x^ for i = l,...,r . I t  is now easy to show th a t  th e re  is no prior, 
proper or im proper, for k which leads to the  posterior given by (2.2).
A fu r th e r  paradox  th a t  a rises  from  im proper p rio rs is th a t  of 
strong inconsistency . Stone (1976) gives the  following sim ple example. If 
Yj|0 ~ N(0,1) and  th e  im proper p rio r e49.d0 is assigned  to 0 th en  
P r(0  > yj + 2 j yj) = 0 (2 ) regard less of yj while Pr(0 > + 2 | 0) = 0 ( - 2 )
regard less of 0.
T here appears to be a basic incom patibility betw een the  concept of 
vague prior knowledge and  the  specification of prior knowledge by way of a 
p rior density  function. A density  function contains a lot of inform ation, for 
exam ple  in  specify ing  th e  p a ra m e tr ic  form  of th e  d is tr ib u tio n . 
F u rth e rm o re , a p rio r w hich m ay look in tu itiv e ly  un in fo rm ative  for a 
variab le  can look very  in form ative for m any  functions of th a t  variab le
ffyihl,K) =
rj.exp{-r|y^} i = 1 ,...,k
cri.exp{-criyj} i = K +l,...,r
(2.1 )
i = i i=K+l
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(Efron, 1973). For this reason the Bayesian approach is arguably too 
restrictive to be able to describe prior knowledge in all conceivable 
situations.
Clearly it can be difficult to formulate a satisfactory representation 
of vague prior knowledge in the Bayesian approach, whether by proper or 
improper priors. Furthermore, it is in this particular situation tha t the 
frequentist methods are very powerful and elegant. For this reason the 
Bayesian approach is considered inadequate when there is vague prior 
knowledge. This thesis addresses this problem and attempts to resolve it.
2.2 The Sample Mean I&etflectmg Vague Prior Knowledge
In section 1.3 it was shown th a t in the design based approach, a 
simple random sample without replacement leads to T' = N ys as the 
p-unbiased estimator of the population total T. This is the number raised 
estimator and is simply a scaling up of sample values to reflect the whole 
population. In the superpopulation approach, the model given by (1.5)-(1.7) 
leads to the number raised estimator as the ^-unbiased estimator of T.
Consider an individual stra tum  of a large, finely stratified 
sample. Typically there will be known associated variables x^  which can be 
profitably included in the estim ation scheme, for example by ratio 
estimation or, if x is classificatory, by poststratification. However, the 
situation can arise in practice where there is such fine stratification that 
negligible prior information is given by the xi. Put another way, to 
distinguish between units a t this level would not be cost-efficient. 
Moreover, as far as the theoretical development of a theory of sampling is 
concerned, this situation serves as a starting  point from which more 
complex situations can be developed. In Bayesian terms, this requires a 
specification of vague prior knowledge.
Frequentist foundations, both design based and superpopulation,
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reflect vague prior knowledge by use of the number raised estimator. (In 
fact, frequentists consider that it is the implementation of simple random 
sampling which reflects vague prior knowledge, with the number raised 
estimator being a consequence of this. The opinion of the author is that it is 
the number raised estimator that provides the intuitive motivation and that 
simple random sampling schemes were developed to support them). 
Whether this estimator is based on correct or incorrect foundations is not of 
primary importance. The important point is that the number raised 
estimator is successfully used in practice. Furthermore, it does not waste 
any cost-effective prior knowledge when applied appropriately, for 
example in the context of fine stratification. Because of its well established 
usefulness and simplicity, theoretical considerations aside, any successful 
theory of finite population sampling must be able to incorporate the number 
raised estimator.
The number raised estimator is intuitively appealing even before it 
is formally justified by statistical theory. For this reason Bayesian 
techniques have been developed which attempt to reproduce it. While it can 
be approximated without difficulty, one must resort to improper priors to 
reproduce it precisely. Moreover, it is arguable that the number raised 
estimator is so intuitively compelling that it is worthwhile beginning with 
it as a premise and then deducing the characteristics of a subjective 
probability framework which would support it. This is in fact how this 
thesis developed.
More specifically, we can set
EYj|ys = ys for all je s (2.3)
where E . |ys denotes the Bayesian posterior expectation conditional on the 
sample values ys. Then ETiys = sy{ + sys = Nys.
There is nothing particularly radical about using an estimator as 
a starting point. Many robust estimators come about because they 'look
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good', and are then evaluated empirically (see for example Andrews et al, 
1972). Neither is it unnatural tha t foundations should be motivated by 
equations involving expectation operators, as opposed to beginning with 
Kolmogorov’s axioms of probability. Indeed, in many ways defining 
axiomatic properties of the expectation operator is the more natural 
approach to the development of probability theory (Whittle,1970).
2.3 CoELcIuisions and Aims
In section 1.3 were discussed the paradoxes which arise when 
estimators are not conditioned on the sample outcome. These occur due to 
the fiducial interpretations that the user of statistics is required to make, as 
discussed in section 1.7. Similar paradoxes were shown to occur in the 
superpopulation approach, from precisely the same causes. For these 
reasons, the frequentist foundations are rejected as possible contenders for 
any universally 'correct' foundations as conjectured in section 1.2.
This leaves subjective probability. The Bayesian foundations 
overcome these paradoxes: for a broad discussion see Cornfield (1969) and 
for a lucid example see Lindley and Phillips (1976). Nevertheless, the strict 
confines of the Bayesian approach are rejected, as they currently stand, 
because they are inadequate to cope with real-world complex situations 
where there is vague prior knowledge. Bayesian applications to such 
situations are either im practical or else in ternally  inconsistent, as 
discussed in section 2.1.
The aim of this thesis can be considered from two different 
perspectives. It is an attem pt to reproduce classical finite population 
estimators, such as the number raised estimator, in a subjective probability 
framework w ithout the emergence of conceptual inconsistencies. It is 
equivalently an attem pt to generalise the Bayesian approach to permit the 
specification of vague prior knowledge without the problems currently
assoc iated  w ith  it. As such, a ll of th e  theo ry  developed h e re  can be 
considered e ith e r w ith in  the  context of finite population sam pling  theory, 
or else completely independently  of it.
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CHAPTER 3
THE OBSERVER BASED FOUNDATIONS
3.1 Irntrodmctio m
This chapter outlines the foundations of the proposed observer 
based approach to the foundations of statistics. They are a generalisation of 
the Bayesian foundations and the discussion here is largely concerned with 
identifying the differences from the Bayesian approach.
Suppose there exists a population of random variables {Yj} which 
can have realisations {yj}. Let s denote a set of n labels associated with an 
observed sample. For all ie s, Yj = yj and denote the vector of sample 
observations {yjiie s} by yg. The symbol £ will denote a set of r labels of 
unobserved random variables and will denote the vector of {Yj:je Q. Let 
yg = Z^yj/n the sample mean, ys = nyg the sample total and Y  ^ = Ij^Yj. 
Let £'u£"= £ be a partitioning of £ into mutually exclusive subsets of r' and 
r" elements respectively. Let T = ys + Y  ^ denote the total of the finite 
population, which has N = n + r elements. All density functions will 
usually be denoted simply by f and distribution functions by F. When this 
can cause ambiguities, appropriate subscripts will be used. The discussion 
below is equally applicable to continuous, discrete or mixed distributions, 
with appropriate changes in the formulae.
In the Bayesian framework prior knowledge is quantified by a 
prior density function. Suppose the Yj are independently and identically 
distributed random variables with continuous density function flyjlg) where 
0 is an unknown vector of parameters. Prior information can be 
represented by specifying fig), the prior density function of 0. The posterior 
density function of 0, given observations ys, is then determined by Bayes' 
theorem: f(0|ys) = f(0)flys|0) / J f^X9)f(ys|6)d9 . This has been discussed in 
section 1.8.
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Difficulties occur when it is considered that there is little or no 
prior information about the vector 0. For example, the often used Bayesian 
prior for the mean |i of Bernoulli random variables is the Beta distribution. 
The prior knowledge that Beta(a,b) represents can be interpreted as 
equivalent to having previously observed a sample of size a+b of which a are 
successes, where yj = 1 is a success'. It then follows that if there is no prior 
knowledge about ji then a Beta(0,0) prior density function is appropriate. 
Unfortunately Beta(0,0) is not a proper density function as it does not 
integrate to one. Such 'improper priors' can be used in practice, but there 
are many problems associated with their use, as discussed in section 2.1.
The observer based approach is a subjective probability framework 
which addresses these problems and produces well known and intuitively 
appealing estimators. Some are similar to estimators obtained by 
frequentist methods. Some are similar to those which can be obtained by 
Bayesian methods using improper priors, but without violating 
Kolmogrov's axioms.
It has been argued in section 2.1 that the difficulties in the 
Bayesian approach arise from the fact that a prior density function f(9) 
contains a lot of information and so the approach is inconsistent with the 
notion of vague prior knowledge. The observer based approach presents the 
idea that if there is substantial prior information, then the formulation of 
fig) is appropriate, but that in circumstances with less information a less 
stringent method of quantifying information is more appropriate. The 
approach incorporates two particular weakenings of the Bayesian 
approach: (i) there is no necessity for any prior density function f(9), either 
proper or improper, to exist and (ii) there can be a family of possible 
posterior density functions flyr|ys) for The approach does not allow the 
use of improper priors.
In the observer based framework, knowledge is quantified by a
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probability state (PS). A PS is any collection of equations (or inequalities) 
which imply a restriction on any relevant density functions. For example, a 
PS can be simply a Bayesian formulation of prior knowledge: a known 
parametric form f(yj|g) along with a known prior ft9) for 9. Thus the 
observer based framework generalises the Bayesian framework. When 
there is vague prior knowledge a PS can consist solely of constraints on the 
posterior density function of For example, a PS can incorporate 
equation (2.3). It may also include a parametric model for These will 
determine restrictions on the forms of f(y^|ys) and fly^lg) respectively.
Bayesian prior knowledge is very economically quantified by fig). 
The observer based approach is designed to also yield economical 
presentations of vague prior knowledge by way of a PS. Consider first the 
most straightforward but laborious way to have well defined posterior 
density functions for any y^|ys without the need for a prior fig) to exist. 
This is by explicitly specifying fly^|ys) for every set £ and every sample 
outcome ys. This can be demonstrated by example. For the Bernoulli!}!) 
case, treated in chapter 6, we could for example quantify vague prior 
knowledge of g = p by the following relations:
Yj|p ~ Ber(p), foralljes, (3.1)
and if ys is any set of n sample observations satisfying ys = k * 0 or n then 
Pr(y^|ys) = t+k"1Ct.'-t+n-1Cr_t/{n+r-1Cr.rCt} (3.2)
where t = Ejg^yj. The restriction that k * 0 or n is imposed so that the 
posterior density functions will be non-degenerate. What we are doing 
here is defining, one by one, every possible posterior density function that 
can can arise by having different sample outcomes ys and different sets 
Equation (3.2) represents an infinite list of constraints which reflect prior 
knowledge. Compare this to the elegance of the Bayesian approach where 
these same posterior density functions result from the use of the improper 
prior Beta(0,0). That is, in the Bayesian approach, all of the constraints in
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(3.2) are a consequence of the single constraint that fig) ~ Beta(0,0). 
However, the significant advantage of (3.2) is that Kolmogorov's axioms are 
not violated, for the simple reason that fig) and fiy^|ys) for ys = 0 or n are 
considered to not exist.
3.2 Bayes-consistemcy and Economy of Presentation
There are two obvious problems associated with this formulation. 
Firstly, there should be some way of ensuring that these explicitly defined 
posterior density functions fiy^|ys) are in some sense logically consistent 
with each other. Secondly, it is a very uneconomical and unconvincing 
way of expressing prior knowledge. These problems, however, can be 
overcome in the observer based approach without resorting to the use of an 
improper prior.
Consider the first problem. Logical consistency is ensured in the 
Bayesian approach by Bayes' theorem. By fixing fig), posterior density 
functions fiy^|ys) for every possible ys are an immediate consequence. One 
can then update this posterior density function to fiy^'|y^M,ys) when further 
information, y^», comes to hand by
Ky^ 'ly^ ">ys) = fiy^lys)/®[y^ "lys) (3.3)
recalling that £ = £’u£" is a partitioning of The consistency that Bayes' 
theorem ensures is that fiy^ '|y^",ys) is independent of the order in which 
the elements of {ys,y^M} are observed. That is, fiy^iy^",ys) can be derived 
directly by (1.19) and the result will be the same as that obtained by 
updating fiy^|ys) to fiyr'!y^ ',ys) through (3.3).
In the Bayesian framework, the conditional probability fiy^|ys) is 
defined by
fly£lys) = f(y^.ys) > Kys)- (3-4)
Equation (3.3) is a consequence of this. The observer based framework 
defines conditional probabilities by a different means. In this example, the
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conditional probabilities Pr(y^|ys) are defined by (3.2). Equation (3.4) is 
inadequate since f(ys) will not always exist (when ys = 0 or n). Logical 
consistency between different posterior density functions of can then be 
obtained by requiring th a t the relation (3.3) hold, whenever all of its 
elements exist. This approach does not require that fly^O, fly^") and flys) 
exist. Similarly, if the Yj are of the known parametric form flyj|9) then we 
can require that
fl§ly£M>ys) = fl§lys) • flyjHS) / fly£Mlys)> (3.5)
provided all the terms exist.
Any collection of posterior density functions which obey (3.3) and 
(3.5), when the all term s in the expressions exist, will be called 
B aves-consisten t. In the observer based approach, Bayes-consistency 
provides the logical consistency between different density functions that 
Bayes' theorem and (3.4) provide in the Bayesian framework.
If all the term s in (3.3) and (3.5) are required to exist, they 
essentially amount to Bayes' theorem. It is the provision tha t some terms 
may not exist that is the important distinction to bear in mind.
In the Bernoulli example above, given (3.1) and (3.2) it can be 
shown th a t (3.3) holds, whenever all the elements of (3.3) exist. A 
particular advantage of Bayes-consistency is tha t it permits a framework 
which avoids the restriction of dealing only with density functions which 
are assumed to be of a particular parametric form, fly^ lQ) (see chapter 5).
Bayes' theorem arises naturally  from the likelihood principle 
which essentially states tha t all of the information in a sample ys that can 
be used for inferential purposes is contained in the likelihood function 
f(ys|9). For a formal definition and discussion see Cox and Hinkley (1974). 
This can be seen in equation (1.19) where the only occurrence of ys in the 
expression for fty|ys) is in the term fl9|ys), and since
S0|ys) = ffys|6 )f(9 )/Jftys|9)fl:e)de (3.6)
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then the only occurrence of ys is in f(ys|0).
The observer based approach adheres to the likelihood principle 
but with a proviso. In its current form the principle presupposes that the 
likelihood function both exists and is known. Since this need not be the case 
in the observer based foundations, the likelihood principle is adopted with 
the qualification in so far as the likelihood function exists and is known.
Define a solution to a PS to be a Bayes-consistent collection of 
functions ffy^ly-q) (and, if appropriate, fX01y^)) where £ and r\ are 
non-intersecting sets of labels. The {y ,^y-q} included in a solution is the 
domain of the solution. In the Bernoulli example above the domain of the 
solution to (3.1) and (3.2) is all Ky^ly^) for which y^ does not consist of only 
0's or only l 's  (i.e. ys * 0 or n). It is understood tha t domains of solutions 
have the following property: if  fly^ly^) is in the domain then so is 
flyrlyrj^Tj')* I11 other words, if a sample ys determines a unique posterior 
density function for y^ then so will any sample which includes ys. It can be 
seen that if fly^|ys) is in a domain, then so are all the terms in (3.3).
The second problem associated with the PS defined by (3.1) and 
(3.2) is tha t it is cumbersome. Consider the constraint given by (2.3) which 
can be taken to represent a state of vague prior knowledge. If this is 
included in a PS then it defines a family of fly^|ys)'s for every and ys by 
specifying tha t all the marginal means of fly^|ys) are ys. It turns out that 
the PS defined by (2.3) and (3.1) has a unique solution which is given by (3.2) 
(see chapter 6). The formulation (2.3) plus (3.1) is just as economical as the 
Bayesian formulation of (3.1) plus the improper prior Beta(0,0) for q, which 
yields the same posterior densities.
3.3 Discus siom.
The specification of prior knowledge by (2.3) and (3.1), with the 
requirem ent of Bayes—consistency, thus overcomes the two problems
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associated with (3.1) and (3.2).
Equation (2.3) is not the only constraint that can be used to quantify 
vague prior knowledge, for example the median of ys can be used instead of 
the mean. While (2.3) has a certain amount of arbitrariness, it has much 
intuitive appeal. A model used to describe data is rarely the only feasible 
one, but this does not detract from its usefulness.
Intuitively appealing PS's such as that defined by (2.3) and (3.1) 
can be formulated for a wide variety of situations of vague prior knowledge. 
This thesis presents several such probability states and discusses their 
implications. In particular it will be shown that the observer based 
framework overcomes the theoretical difficulties found in the analogous 
Bayesian solutions and has a versatility in dealing with cases of very weak 
prior knowledge which has no obvious analogy in Bayesian theory. 
Estimators and confidence intervals will be obtained which are identical, or 
very similar, in form to frequentist solutions.
An explanation is needed in the interpretation of probabilities and 
expectations in the observer based approach. Probability functions such as 
f(yj|0) or F(0|ys) are interpreted exactly as they are in the Bayesian 
approach. An expectation operator admits a family of possible posterior 
probability functions. For example, equation (2.3) is saying that the random 
variable Yj has a density function flyj|ys) which is not precisely known but 
which has mean yg. A probability state can also admit a family of possible 
solutions. One of the strengths of this approach, however, is that many 
parsimonious probability states have a unique solution which can be 
determined.
The observer based approach has been shown in this chapter to 
have the following basic differences from the Bayesian approach. It is a 
generalisation of the Bayesian approach as it has a broader way of 
specifying prior knowledge. This is done by not requiring the existence of
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any prio r density  function and  by allowing a fam ily of possible posteriors. 
P rio r knowledge is in s tead  form ulated  by a probability  sta te . These can 
produce posterior properties which resu lt from the use of im proper priors, 
b u t which do not violate Kolmogorov's axioms. Logical consistency and the 
l ik e lih o o d  p r in c ip le  a re  m a in ta in e d  in  th e  f ra m e w o rk  by 
Bayes-consistency.
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CHAPTER 4 
PRELIMINARIES
4.1 Notation
Some preliminary notation is given at the beginning of chapter 3. 
This section outlines further notation that is adopted throughout the 
remainder of this thesis. Extensions to this notation are sometimes given 
within specific chapters.
Many of the proofs are concerned with moments. If r\ is any set of 
m population units, some of which may be in sample and some not, define:
Mt,ri “ Zjer| DjVm
t^,s = ®qjys
where = ZjeTjYj/m. As a general rule, an upper case symbol denotes a 
random variable while the corresponding lower case symbol denotes a 
realisation. For examples d^s = y^  -  y s for any is s and m ^s = 
SiG s(y^-ys)Vn. A subscript such as s+j denotes the union of s and j, for 
example M2>s+j = (su j)(Yr  Ys+j)2/(n+l).
Pr(e) denotes the discrete probability of the event e.
4.2 Characteristic Differential Equations
Many of the probability states that are investigated in this thesis 
yield unique solutions. Such probability states include the constraint that 
the distribution of Yj|9 has the known parametric form flyj|9) for all j<es, 
with the Yj|9 independent. The following formula is very useful in 
deducing a unique solution. Let g(9) be an arbitrary function of 9. Then 
E{g(9)|Yj=yj,ys) = J g(6)dF(9|ys+j)
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= J g(0).f(yj|0).dF(9|ys) / flyj|ys)
by Bayes—consistency
= E{g(0).flyj|0)|ys} / flyj|ys) (4.1)
This equation can be differentiated with respect to yj. It turns out that by 
judicious choice of the functions g(9), and by incorporating the constraints 
of the PS, this differentiation process can result in an ordinary differential 
equation based on either flyj|ys) or fl9|ys). The advantage tha t this gives is 
that existence and uniqueness results of ordinary differential equations are 
well established so th a t a unique solution to the PS can then be easily 
deduced. Such uniqueness and existence results can be found in any 
standard textbook, for example Boyce and DiPrima (1969).
In the case of a discrete density function, equation (4.1) is then 
expressed as
If Yj is integer valued, judicious choice of g(9) can lead to recursive 
relations between Pr(yj|ys) and P r(y j+ l|y s) which then yield a unique 
solution.
4.3 Results DeduciM© from Equation (2.3)
An immediate consequence of Bayes—consistency is tha t if, for 
some function g(.), Eg(y^)|ys is known then
This relation, and variations of it, are useful in deducing properties of a PS. 
This is because PS's are generally defined in terms of expectations, such as 
equation (2.3). This technique has been used w ithin the Bayesian 
framework, by Ericson (1969b, 1970) to determine the form of posterior 
means and variances and by Goldstein (1975) to uniquely determine
(4.2)
E g (lc)|ys = E{Eg(Ic)IYCsys}lys. (4.3)
moments of prior distributions.
Applying (4.3) to equation (2.3) yields the following results:
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cov(Yj,Yk|ys) = E(Y j-ys){E(Yk - y s)|Yj,ys}|ys j*k*j,kes,
= var(Yj|ys) / (n+1) (4.4)
since by (2.3), EYk |Yj,ys = (Yj+ys)/(n+l). Similarly, cov(Yj,Yk |ys) = 
var(Yk|ys)/(n+l) so that it follows that var(Yj|ys) is independent of j and 
cov(Yj,Yk|ys) is independent of both j and k. Also,
ETlys = ^ies^i + ^jgsEYj|ys
= T  by (2.1) (4.5)
where T = Nys as given in equation (1.3), 
var(T]ys) = v a r 0 ^ sYj|ys)
= I jg s var(Yj|ys) + £ jg s I kg Scov(Yj,Yk|ys) j*k 
= N2(l-n/N)var(Yj|ys)/(n+l) by (4.4). (4.6)
If we consider each Yj to be independently generated from a distribution 
with unknown mean p, then since EYj|ys = E{EYj|p}|ys = Ep|yg then by 
(2.3):
Epiys = ys. (4-?)
4.4 A Theorem
Theorem 4,1: Suppose a probability state includes the constraint that flyj|9) 
is given and the Yj| 9 are independent. Then for any solution to the 
probability state there exists a function h(9) of 9 so that for any sample, s,
f(9|ys) ~ f(ys|9).h(9) (4.8)
whenever the elements in (4.8) exist. The constant of proportionality is a 
function of ys only.
Proof: By Bayes-consistency
fl0|ys+j) = fCyjl§)-«8lys)/fiyjlys)- (4.9)
Thus the only factor in f(9|ys+j) which involves both 9 and yj is flyj|9). 
Similarly the only factor in fl9|ys+j) which involves both 9 and y^ , for any 
ies, is flyj|9). Thus fl9|ys+j) is of the form
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R0|ys+j) = ^ y s + jl^ -^ ^ ^ i^ s + j) (4.10)
Equating the right hand sides of (4.9) and (4.10) yields
(4.11)
satisfying equation (4.8). From equations (4.10) and (4.11) it can be seen that 
h(9) does not change as the sample size increases so that h(9) in (4.8) is the 
same for all possible samples.■
The function h(9) performs the same role as a prior, either proper 
or improper, does in the Bayesian framework. If h(9) turns out to be a 
proper density function, it can be interpreted as such in the observer based 
frame. If improper, it is interpreted as no more than  a function which 
characterises the solution.
Thus the search for a solution to a probability state can be 
mechanically equivalent to the search for a prior for 9. However, with the 
exception of the Laplace IPS (g known) of section 11.2, the function h(9) is 
not explicitly sought. This is because there are other more elegant methods 
of finding solutions. Also, many of the probability states do not meet the 
conditions of theorem 4.1. In this instance there is no h(9).
4.5 B ayesian Estim ation
Estim ators used in  frequentist frameworks are typically chosen 
from among the collection of p— or ^-unbiased estim ators. The actual 
choice is usually determined by optimizing on some quantity, for example 
by minimizing p— or variance. Where unbiasedness is not easily 
achieved a near-unbiased estimator is chosen.
Bayesian estim ators can be chosen by different criteria. For 
example, an explicit loss function L(T,T') can be employed so th a t the 
posterior expected loss, EL(T,T')|yg, is minimised (see Maritz, 1970 for a 
discussion). This criterion is inappropriate in the context of this thesis
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which is aimed at producing estimators which do not presuppose the needs 
of the broad spectrum of users of statistics. Other criteria are to choose 
estim ators which represent measures of central tendency of posterior 
distributions. The most common criterion is to choose the posterior mean of 
T. This has been implicit in the discussion in chapter 2 and in particular 
equation (2.3). Other criteria could be to choose the posterior mode or 
median. Christensen and Huffman (1985) discuss the relative merits of 
these criteria. This thesis will remain within the context of presuming the 
posterior mean to be the appropriate estimator.
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CHAPTER 5
THE INFORMATIONLESS 
PROBABILITY STATE
5.1 Formnilatiom
The Informationless Probability State (IPS) which will be defined 
here provides a characterisation of no prior knowledge of random variables
Yj-
Firstly, the constraint (2.3) is appropriate for a model exhibiting a 
lack of knowledge of Yj. This can be contrasted with the Bayesian use of 
informationless priors over R. Suitable priors will have a high variance 
and be fairly uniform over a wide range. This is done to enhance the 
resulting posterior estimator's data dependence, so that for example the 
posterior mean will be close to the sample mean. The desirability of this 
property is made explicit by (2.3). Bayesians can obtain (2.3) by the improper 
prior p~N(0,°o), which is interpreted as the limit as o2 -» °° of ji ~ N(0,a2).
Secondly, when there are n units in the sample it is reasonable 
that one should be able to simultaneously estimate n posterior functions of 
Yj. A suitable choice of functions are the posterior moments of Yj up to 
order n. The IPS thus contains the constraints
h fi  = at,n mt,s fort =2,....n (5.1)
where a^n is a non-zero constant depending on only t and n, for all ys 
satisfying m2s * 0 (so that the posterior density functions are not 
degenerate). This form of X,^ s suggests itself because it is translation 
invariant and symmetric in the ys. Also, forms of which involve 
functions of mu s other than m^- s itself would imply some knowledge of 
the form of the distribution of Y j|ys . For example, if Yj is normally 
distributed then it is known that the higher order even moments of Yj are 
functions of the second moment of Yj. Note that there are no restrictions on
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posterior moments of order higher than n, other than those resulting  
indirectly through Chebycheff s inequalities.
The IPS is defined by (2.3) and (5.1), for sam ples satisfying  
m 2,s * It can be shown that the a^n all equal 1, by use of the following 
two lemmas.
t
Lemma 5.1; D £s = D£ • D|;v [n+l]v_t for jss .
v=0
Proof: By directly expanding D£ s = (D^g+j + Dj g/fn+ipLB
t
Lemma 5.2: . = { n £  ^ ( - D j  ^ .[n + lF .n ^  + (nDj s)t}/(n+l )t+1
v=0
= 2^e(sMj) D?s+j / (n +1)
= S i£(suj)< Di,s -  Dj.s/Cn+1])4 / (n+1)
t
= *Cv D y j-D ^ t-M n + D v -w
t
= v? 0 ‘Cv (n- ^ 3  + DYS) (-Dj s)t_v (n+1 )v- w  
and the result then foliows.H
Theorem 5.1: In the IPS, a^n = 1 for all n and all t < n.
Proof: By induction over t. The IPS requires m2 s * 0 so that n > 2. For 
algebraic convenience we include a^ . n for t = 0 and t = 1. Then, since m0 s = 
X,0 s = 1 then a0 n = 1 for all n > 2 and since mx 3 = ^  s = 0 we can arbitrarily 
set ax n =1 for all n > 2. Thus the result holds for t = 0 and t = 1. Now, if  p,q 
are non-negative integers, define ^pq)S = E DjPgD^ |ys, j^k; j,kg s. It is easy 
to show, and clear from the discussion below, that this expression is 
independent of j and k. Now,
^pq,s ”  ED * (ED^P I Yj,ys} I ys by Bayes—consistency
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= EDjP {E S1C V D J ^  D9-v [n + l]^  |Yj,ys) I ys by lemma 5.1
= ED ? { £  qCv aViI1+1 Dq'v [n+1]^ ) I ys
v=0
since by (5.1), ED^s+j|Yj(ys = a ^
= (n+l)_q_1 EDP, ( £  qCv a ^  Dq-V
v=0v
•c n  L v c -  %  (- d j,s)V_w (n+1)w + (nDi,s)V b  1 y s
by lemma 5.2
= (n+l)~q_1 X  qCv av n+1 [ nv
v=0
+ » £  VCW %  (-l)v-w (n+l)w a m^+q_W(S ] (5.2)
w=0
Next it will be shown tha t the theorem holds for t = 2 and t = 3, 
when n>5. Let n>4. Setting p=3 and q=l in (5.2) yields s = a4 n m4 J  (n+1) 
while setting p=l and q=3 yields X 31 3 =
3a2,nm2,s(a2,n+l - a3>n+l)n/(n+1)2 + a4,nm4,s([n2- n]a3,n+l +3na2n+1+l)/(n+l)3 
Since = X ^  s these two forms can be equated. In particular, by
equating the coefficients of m | s and m4 g separately, the respective 
equations a2 n+1 = a3 n+1 and 3a2 n+1 + (n—l)a 3 n+1 = n+2 result. These resolve 
to a 2 n+i = a 3 n+i =  ^ an<^  since the theorem holds for t  = 2 and t = 3 for all 
n > 5. Now the theorem will be proved for t = 2. If n>2, setting p=0 and q=2 in 
(5.2) yields
h *  = { a 2 , n +  na2,na2,n+l + n[n+1]a2,n+l > “ 2,3 '  (n+1 ^  f5.3)
Since by (5.1), X 2 s = a 2 nm2 s> equating these two forms of X 2 s yields a2 n = 
(n+l)a2 n+1/(n+2—a2 n+1). Using this to work inductively downwards from the 
result a2 n+1 = 1 for n>4 yields a2 n = 1 for all n>2 and so the theorem holds 
for t  = 2.
Similarly for t  = 3. If n>3, setting p=0 and q=3 in (5.2) yields
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X,3,s {(3n+l)a3>n + (n2-n)a* na3,n 3,n+1 n[n+l]2a3,n+l ) m 3,s/ (n + 1 >3
after substitu ting a2 n+1 = 1. Equating this with a3 nm 3 s yields a3 n = 
(n+ l)2a3 n+1/(n2+ 3 n -[n - l]a 3 n+1). Again, working inductively downwards 
from a3 n+1 = 1 for n>4 yields a3 n = 1 for all n>3 and so the theorem holds for 
t=3.
Suppose now that the theorem holds for up to t-1. Then setting p=0 
and q=t>3 in (5.2) yields, after substituting n+1 = 1 for v up to t-1 ,
t  V
\ s  =  (n + l)-«  2  ‘C v { n E o vC w ^  (-1 )v-w (n+1 )w mt_w s
+ n(-l)vmt>3[at;n- l ]  + n ^ n ^ }
+ (n + 1 )-« ( V +1- l )  {n l  lCw ^ ( - » ^ ( n + D X w ,
+ n ( - l ) t mt,s K n- 1] + (5.4)
n A mw .s ^ w ,s ( - i)w(n+i)w- t-1 2  *CVVCW(-1)Vw=0
+ 0 + a ^ m t/n + 1 )  +
where rjt 3 is the second part of the expression given by (5.4)
= mt,3(n+at ^ / (n+1) +
X ^ C ^ C - l ) '
v=w
(5.5)
}(5.6)
by using the identities ^CV.VCW = tr-wCt_v.^C^_w and
0 if t > w
(-1)* if t  = w.
Equation (5.5) can be equated with w ith a t n m t s . In particu lar the 
coefficients of m2 sm t_2 s can be equated. These coefficients m ust be 
non-zero because t > 3. This yields
(n+l)"^1(atjn+1-l)n{tC2(-l) t-2(n+l)2 + tCt_2(- l)2(n+l)t-2} = 0.
This can only hold if at n+1 =1. Substituting at n+1 = 1 back into (5.5) gives r\t s^ 
= 0 and then once again equating (5.5) with at nmt g yields at>n = 1. Hence by
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the process of induction at n = 1 holds for all t and all t < n.H
Thus the only possible Bayes-consistent posterior expectation of 
moments are the sample moments. In chapter 7 is given a restricted 
existence result for solutions to the IPS.
5.2 Finite Fopnlations
This section considers some applications of the IPS to finite 
population estimation. Equation (4.5) gives T' as the posterior expectation of 
T|ys. From theorem 5.1, var(Yj|ys) = m2 g. Thus from (4.6)
var(T|ys) = N2(l-n/N)m2s/(n+l). (5.7)
The estimator T' arithmetically duplicates the design based p-unbiased 
finite population total estimator, based on a simple random sample without 
replacement, and the superpopulation ^-unbiased estimator based on the 
model (1.5)—(1.7). The variance (5.7) differs from the corresponding 
frequentist estimator (1.4) by a factor of (n—l)/(n+l). The interpretations of 
these formulae, however, are very different in a subjective probability 
framework.
A central limit theorem for T' can be constructed. Madow (1948) 
derived the analogous central limit theorem in the design based 
framework. Derivations of central limit theorems in the design based and 
Bayesian approaches are fairly direct as the explicit probability structure is 
taken as known. The IPS in the observer based framework requires a less 
direct method. As the IPS specifies only posterior moments, the proof is 
obtained by showing that these moments approach those of the normal 
distribution. The t^ *1 posterior moment of T involves a sum of (N-n) 
random variables, raised to the power t. The algebra needed in the 
expansion of such powers is complex and needs to be introduced in some 
detail. The terminology of partitions , given below, is well established (see
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Kendall and Stuart, 1963, section 12.5).
A partition of weight t and power r is a set of r positive integers 
which sum to t . For example, all possible partitions of weight 4 are: 4, 22, 
112 and 1111 which have power 1, 2, 3 and 4 respectively. The set of all 
partitions of weight t will be denoted . A partition P can be expressed 
conveniently in two different ways, either
P = qxq2....qr (5.8)
or
P = p \ p 2 ....p7^1 (5.9)
1 2  h
where px , p2,....,Ph are distinct integers and there are 7^  repetitions of the 
integer pp . . .  , 7th repetitions of the integer ph . For example 112 = 122L
Define
-  (Y1-3Fs)qi... (Yr-yJ^
where Y^,...,Yr e s and P is a partition expressed as in (5.8). Define
h TO,cep) = ti/{ n (Piiv i.
k=l
where P is defined as in (5.9).
Lemma 5.3: In the IPS, if  P = q1....qr is a partition of weight t and power 
r, then
lim nr-t/2 ED^I y . =
n->oo s
0
0
if  any qj >2, j=l,...,r  
if  t is odd
. (2r-t)!|i2t/2/{(r-t/2)!2r_t/2} otherwise
(5.10)
(5.11)
(5.12)
provided mu>s is bounded as n ->°° for all u, and p2 = n^oo m 2 s 
exists.
Proof: By induction over r. Consider first the case when r =1, then D^ = Dj s
with t > 1 and we have
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|i2 if  t = 2
0 otherw ise
since m t g is  bounded a s n - > ° °  and ex ists. T his sa tisfies  (5 .10M 5.12 ).
lim  n ^ E D *  |yq = hm  n ^ n u ,
n - > o o  J»s  n - > ° o  c’3
Suppose th a t (5 .10M 5.12 ) hold for powers up to r —1. Then,
E D 3P |y s = E D ^ .. . .D ^ 3 ly s
E d J s ....d X  {E D^3 |Yc>y s) I y s (5.13)
w here I f  = C£v ....,Y r_1)'. Now,
E D ^ I Y C,y s = E  \ ( Y s + c - y s) ^ . E D * 3+?| ; ^ y s
k=0
since Dr>g = Dr>g< + (Ys+r -  ys)s+C
E (Ys+^ ' ~  ys) -Mk,s+;'
k=0
by (5.1) and theorem  5.1
E  E  V  (Ys+C -  ys) ’^  (Yj -  Ys+? f  /(n+r—l )
je(su£) k=0
= X  (Yj -  y s ) r/(n + r - l)  
je(»uQ
= + E  D ^V C n+r-i),
and su b stitu tion  into  (5.13) yields
n  _t/2 E D 3 1 y3 ( 1 + ^ V 1 . {  n  
n
+ X n
j=l
r-l-t/2
r_t/2 “V s  E -  DX  1 y3
4H - Gfj+1 q__l
E D , - . . . . n : ; . n r .  - .D !: ; . . . . D r_M iy s |
qi
K s j - l ,s  j,s j+l,s (5.14)
T h is  e x p r e ss io n  in v o lv e s  p a r tit io n s  o f  p ow er r—1 for w h ich  
equations (5 .1 0 M 5 .1 2 ) are assu m ed  to hold.
I f  P h as a q ■ >2 th en  w ith ou t loss  o f gen era lity  le t qr >2. T he first 
term  in  (5 .14) in vo lves a p artition  of pow er r -1  and w eig h t t - q r and so by
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(5.10M 5.12) will approach 0 as n—>°° since (r -1 )— (t-qr)/2 > r — t/2. The 
second term has partitions of power r-1 and weight t and so approaches 0 
as n -»°° by (5.10). Thus (5.10) holds for power r.
If t is odd, either at least one >2 or else at least one qj = 1 • The 
former case has been treated and equals 0. For the latter case, without loss 
of generality let qr = 1. The first term in (5.14) is 0 because naq g = 0. The 
second term approaches 0 as n— by (5.11). Thus (5.11) holds for power r.
The remaining case is when t is even and each qj <2. Then P = 
l2 r —t 2t—r^  Consider first the case when every qj =2. The second term in 
(5.14) has qj + qr = 4 and so by (5.10) will approach 0 as n -»°° . The first term 
involves the partition P = 2(^“"2)/2 which has power r—1 and weight t-2  and 
so its lim it as n—>°° is
}i2(2[r—1]—[t-2])!|i2i;t“2^ /2 / {([r-1 ]—[t>—2]/2)!2^ r_1 Ht-2]/2 } by (5>12)
= (2r—t)! p*^2/ {(r—1/2)! 2r_t/2}
satisfying (5.12). Consider now the second case when, without loss of 
generality, qx = .... = qt_r = 2 and qt_r +1 = .... = qr = 1 , with r > t/2. The first 
term in (5.14) is zero since mx s = 0. The second term in (5.14) involves a 
sum of (r—1) terms of which the first (t—r) are of the form (5.10) and thus 
approach 0 as n—>°° while the remaining (2r—1-1) are of the form (5.12). 
Since their power is r-1 and their weight t, the limit as n— of their sum 
is therefore
(2r—1-1).(2[r—1 ]—t)!|-i2t/2 /{([r—1]—t/2)!2^r_1 _^t/2 } by (5.12)
= (2r-t)!|i2t/2/{(r—t/2)!2r_t/2}
satisfying (5.12). Thus (5.12) holds for power r.
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Thus, by induction, (5.10M 5.12) hold for all r.B
Theorem 5.2 (Central Limit Theorem): In the IPS, if  
Z = (T-T')/{var(T I ys)}1/2 then as n and (N-n) —> 00 such that f=n/N is 
constant, then ZI ys —> N(0,1) in distribution provided mu s is bounded as 
n-> 00 for all u and JI2 = limn^oom2 s ex s^ s^ - 
Proof:
Z = (T -  N ys ) /  { N2 (1-n/N  ) m ^ /  (n+1) }m  by (5.7)
= { (f+1/N) /  [N d -flm ^ ] )1/2. {Sjei.DjiS)
Let lim* denote the Hmit as n and (N -n )—> 00 such that f  = n/N is constant. 
Then
lim* E Z * I ys
{ f / ( l - f ) } ^  M ^ 2 bm * N - ^ E  ( S je;DJ s )‘ I y £
{ V i l - W 2 lim* N_t/2 {(N-n)!/(N-n-rp)!} C(P) ED3P I y £
where P has power rp
{fZ(l—O)*72 M-2_t/2
—' t/2-rp 1 r P- l  rp-ü2 p
.lim* 2 ,  f  .[1 -  f][l -  f  -  -  f -  C(P) n . EDS I ys
Pen,
{f /(1-ß)1^2 iu-“2 Z  f tf2-r [1—f  ]r C (l2r_t 2t_r) (2r-t)! Ho172 /  ((r-t/2)!2r- t/2}
r=t/2
l 0
t even 
t odd
by lemma 5.3
t! 2_t/2 / (t/2)! t even
0 t odd
by substituting z = r -  t/2. These are the moments of N(0,1) and hence the
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posterior distribution of Z approaches N(0,1) in distribution.■
Thus Bayesian confidence intervals can be established in the IPS 
for large sample and population sizes by using normality approximations. 
From (4.5) and (5.7), a 100(l-a)%  Bayesian confidence interval for T is 
given by the range
y3 ±
[1—flm 2,s 
n +1
1/2
) (5.15)
where is the upper 100(a/2)% point of N(0,1). For small samples, 
bounds on the ranges of confidence intervals can be determined by the use 
of Chebycheff inequalities, taking into account the first n moments. 
However, these are known to be generally too broad to be of practical use.
5.3 Infinite Popuilatioms
The above results can be applied to infinite populations by 
considering each Yj to be independently generated from a density function 
with unknown mean p and unknown central moments p2,p3... • Since the 
param eters p,p2,p3,... are themselves considered to be random variables, a 
comprehensive examination of their properties becomes cumbersome and 
unprofitable as they each have moments and are not independent. Only the 
behaviour of p will be considered here.
From (5.7), var(T|ys) = (l-n/N )m 2 s/(n+l). Letting N—>°°, with n 
held constant, then T —>p so th a t th is formula becomes var(p |ys ) = 
m2 «/(n+l). Then, by (4.7), a 100(l-a)% confidence interval for p is given by
ys ± Z ( = * ) “a/2 n+1
which is the lim iting case of (5.15). General moments of p can be 
determined by considering the limit as N—>°° of E (T -ys)t |ys . A discussion 
of this is in the appendix to this chapter.
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5.4 Transform ations of IPS Bandom V ariables
The IPS does not suffer from the problems that occur in Bayesian 
formulations where an uninformative prior for a variable leads to very 
informative-looking priors for transformations of that variable. This has 
been discussed in section 2.1. The IPS does however have the property that 
defining it with respect to a variable Yj is not equivalent to defining it with 
respect to a transformed variable Wj = w(Yj).
Define wg, and mu g(w) as were yg, yg and mu g but with w^  in 
place of the yp If the IPS was defined with respect to the variable Wj it 
would consist of the following:
EWjl^g = wg je s  (5.16)
E(Wj-wg)u l ^ g = mu>g(w) jes, u = 2,...,n (5.17)
Theorem 5.3: The IPS defined with respect to Yj does not conflict with 
constraints of the IPS defined with respect to any transformation Wj of Yj. 
Proof: The constraints of the IPS have been shown, by theorem 5.1, to be 
equivalent to requiring that Yj|yg have the same first n moments as the 
empirical distribution function (e.d.f.). Thus the e.d.f. will always be a 
possible posterior density function for Yj|yg. Equations (5.16) and (5.17) are 
properties of the e.d.f..■
Consider the case where Wj = Yj^, t an integer.
Theorem 5.4: In the IPS, if Wj = then
EWj I yg = wg provided t < n, and (5.18)
E(W j-w g)u I yg = m u g(w ) provided ut < n. (5.19)
Proof:
u vt
EfWj -w s)u I ys = E Z-)uCv(-ws)u-v Z ^ D ^ y s ^ l y g
after expansion and using Wjv = (Dj s+ys)v^
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u vt
= £  UCV (-ws )u-v £  vtC, m 3 ysvt_z
v =0 v * 2=0 Z Z’S 0
provided ut < n (whence z < n)
u vt
= 2  v£  UCV(-WS )u-v £ v t c 2(yi- y s)z ysvt-l/n 
= m^s(w). (5.20)
vt
since £ ^ 0 ,  (yi-ys)z ysvt_z = yjvt = w^.
Thus (5.19) holds. Setting u = 1 in (5.20) yields (5.18).■
Thus the EPS does not produce informative—looking constraints on 
transformed variables. In the case of general transformations, bounds on 
EWj|ys and var(Wj|ys) may be obtained through Chebycheff inequalities, but 
these would be expected to be too broad to be of practical use. Such bounds 
will, by theorem 5.3, always contain wg and mu>s(w) respectively. By 
theorem 5.4, in the case of W j = Yj^ , constraints on some of the moments of 
Wjiyg will be determined precisely by the IPS and will coincide with the 
constraints of the IPS defined with respect to Wj.
APPENDIX
5.A.1 Higher Order Moments
In section 5.2 the formula for var(T|ys) in the IPS was given by 
equation (5.7). In section 5.3 the formula var(|i|ys) = m2 g/(n+l) was derived 
from this by letting N—>°°. While the expression for the t th posterior 
moment of Y j is simple in form, being m2 s, the tth posterior moments of T 
and p rapidly become very complex as t increases.
The IPS can be compared to a simple random sample without
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replacement (SRSWOR) in the frequentist framework. Then varp(T) as 
given by equation (1.4) is roughly analogous to var(T|ys). Similarly, by 
letting N—>°° the estimator of the variance of the mean of an infinite 
population can be found and will be roughly analogous to var(p|ys). It is 
well known that these also become very complex as t increases.
In this appendix some of these higher order moments are derived. 
For the SRSWOR case a more thorough presentation is given, relating it to 
previous literature on the subject. Section 5.A.3 follows closely the contents 
of the paper Hinde (1986).
The notation of partitions introduced in section 5.2 will be used in 
more detail. The subscript s, as for example in m^ . s, will generally be 
dropped for convenience. The symbol for posterior moments Xpq will be 
extended to include more subscripts, for example
Xml = EDJD^g Dls DvJy s 
where j,k,l,v are distinct units not in s.
5.A.2 Higher Order Moments in the EPS
The posterior moments of T and fi for t = 2 have already been 
given. Those for t = 3 and 4 will be presented here.
E(T— Nys)3|ys 
= E ^ ^ / J y s
= (N-n)A3 + 3(N—n)(N -n-m i2 + (N-n)(N-n-l )(N-n-2)A.m  (5.21)
Now,
Am = E Dj>s Dks {EDv s|ys+j+k} |ys
= E r >i,sDk,s(Y3+j+k- y s) |y s
= E Dj,s Dk,s ®j,s + Dk,3V(n+2) iys
= 2A12/(n+2). (5.22)
In a similar fashion it can be shown that A.12 = A.3/(n+l), and it is already 
known that X 3 = m3. Substituting these into (5.21) then yields
N(N—n)(2N—n) 
(n+l)(n+2)
(5.23)E(T— Nys)3|ys 3
As N —>°o (with n fixed) then T —> fi. Dividing (5.23) by N 3 sind taking this 
lim it yields
E(jj. — ys)3|ys = 2m3/([n+l][n+2]). (5.24)
Similarly, for the case t = 4,
E(T— N ys)4 |ys
= (N-n)X4 + (N -n )(N -n -l)(4X13 + 3^22) + 6(N -n)(N -n-l)(N -n-2)A 112
+ (N—n )(N -n -l)(N -n —2)(N-n-3)Xl m  (5.25)
By the same methods that were used to derive (5.22) we have
^ l i i i  =  ^ ^ i12/(n + 3 )
^112 = ^ 2 2  + i^ 3)/(n+2)
^ 3  = k4/(n+l)
and X-22 = (nm | + m4)/(n+ l).
The derivation of X 2 2  is more difficult than the others. It can be obtained 
from equation (5.2) by using the fact that all the coefficients atn equal one. 
Substituting these into (5.25), with X4 = m4 yields
E(T- N ys)4 |ys
------- N(N n)------- { [6N2 — 6Nn + n2 — n]m4 +
(n+l)(n+2)(n+3)
3n[N—n—1][N+1 ]m | } (5.26)
Dividing this by N4 and letting N-»°° (with n fixed) yields
2
_ 4 6m4 + 3nm2
'?■ = (n + l)(n+2)(n+3j (5.27)
§„A„3 H igher Order M oments from a SR8WOR
Because this section is concerned with frequentist properties, the 
notation needs to be changed accordingly. The expectation operator is now 
Ep but will be denoted E for simplicity. Lower case y^  will be interpreted as 
the ith selected unit, while will be interpreted as the ith population unit.
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While the sample consists of n selections out of the population of N units, 
we will consider selections to extend from 1 through N. It will be 
understood th a t the first n selections, ie {yp...,yn } are in the sample s, 
while the remaining N—n 'selections' will be contained in s. This is done to 
simplify the discussion and it will be seen th a t this does not affect the 
validity of the results. Let £g and 2^ denote summation over all units in s 
and the population respectively, for unequal subscripts, for example
E v-^v- = • • • v-^ v-
Let
n® = n(n—1).. .(n—k+1) 
Let P be a partition denoted as by (5.9):
7ti 7t2 %
P = Pi P2 •••Pk (5.28)
The following accepted conventions will be used. Weight will be denoted by 
co and power by p. If p^>l for all i then P is a non—unit partition, otherwise 
it is a unit partition. Also,
and
<P>N
r  pi pi
2 j yu • y i 2
Pl P2
Yi -Yi
V 1
-vr.Y^
yi
Pk / I
; / n (P) (5.29)
Yr / N (p) (5.30)
rt!+1
denote the sample and population symmetric means respectively.
The general problem of finding and estim ating m oment-like 
functions began early this century and was soon found to be highly 
intractable, as for example Tchouproff (1918-1921). A significant step 
towards resolving the practicalities was made by Carver (1930) who 
explicitly listed the first eight moments of a sample mean, introducing the 
'Carver functions' which enabled a greater simplicity of presentation. 
Dwyer (1937) produced a quite general method of solution which in 
particular was shown to be able to produce expressions for estimates of
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population moments for infinite populations, by use of 'h -sta tistics '. 
However, because of the generality of the method it is impractical for 
determining higher order moments, and h—statistics are not applicable to 
the estimation of population moments of a finite population.
At a Symposium on Symmetric Functions held in 1971, Dwyer 
(1972) outlined the problems of moment-type estimation and the need for a 
unified solution. While this has not been achieved, a series of papers by 
N ath (1968, 1969), Raghunandanan and Srinivasan (1973) and Dwyer and 
Tracy (1980) have produced methods for obtaining solutions, for the 
m ultivariate case, to expressing and estim ating the expected value of 
(y1-Y 1)....(yk-Y k) where the subscripts denote different variates. By setting 
the k variates to be the same variate this reduces to the kth moment of the 
sample mean. However, the generality imposed by the m ultivariate case 
makes the expression for the univariate case unnecessarily cumbersome.
The problem of estim ating population moments has also been 
pursued. Tracy and Gupta (1971) have generalised Dwyer's h -statistic  to 
estimate products of population moments. Gupta (1975) derives moment 
formulae for h-statistics. While these papers consider finite population 
h-statistics, these statistics do not estimate finite population moments. 
More recently Tracy (1984) has considered finite population moments, for 
the multivariate case and for moments of moments, but does not consider 
estim ates of these quantities. Tracy (1981) considers some unbiased 
estimates of finite population moments and moments of moments.
This section considers jointly the problems of population moments 
and moments of the sample mean, their estimates, and covers finite and 
infinite populations. U nivariate data is considered. The results are 
achieved by a genera lisa tion  of h—sta tis tic s  (d istinct from the 
generalisation proposed by Tracy and Gupta (1971)) which, to avoid 
confusion with previously established notation in this field, will be called
56
z -s ta tis tic s  (and Z-functions). These are  derived from sym m etric m eans
Pi
as follows. Each term  in  <P>S, e.g. y. , is expanded to
(yji -  y^) (yit -  yj2) .... (yi]L -  yj ), and the denom inator is changed
to n (P+co), th u s
zp = E -  y p -* * , -yjK )-öi. - y ^ >.....^  -  y p  1 ^  (5-31)
w here y i^ ,...,y i »yj^»--»yjG) are p+co selections and  sum m ation  is over all 
d istinct com binations of these. For exam ple
z22
Y  (6)
2 ,  - y p  (ytl -  y p  %  -  y p  %  -  y p  / n
S im ilarly
N
zP = I  ...(Yip- \ )/N<P+M> (5'32)
The w eight and power of zp and Zp are defined to be the w eight and power of 
th e ir  argum en t, P.
A com m ent is needed to consider a problem  in  in te rp re ta tion  of the 
z -s ta tis tic s  and  the Z—functions. If  the  sam ple is of size n  we can estim ate 
m om ents up to the  n th. In  defining zp we therefore presum e th a t  n  > co, bu t 
i t  m ay not be tru e  th a t  n  > p+co. This resu lts  in  the  use of m ore subscripts 
th an  exist is s. S im ilarly  N  > p+co m ay no t hold for Zp. We will in te rp re t zp 
as follows (w ith  an  obvious ex tension  to Zp ). E q u a tio n  (5.31) can be 
expanded out to
w here B is th e  set denoting the  200 ways in  which a y -te rm  can be chosen 
from each of the  co factors in  zp. The symbol Zs* denotes sum m ation over all 
p+co subscrip ts. The factor y jy j....yw has precisely co y -te rm s  among 
which duplicates m ay exist. However, th e  num ber of d istinct term s, k say, 
will alw ays satisfy  n > k > p. From  each I s* y^yj....yw the p+co—k term s 
which do not occur can be sum m ed out, yielding
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zP = y i y j - - y w /n(k>}
B
= X l ±<F>s} (5.33)
where <P’>S = £s yiyj..*.yw / n(k). For example z22 is interpreted as 
<22>s — 2 <112>g + <1111>S.
Theorem 5.5: Ezp = Zp
Proof: Using equation (5.33)
Ezp
B
Z ( ± E<P’>S)
B
Z {±<f>n}
Zp .■
see Kendall & Stuart (1963) p.300
Theorem 5.6: E(ys — Y)1 can be expressed as a linear sum of non-unit 
Z-functions of weight t.
Proof:
EC ^-Y )1 = (Nn) ‘ E c X X ^ i - y p  }t
i j
(Nn)
-t
h  Jl it Jt
y ^ - y ^  -  ^ - y ^
where the summation allows repetitions and so {y^ ,...^}  and {yj ,...,yj } 
may each contain repetitions. A typical term within the summation can be 
expressed as
E ([7 ii  ~  yai] _  fyjj -  ya^ > • • • • ( -  y ^  -  -  yati ) (5 -34)
where {ya^,...,yat) are t  distinct selections which are distinct from the 
yj »...»yj ,yj ,...,yj and care is taken in the interpretation of (5.34) as per the 
comments immediately prior to theoerm 5.5. When (5.34) is expanded, 
without splitting []-brackets, there results a sum of products of the form
(yWl yVl) (yWt (5.35)
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where {yv^ ,...,yv^} are distinct from each other, and from the {yWi»...,yWt} 
and hence (5.35) is the expectation of a z-statistic. Now, {yw ,...,yw } contains 
repetitions which can be characterised by a partition P of power p, hence by
theorem 5.5, (5.35) equals n(^  Zp. The fact that Zp = 0 for unit Z-functions, 
which is clear by symmetry, completes the proof.■
Theorem 5.7: If E ( ys -  Y ) = ap.Zp
P
=  ^ b p .<P > N  
P
are the expansions of the tth moment of ys in terms of non-unit Z-functions 
and symmetric means respectively, then ap = bp for all non-unit partitions 
P.
Proof: Expression (5.32) for Zp can be expanded out into the sum of 2t 
symmetric means as follows
Zp = <P>N + linear sum of symmetric means of unit partitions.
The result immediately follows when one considers the complete expansion 
of 2 p ap.Zp into symmetric means.■
The results above allow a tractable solution to the problem of 
unbiased estimation of moments, as well as expressing moments in an 
apparently new form. Since zp is an unbiased estimator of Zp (theorem 5.5) 
and since E(ys -  Y)t can be expressed as a sum of Z-functions (theorem 5.6) 
the problem becomes
(i) determining explicitly this sum of Z-functions, and
(ii) expressing zp in the more practical form of sample moments. 
The solution to the first part is achieved by expressing the tth
moment as
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H y ,- Y ) ‘ = [ l+ c f .  E (  J  - - r ^ -  f 3 n IN— n (5.36)
where c = n/(N—n) and y-g = Y — ys . Since
<P>N = e <p >3
3
Y 1 Pi Pi Pi P2 Pk / I
E Zw yi, • y *  -  yi • ^  . ........y i 1 n
(p)
Pi Pi Pi P2
E yil . yi2 ... y, • y. yi (5.37)
then in expanding (5.36), by virtue of theorem 5.7, we need only be 
concerned w ith determ ining the coefficients of the resu lting non-unit 
population symmetric means and so we need only collect non-unit products 
of the form (5.37), ignoring all other terms. Their coefficients will be the ap. 
This greatly simplifies the algebra involved. Such an expansion gave the 
following formulae for moments 2 through 8:
E ( y ,- Y ) 2 = n_1(c+l)'2 [ (c+1) Z2 ] (5.38)
E(y= — Y)3 = n'2(c+l)'3 [ (c2- ! )  Zs ] (5.39)
E(ys — Y)4 = n-3(c + l)^ [(c 3+ l)(Z 4-3Z22) + 3n(c+l)2 Z22] (5.40)
E(y= -  Y)5 = n-4(c+l)-5 [(c4- l ) ( Z 5-1 0 Z 23) + 10 n (c+ l)(c2- l ) Z 23] (5.41)
E(yg -  Y)6 = n-^c+l)-6 [ (c5+1)(Z6-1 5 Z 24-1 0 Z 33 + 30Z222)
+ 15n (c+1) (c3+ l) (Z24-  3Z222)
+ lOn (c2- ! ) 2 Z33 + 15n2 (c +1)3 Z2 2 2  ] (5.42)
E(ys — Y)7 = n-6(c+l)-7 [ (c6-1 )(Z 7-2 1 Z 25-3 5 Z 3 4 +210Z223)
+ 21 n (c+1) (c4 -1 ) (Z25 -  10Z223)
+ 35n (c3+ l) (c2—1) (Z34-  3Z223)
+ 1 05n2 (c+1 )2 (c2- l ) Z223 ] (5.43)
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E(ys — Y)8 = n-7(c+l)-8.
[ (c7+ l) (Zg- 2 8 2 ^ -  56Zg5 -  35ZU + 5 6 0 ^ 3  + 4202^ , -  63021 ,^ )
+ 28n (c+1) (c3+ l) (2^6— 10Z233— I 5Z224 + 3 OZ9Q92)
+ 56n (c4 -1 ) (c2 -1 )  (Z35 - 1 0Z233) + 35n (c3+ l f  (Zw -  + 9Z2222)
280n2 (c2—1 ¥  (c+1) Z233 + 21 On2 (c+1 )2 (c3 +1) ( Z ^  -  3ZW, 0)
+ 105n3 (c+1)4 Z ^  ] (5.44)
It appears that equations (5.38) — (5.44) follow the simple formula
P
EXys - Y ) ‘ = { n ( c + l ) f \ ] £ c ( p ){Z*i },I1 . . . . { Z Ij ’tk (5.45)
0
where summation is over (non-unit) partitions P of weight t, and
P’
Z* = n [ c P“1 + ( - l ) P] . X ( - l ) P"1 (p '-l)!C (F )Z p . (5.46)
where summation is over (non-unit) partitions P' of weight p, C(P) is as 
defined in section 5.2 and multiplication between Z-functions is symbolic 
e.g. Zp Zq is interpreted as Zpq.
a
The solution to (ii) is more tedious. A program was used to 
algebraically expand the z-statistics. This was done by observing that 
(yt — yj) = (dj — dj) where d^  = yj — y s . Expansion then yields sums of 
products of m^’s. The results are 
z2 n(2) = n2 m2 
z3 n(3) = n3 m3
z4 n(4) = (n4 -  2n3 + 3n2 ) m4 + ( -6 n3 + 9n2 ) m | 
z22 n(4) = (-n 3 + n2 ) m4 + (n4 -3 n 3 + 3n2 ) m | 
z5 n(5) = (n5 -  5n4 + 10n3 ) m5 + (-10n4 + 20n3 ) m2m3 
z23 n(5) = (~ n 4  + r3 ) m 5 + (n5  ” 2 n4 + 2n 3 ) m2m 3
z6 n(6) = (n6-9 n 5+31n4-3 9 n 3+40n2)m6 + (-15n5+120n4-4 3 5 n 3+600n2)m2m4 
+ (-40n4+240n3-^100n2)m | + (45n4-150n3)m2 
z2 4 n(6)= (-n 5+4n4- l l n 3+8n2)m6 + (n6-9 n 5+53n4-1 3 5 n 3+120n2)m2m4 
+ (4n5-2 8 n 4+80n3-8 0 n 2)m  ^ + (—6n5+27n4-3 0 n 3)m |
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z33n(6) = (—n5+2n4-5 n 3+4n2)m6 + (6n5-1 5 n 4-1 5 n 3+60n2)m2m4 
+ (n6-8 n 5+25n4-1 0 n 3-4 0 n 2)m  ^ + (-9n 5+45n4-6 0 n 3)m |
z922n(6)= (2n4-6 n 3+4n2)m6 + (-3n5+21n4-6 0 n 3+60n2)m2m4 
+ (—6n4+30n3-4 0 n 2)m  ^ + (n6-9 n 5+29n4-3 0 n 3)m |
z7n(7) = (n7-1 4 n 6+77n5—196n4+252n3)m7
+(—21 n6+273n5- l  344n4+2268n3)m2m5 
+ (—70n5+560n4-1260n3)m3m4 + (105n5^ 2 0 n 4)m |m 3 
z25n(7) = (-n 6+8n5-2 9 n 4+22n3)m7 + (n7-1 4 n 6+92n5-241n 4+198n3)m2m5 
+ (5n6-4 0 n 5+125n4-1 1 0 n 3)m3m4 + (—10n6+40n5—20n4)m | m3 
z34n(7) = (-n 6+6n5-2 3 n 4+18n3)m7 + (3n6+6n5-8 7 n 4+162n3)m2m5
+ (n7-9 n 6+33n5-5 n 4-9 0 n 3)m3m4 + (-18n6+93n5-1 2 0 n 4)m | m3 
z 223n(?) = (2n5-6 n 4+4n3)m7 + (-2n6+12n5-3 4 n 4+36n3)m2m 5
+ (-n 6+n5+10n4-2 0 n 3)m3m 4 + (n7-7 n 6+21n5-2 0 n 4)m | m 3 
z8n(8) = (n8-2 0 n 7+ l 62n6-664n5+1457n4- l  476n3+l 260n2)m8
+ (-28n7+532nM 004n5+14588n4-29568n3+35280n2)m2m6 
+ (—112n6+l 904n5- l  3552n4+47376n3—70560n2)m3m5 
+ M 2 0 n 5+5880n4-28140n3+44100n2) m2 
+ (1120n5-10080n4+23520n3)m 2m2
+ (210n6—2940n5+16590n4-35280n3)m 2 m4 + (-420n5+2205n4) m4 
z26n(8) = (—n7+ l 3n6-71 n5+l 67n4-288n3+ l 80n2)m8
+ (n8—20n7+ l 83n6-916n5+3056n4-6384n3+5040n2)m2m6 
+ (6n7- l  0 8n6+946n5-4492n4+l 1088n3- l  0080n2)m3m5 
+ (30n6-450n5+2640n4-6720n3+6300n2) m2 
+ (-100n6+980n5-3240n4+3360n3)m 2m2 
+ (—15n7+225n6—1590n5+5070n4-5040n3) m2 m4 
+ (45n6-285n 5+315n4) m4
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z35n<8> = (—n7+ lln 6-57n5+109n4-182n3+120n2)m8
+ (3n7-14n6-7 n 5+554n4-2576n3+3360n2)m2m6 
+ (n8-19n7+169n6-693n5+886n4+2632n3-6720n2)m3m5 
+ (5n7—75n6+425n5-705n4—1330n3+4200n2) m2 
+ (—10n7+20n6+490n5-2980n4+5040n3) m2m2 
+ (—15n7+l 80n6- l  335n5+531 On4—7560n3) m2m4 
+ (90n8-690n5+1260n4) m4 
z44n(8) = (—n 7+l 1 n6—63n5+145n4-248n3+l 56n2)m8
+ (52n6^ 496n3+2108n4—4592n3+4368n2)m2m6 
+ (8n7-112n6+744n5-2768n4+6832n3-8736n2)m3m5 
+ (n8- l  9n7+l 51 n6-813n5+l 696n4-3976n3+5460n2) m2 
+ (—16n7+l 12n6—32n5—1888n4+4704n3) n^m 2 
+ (—12n7+102ns-780n5+3966n4-7056n3) m | m4 
+ (108n6-864n5+1701n4)m 4 
z233n<8> = (2n6-8 n 5+22n4-40n3+24n2)m8
+ (—n7+5n5+96n4—532n3+672n2)m2m8 
+ (-2n7+22n6- l  22n5+202n4+476n3-l3 4 4 n 2)m3m5 
+ (-8n6+62n5—130n4—224n3+840n2) m2 
+ (n8-12n7+63n6-52ns-536n4+1176n3) m2m3 
+ (6n7—21n6—171n5+1140n4-1764n3) m | m4 
+ (—9n7+99n6-384n5+504n4) m4 
z224n<8) = (2n6—14ns+58n4-106n3+60n2)m8
+ (-2n7+28n6-234n5+l 016n4-2128n3+l 680n2)m2m6 
+ (-20n6+248n5- l  340n4+3416n3-3360n2)m3m5 
+ (—n7+l 7n6- l  59n5+793n4-2030n3+2100n2) m2 
+ (8n7-100n6+564ns-1552n4+1680n3) m2m§
+ (n8- l  9n7+l 94ns- l  004ns+2538n4—2520n3) m |m 4 
+ (—6n7+63n6-237n5+315n4) m |
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z2222n(8) = (—6n5+36n4-66n3+36n2)m8
+ (8n6—96n5+496n4—1176n3+l 0 0 8 x12)11121113 
+ (48n5-480n4+1680n3-2016n2)m3m5 
+ (3nM2n5+285n4-966n3+1260n2) m2 
+ (-24n6+264n5-1024n4+1344n3) m2in^
+ (—6n7+96ne-624n5+l 830n4—2016n3) m2 m4 
+ (n8—18n7+l 25n6—384n5+441 n4) m|
Estimation of moments of ys is achieved by replacing the 
Z-functions in equations (5.38)-(5.44) with the corresponding z-statistics 
above.
While the above formulae are concerned with the behaviour of the
sample mean, they are immediately applicable to population moments
N
M^n = X c Y j - Y ^ / N -  (5-47)
j=l
which will be denoted simply Mt. Mt is equivalent to the tth moment of a 
sample of size n = 1 . Thus in equations (5.38M5.44) the only differences are 
that c = 1 / (N-l) and n = 1 (but n is left unchanged in the zp).
Asymptotic results for infinite populations can be obtained. 
Suppose that I Yi I < K for all i and define
Mp = {M  ^} 1---- [Mp^} k , mp = {mpi} 1 ------{mpk} k, ji = lim Y,
N—K»
Hp = lim Mp , and |jp = {|ipi) 1 ---- ) * .
N—>«
Theorem 5.8: As n , N —» then Zp -> |ip and zp —» mp.
Proof: The proof is given only for zp as the analogous proof for Zp is then
obvious. Since each y^  can be replaced by yj — ys in zp without altering its 
value, we can without loss of generality let ys = 0. Expressing zp in the form 
(5.33) (note that Zp can also be expressed in this form) we observe that there
is only one n o n -u n it < P '> S, nam ely  < P > S. C onsider a g en era l u n it 
sym m etric  m ean:
<P>S =
3
V  P2 P2 P3 Pk (p)
2 , y i . - y ^ - y i  .-y; ......... yi / n
pV 1 V 2
X 1 , . P2 P2 P3 Pk (p)
= Z r  < -  y«, -  yj, -  -  y i } • yi. -  yi -yi . ......... yi / nP  ^ «2+l «5+2 p
= {a sum of sample symmetric means} / (n-p+1)
-> 0
since all symmetric means are bounded. Consider now the non-unit 
partition
a
V 1 Pi Pi Pi P2 Pk (p)
<p>s = 2 - i yi, -yi2 - y i  ......... ys / n
p«1 iq+i
a a
V  V  Pi Pi Pi P2 Pk ; (
2rf- "2*yi, -yi2 - yi .......* /n' li J loi *1 "1+1
p
since the increase in the numerator will consist of at 
most 0(nP-1) extra terms.
since ys = 0.1
Thus if N oo and n/N —> f^ > 0 then (5.38) -  (5.44) become 
E(ys -Y )2t -> (p2/[2n(c+l)])t .(2 t)!/t!
E(ys -  Y)2t+1 -» p^1 |l3 (c2—1) (2t+l)! /  (2t.3.nt+1(c+l )t+2( t - l )!} 
where c = f^ / (1— f^) and their estimates approach the same form with mk's 
replacing the jik’s.
If N —> oo with n remaining fixed, the moment formulae take a 
simple form:
a
-  —  t  - t  ' V  t
E(ys — Y) = n  E ( 2 .A ) where Di = yi -  Y
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-tn
P sX C(P). E X
where summation is over all partitions of weight t. As N -> °o the yj in 
sample essentially become independent so that
E(ys - Y )  -* n_t X c (p ) • X ....
1 P
P
-> n_t X c ( P ) . n(% p  (5.48)
where summation is now over non-unit partitions of weight t, since pp = 0 
for P a unit partition. These quantities are estimated by using the zp in 
place of the fip in (5.48). To estimate population moments, set n = 1 in (5.48) 
and replace the qp with the zp to obtain zt as the estimate of |it. Thus the 
z-statistics are generalisations of h-statistics.
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CHAPTER 6
THE BERNOULLI IPS
Suppose each Yj in the population is an independently generated 
Bernoulli random variable with unknown mean p ,i.e.
Yj I p ~ independent Ber(p) for all jg s . (6.1)
Suppose further that there is considered to be no prior knowledge about p. 
Then, as was done for the IPS, constraint (2.3) is adopted. No further 
constraints are required as there is only one unknown parameter p. The 
Bernoulli IPS is thus defined by (2.3) and (6.1), for samples satisfying ys * 
0 or n. The sample values ys can be expressed as k successes in n trials so 
that ys = k/n is the sample proportion.
Theorem 6.1: The Bernoulli IPS has a unique solution given by
p I ys ~ Beta(k,n-k), (6.2)
and
Pr(Yfl)=...=Y(t)=l;Y(t+1)=...=Y(r)=0 I ys) = ‘* > c t ,r-t+n-k-ic ^  /
(6.3)
where {Y(1),...,Y(t)} is any given subset of t elements of 
Proof: Equation (6.3) is first proved, by induction over r. Denote the 
probability expressed in (6.3) by P(t,r I k,n). If r = 1 then P(l,l I k,n) = EYj I ys 
= k/n by (2.3) and hence P(0,11 k,n) = (n-k)/n, satisfying (6.3). Suppose now 
that (6.3) is true for up to r—1 where r > 2. Then
P(t,r I k,n) = EYr ..Yt (1-Yt+1) ... (1-Yr) I ys
= EYj( EY2...Yt(l-Yt+1) ... (1-Yr) I Y v yJ  I ys
provided t >0
= EYX{ P(t-l,r—1 lk+Y1,n+l) } I ys 
= (k/n) P(t>-1 ,r—1 I k+1 ,n+l)
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(6.4)
If t =0, then
P(0,rlk,n) = E(1~Y1) ... (1-Yr) I ys
= P (0 ,r - l lk ,n )  -  P (l,rlk ,n ) by expanding (1-YX)
= r+n-k-20^  /  n"-2C r_1 _  k.r+n- k- 2Cr_1 /  {r.n+r- 1Cr )
= r+n-k-1Cr / n+r-1Cr also satisfying (6.3).
Thus (6.3) holds for r and so by induction it holds in general.
Consider now the posterior distribution of p. Firstly, E ji I ys = ys 
by (4.7). Also, EY1...Yt I ys = E {EY1...Yt I p} I ys = E p  ^I ys and therefore
by (6.3). These moments characterise the B eta(k,n-k) distribution, 
therefore (6.2) holds. Finally, it is easy to show th a t this solution is 
Bayes-consistent.■
Each Yj I ys is a Bernoulli random variable with mean ys and var(Yj I ys) = 
ys ( l - y s) = m2 g^ , the same as for the IPS. Hence from (4.6)
and so if we define Z = (T-T’)/{var(T I ys)}1/2, this will be a special case of Z 
as defined in theorem 5.2. Therefore, observing tha t all the limits as n—>°°
(N-n)—>°° such tha t n/N is constant, ZI ys—>N(0,1) in distribution.
These results can be approximated in the Bayesian framework by 
choosing the prior for p of Beta(e,e) where 8>0 is small. The improper prior 
obtained by letting e —» 0 duplicates them exactly.
E pt I yg = t+k-1Ct / n+t_1Ct (6.5)
From (6.3) the density function of T is
_  t+k-l£^  r-t+n-k-1 Q  j  n+r-1 Q
var(T I ys) =N2(l-n /N  )ys( l -y s)/(n+l) (6 .6)
of the moments E(Yj -  ys I ys exist, then in the Bernoulli IPS, as n and
Consider now the paradox described in section 1.3 where from a 
Bernoulli population of size N = 3 was drawn a sample consisting of {0,1}.
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The estim ato rs  of v a rp(T') and  var^(T-T ') in  th e  design based  and the  
su p erp o p u la tio n  approaches respective ly  w ere bo th  3/4, w hereas the  
squared  e rro r of T' is known to be precisely 1/4. I t  can be seen th a t (6.6) 
resolves to 1/4 and so the  Bernoulli UPS overcomes th is paradox.
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CHAPTER 7
THE MULTIPLE BERNOULLI IPS
Suppose each Yj in the population is an independently generated 
multiple Bernoulli random variable. That is, Yj can take only the values 
zi and
Pr(Yj = I cc) = for k = l,...,m  (7.1)
where a  = (^ , . . . ,0^ )  is unknown and satisfies Zg=1 ak = 1. A way of 
characterising no prior knowledge concerning a  is to specify that
Pr(Yj = I ys) = n^/n for k = l,...,m . (7.2)
where the sample ys consists of n^ occurrences of z^ for k = 1 ,...,m and 
n = The multiple Bernoulli IPS is defined by (7.1) and (7.2) for
samples satisfying n^ * 0 for k = l,...,m .
Theorem 7.1: The multiple Bernoulli IPS has a unique solution given by
ftaly j T T arcn) I I -  
k=i r<
nk- l
•k
T(nv)
(7.3)
on the range I^=1 ak = 1, ak > 0 for k = l,...,m . Let Y(q = Y(1),..., Y(r) be any 
given permutation of Let <r1,...,rin> denote the event that the first rx 
variables in Y(q equal zv  the next r2 variables equal z2, ..., the final rm 
variables equal zm. Then
I y3)
r(n) T T  r (nk+rk) 
r(n+r) t r  r(nk)
(7.4)
where J^L1rk = r and Pr(Y(Q I ys) is zero elsewhere. 
Proof: First it is shown by induction over t that
E c£  . . . a ^ l y g
r(n) jn r  H nk+tk) 
r(n+t) t=i r(nk)
(7.5)
where t = LJLj t^ and the t^ . are non-negative integers. In equation (4.2) put
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tl ^  tk-1  tfei
g(9) = ... ak_r ak ,ak+1 and y- then
_  •'l Tn. it
E Oi ... a m 1 y3 = —  E ctj ... a k_r a
tk-1  tfcd
.a,,., a m I Y i = z k - y s (7.6)
by (7.1) and (7.2). Setting t  ^ = ... = t^_^ = t^ ^  = ... tj^ = 0 and t^ = 1 in (7.6) 
yields E I ys = n^/n. Repeating this for different k establishes (7.5) for 
t = 1. Suppose now that (7.5) holds for up to t-1 where t > 2. Then (7.6) 
becomes
EOi — a m Iys
fk  r(n + l) ________ H n ^ )  ... H i y - t j ________
n ' Hn+t) ' r(n1) . . .r ( n k_1).r(nk+ l).r(nk+1)... H n J
which simpHfies to (7.5). Thus by induction (7.5) holds for all t.
Equation (7.5) gives the joint moments of the Dirichlet process 
given by (7.3). Since T£=l I I is bounded, (7.5) uniquely characterises (7.3). 
Thus (7.3) holds. Equation (7.4) then follows since
Pr(<r1,...,rm>|ys)
= E Pr(<r1,...,rm>|a) I ys
_  ri
=  E  «1 -  a m 1 y 3
T(n) r (nk+rk)
by (7.5)
H n+r) k=i H nk)
Suppose C is partitioned into and which have r '^ and r^" 
occurrences of z^ . in £' and respectively for k=l,...,m . Then by (7.4)
T(n-frM) y r  r n^k+rk,+rk  ^
r (n + r ”+r') k=i r(nk+rk”)
Pr(<r1’,...^m> ly ^ ,y s)
which is readily seen to equal Pr(<r1,...,rm>|ys) /  Pr(<r1",...,rm">|ys). 
Similarly, relations such as f(a|ys).Pr(y^|g) = fla |ys+^).Pr(y^|ys) can be 
directly shown to hold. Thus (7.3) and (7.4) are Bayes-consistent.B
This theorem establishes the existence of a solution to the IPS of 
chapter 5, on a restricted domain. Suppose the IPS is considered
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appropriate and a sample y s is obtained which consists of n^ > 0 
occurences of for k = The distribution on these z-values given by
(7.2) satisfies EYj|ys = y s and X^ . s = mj. s for t = 2,...,n. Therefore this 
distribution is a solution to the EPS provided the Yj can only take the values
Z1
These results can be approximately duplicated in the Bayesian 
framework by choosing the prior for a  of f(a) «= {a^ ... The
improper prior obtained by letting e 0 duplicates them exactly.
The multiple Bernoulli distribution is a generalisation of the 
Bernoulli distribution. However, the formulation of the Bernoulli IPS by 
equations (2.3) and (6.1) is not, strictly speaking, a special case of (7.1) and
(7.2) . The formulation chosen for the multiple Bernoulli IPS has the 
advantage tha t, with a change in the notation, Yj can be a categorical 
variable, having m possible categories.
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CHAPTER 8
THE POISSON IPS
Suppose each Yj in the population is an independently generated 
Poisson random variable with unknown mean 9 > 0, i.e.
Yj I 9 ~ independent Poisson(9) foralljgs. (8.1)
The Poisson IPS is defined by (2.3) and (8.1), for samples 
satisfying ys>0.
Theorem 8.1: The Poisson IPS has a unique solution given by 9|ys ~
Gamma(ys,l/n), i.e.
y8- i  —n9 y8
^9|ys) = ----(y L i);11 » for 9 > 0, (8.2)
and
y8
n .(ys+y - l)!
Pr(y = y c lyg) = -------— ------ &------------  . (8.3)
(n+r) B ?.(yg-l)!y 1!...yr!
where y^  = (yx,...,yr).
Proof: If yj is a non-negative integer then setting g(9) = 1 in (4.2) 3d elds
yj! Pr(Yj = yj I ys) = E e_09 I ys (8.4)
while setting g(9) = 9 yields
7j! Pr(Yj = yj I ys) E91 ys+j = E e ^ ^ ' l  ys
= (yj+1)! Pr(Yj = yj+11 ys) by (8.4). (8.5)
However E91 ys+j = ys+j by (4.7), so that (8.5) yields the recurrence relation
Pr(Yj = yj+1 I ys) = ys+j Pr(Yj = yj I ys) /  (yj+1) (8.6)
By induction over yj, and the requirement that the probabilities sum to
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unity, it is straightforw ard to show th a t (8.6) implies
y8
n  .(ys+y«-D!
PrCY. = y, I y j  = ----------- — ---------  . (8.7)
J J s  y8+yj
(n+1) .(y3—1 )!yj!
The characteristic function of 9 I ys, cp0(t), can be found as follows.
<p0(t) = E evte I ys where t isV (- l)
= E e-0 e ^  +1) I ys
-  (tt + i y
w=0 w !
E e ^ 0 WI ys
= 2  ( t t  +1,)W ( w!Pr(Yj = w I ys) ) from (8.4)
= ( l - i t /n ) - ^3 by (8.7). (8.8)
This is the  characteristic  function of the  gam m a d istribu tion  given by (8.2) 
which is therefore the  un ique solution to the  Poisson IPS. E quation  (8.3) 
follows directly  from Pr(Y ^=y^l ys) = JQP r(JV = yr I 9).dF(0 I ys) by (8.1) and 
(8.2). I t  is stra igh tforw ard  to show th a t  th is  solution is B ayes-consistent.B
C onsider now a fin ite  population  to ta l T = y^ + ys of N = n + r 
un its. F rom  (8.3) we have
Pr(Tlys) = X  P r a , = yr lys>
yr :yr=T -ys ^ ^  ^
(T-1)! nY8 ^  1
(n+r)T.(ys- l ) !  y?:y;=T-y8 yi !” *yr
/  n  \ y‘ 1 /  r  nT (T-1)!
r  (ys—1)! '  ^ n+ r '  (T -ys)!
(8.9)
which is easily  estab lished  by induction  over r. A cen tra l lim it theorem  
applies to T.
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Theorem 8.2: In the Poisson IPS, if Z = (T—T')/{var(T 1 ys)}1/2 then as n 
and (N—n) —> 00 such that f = n/N is constant, then Z|ys —» N(0,1) in 
distribution.
Proof: From theorem 8.1, var(Y j|ys) = (n+l)ys/n. By (4.6) this results in 
var(T |ys) = N ^ l — n/N )ys/n  and so
fT r i V2Z = ------_ [ — ] (8.10)
[(1-O yJ x" f
From (8.9) the characteristic function of TI is found to be
(
lt y8
)
N - r e
from which it follows, from (8.10), that the characteristic function of ZI ys is
(Pfc(t) = f M  exp{tt([l-f]/ys)1/2) - [ 1 - f ]  exp{tt([l-f|ys)-1/2}} y3
= ? a {1  + i t ( [ l - f  ]/ys)1/2 -  t2[l—f]/(2ys)
— (1—f)[l + tt([l—f]y s)_1/2 —t2(2[l—flyg)-1] + OCyg-3'2) } "ys
by the expansion of ex
= ( 1 + t 2/(2ys) + 0 (y s_3/2) ) Ys
—> exp{-t2/2}
as n —» 00 such that f is constant. Thus the characteristic function of Z 
converges pointwise to that of a N(0,1) variable and so Zl ys converges in 
distribution to a N(0,1) variable.®
These results can be approximately duplicated in the Bayesian 
framework by choosing the prior for 9 of the form Gammafel/e) where e>0 
is small. The improper prior obtained by letting e —» 0 duplicates them 
exactly.
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CHAFTEE 9
MULTIPLE LINEAR REGRESSION
9.1 Normal Errors
Consider the following model:
Yj = *'j -S + Ej (9-1)
with 8j I ßjO2 ~ independent N(0,wja2) (9.2)
,...,ßp)' and a 2 are unknown parameters and 
and wj are known for all population units. The Normal IPS  which will be 
defined here provides a characterisation of no prior knowledge concerning 
the param eters ß and a 2. Let X and denote the nxp and rxp matrices 
whose rows consist of the vectors xj' for je s  and je £ respectively, W and 
the nxn and rxr diagonal matrices whose diagonal elements are the wj for 
je s and je £ respectively and let A = X'W_1X. It will be assumed that A-1  
exists.
Now, (2.3) is not appropriate as the differences in the xj should be 
reflected in differences in the posterior expectations EYj I ys . There is a 
weaker constraint that can be used, tha t EYj I ys is a symmetric linear sum 
of the elements in ys. This requires that the coefficients of each of the yj be 
symmetric in all labels in s except for i itself. That is
®Yj  ^?s = ^ ie saj,i,s7i s (9-3)
where the ajj_ s are constants depending only on s and j, and are
symmetric in s-i (the set s with the label i excluded). Coefficients 
'dependent on a set of labels s*' is taken to mean dependent on {xj,wj:jes*} 
but not involving the dependent variables Yj. 'Symmetry in a set s*' is 
taken to mean symmetry in the known vectors (xj ,^...,Xjp,Wj) for all je s*.
A sim ilar constra in t is applied to the posterior variance 
var(Yj I ys). Define ß = (ßlv ..,ßp)' = Eß I ys. Then
where ß = (ß^
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by (9.1) & (9.2)
E Y jlys = ECEYj I (3,a2} I ys 
= E xj'.ß lys
= x'j.ß. (9.4)
A natural estimator of var(Yj I ys) is thus a weighted sum of the (yj — x'j. j))2 
for all ie s. The following constraint will therefore be used:
variYj I ys) = gj)S^ is  s (yi -  x'i-ß)2 bijS j e s  (9.5)
where gj>s is symmetric in s and b^s is symmetric in s—i.
Theorem 9.1: Constraints (9.1 M 9.3) yield ß = A_1XfW_1ys.
Proof: Consider first the case where p= l, and xj  ^ = 1 for all units in the 
population so that (9.1) becomes Yj = ß + ej. Then EYj I ys = Eß I ys by (9.4) 
which is independent of j and so (9.3) can be rewritten EYj I ys = sai,syi 
= ys say, where 24 s is symmetric in s—i. Now,
EYk ly s = E{EYk ly s,Yj}!ys j* k ;j,k es
= E ^€(su j)ai,s+j ^ 1 yS 
= ^iesai,S+jyi + aj,S+j^iesai,syi 
= W ai,s+j + aj,s+jai,s^yi*
Equating the coefficient of yj in (9.6) with that in ys yields
1_ aj,s+j = ai,s+j 1 ^»s 
Since 1 -  aj?s+j is symmetric in the set s then by (9.7) so is a^s+j/ a^s . Thus
any factors in a^s+j and a^s which are not symmetric in s m ust cancel out 
and so a^  s must be of the form a^.cs where a^  is a function of i only and cg 
is symmetric in  s. From this, (9.7) becomes (cs+j )-1 = cs_1 + aj. By the 
symmetry in s+j of cs+j this implies cs-1 = I ie saj so that
^ S  = sak  ^ 1- (9*®)
Now,
cov(Yj,Yk l ys) = E (Y j -y s){E(Yk - y s) l y s,Y j}lys j*k;j,kg;s
= E (Yj -  ys)(Ys+j -  ys) I ys by (9.3)
= aj(2ie(suj)ai )-1 var(Yj I ys). by (9.8) & (9.3) (9.9)
(9.6)
(9.7)
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This is independent of k, and similarly m ust be independent of j. This 
covariance can therefore be universally denoted by covs. Now,
var(Y^ I ys) = E{var(Xje^Yj I ß,G2)} I ys + var({EXje^Yj I ß,G 2} I ys)
= (Xj€^wj) Eg2 I ys + i^vatfßlyg), (9.10)
and setting r = 1 in this equation yields
var(Yj I ys) = wj Eg2 I ys + var(ß I ys). (9.11)
Also,
varCY^ I ys) = var(Yj I ys) + 2Xj#kj ik£i;C0v(Yj,Yk I ys)
= (Ije;wj) Ect2 I ys + r.var(ßlys) + r(r-l)covs (9.12) 
by (9.11). Equating (9.10) with (9.12) yields var(ß I ys) = covs and substituting 
this into (9.11) yields Eg2 I ys = {var(Yj I ys)-covs}/wj = Xiesa^.covs/(wjaj) 
from (9.9). Thus, since Eg2 I ys is independent of j, then aj °c 1/wj. Therefore 
from (9.8),
EYj i ys = (2 i63yi/wi} /{ S issl/w i). (9.13)
This, by (9.4), satisfies the theorem which therefore holds for this special 
case.
Consider now the model when p=l for general xj. If Zj = Yj/xj^, 
with Xji*0, then Zj = ß + T|j where t|j I ß,G2 ~ independent N (0,G 2Wj/xj12). 
Thus Zj conforms to the previous special case and so from (9.13) EZj I zs =
{ ZjggZjXj^/wi} / { Xi€3xi l2/w i }, where zs = {zpe s}, for all jg s. This is 
equivalent to EYj I ys = x^ { Xi6syixil/wi } / { Xi€Sxil2/wi }, je s, which by (9.4) 
satisfies the theorem. Thus the theorem holds for p = l.
Suppose now tha t the theorem holds for dimensions up to p-1 
where p > 2. If the model (9.1) is conditioned on ßp then it is reduced to the 
following model of dimension p-1:
^ j ” xjpßp^ßp = *j,p-l& p—1 + ej (9.14)
where = (xj1 ,...,Xj>p_1)', ßp-1 = (ßi,...,ßp_i)', the 8j satisfy (9.1) and
there are n sample observations {(y^-x^ßphie s}. Then in the model of p 
dimensions we have
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E(Yj -  xjpßp)1 ys = E tE tY j-x jpßp^ßp-ysi'ys
= E { ^ 1A £ 1X’p _1W -l(y s -  ßp Cp)} I ys (9.15)
since the theorem is assumed to hold for dimension p-1, and where
Simplification yields X '^ W  x(ys —Xß) = (0,...,0)'. This equates two vectors 
of length p-1 and is equivalent to
In the derivation of (9.18) the model was arbitrarily conditioned on ßp. 
Conditioning on any other element in ß yields (9.18) for k = p. Thus 
X'W-1(ys — Xß) = (0,...,0)’. This readily reduces to ß = A“‘1W-1ys. Thus by 
induction the theorem holds for all p.H
An expression can similarly be obtained for var(Yj|ys) but the 
following lemmas and notation need to be first established. Let q denote any 
set of v population units. The symbol X^ will denote the v*p matrix whose 
Tt h  row x’v , Wp will denote the v*v diagonal m atrix with diagonal 
elements {wv:veq}, will denote X’^ W ^X^ and ß^ = A^X^W ^Y^ where 
Yp is the vector of {Yv:veq}. In particular the sets suj and £ will be used for 
q. This notation should not be confused with the subscripts p-1 used above. 
R&S will denote Raiffa and Schlaifer (1961).
this expression must equal (9.16) for any Xjp_i so that
Ap-lX'p_iW -1(ys- ß pCp) = (ß1 ,...)ßp_1)'. (9.17)
Ck'W-Hys-Xß) = 0 for k=l,...,p—1. (9.18)
Define (pj s = wj + xj’A *xj and h2iT,=2jeT1(yj-xj,.ßT1)2/wj.
Lemma 9.1: If j <£ s then
A^+j -  A A 1xj. xj A 1/(Pj,s* (9.19)
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Proof: Observe that
Ag+  ^ = A + Ar. (9.20)
Now, = A ^ jA A -1
= A^+j(As+j -  Xj.Xj'/wj)A-1 by (9.20)
= A“1 -  Ag’+j Xj. Xj'A_1/wj. (9.21)
Postmultiplying equation (9.21) by xj yields Ag+j xj = A-1Xj.Wj/cpj>s after 
simplification, which when substituted into (9.21) yields the lemma.B
Corollary to lemma 9.1: ^»s+j = <Pk,s "  (xkA_1Xj)2/<pj>s. (9.22)
Proof: By expanding Ag+j in the expression for <Pk)S+j-®
Lemma,9.£  ßs+£ -  ft = A ^ X 'C CS^-X^ß).
Eiqq£  ßs+  ^ = Xg+cWg^Ys+c
= xw-Vg + x*cw£ ^
= Aft + X ^ Q ^ - X ^ ß )  + Acß 
= Ag+Cß + X ^ W ^ Q ^ -X ^ ß )  by (9.20). 
Premultiplication by A^+  ^ then yields the lemma.B
Corollary 1 to lemma 9.2: If j*k; j,k g sth en
Xk'-(ßs+j -  ß) = ?k A_1?j-(Yj -  Xj'.ß)/cpj s (9.25)
Proof: By expressing ßs+j -  ß as in lemma 9.2 and then expanding Ag+j 
by lemma 9.1 and premultiplying by x^'.B
Corollary 2 to lemma 9.2: I f j^ s th e n
(Yj -  «j'-ßs+j) = (Yj -  *j’.fi).Wj/<Pj,8.
Proof: By setting k=j in corollary 1 to lemma 9.2 and then simplifying.B
(9.23)
(9.24)
Corollary 3 to lemma 9.2: E ßg+  ^I ys = ß.
Proof: By taking expectations conditional on ys of lemma 9.2.B
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An expression for var(Yj|ys) can now be deduced.
Theorem 9.2: Constraints (9.1)-(9.3), (9.5) yield
var(Yj1 ys) = <Pj,sh2,s/(n+a) 
where a  is an arbitrary constant.
Proof: If j*k an d j,k g  s,
cov(Yj,Yk |ys) = Ecov(Yj,Yk|Ys+j) I ys+ cov(EYj|Ys+j,EYk|Ys+j|ys)
= cov(Yj,x'k .fis+j l y s)
= var(Yjl ys) . x’jjA^Xj/cpj g (9.26)
by corollary 1 of lemma 9.2. Similarly
cov(Yj,Yk I ys) = var(Yk ly s) .  x'kA-1Xj/(pk s .
Thus var(Yj I ys)/<pj)S must be independent of j and so by (9.5)
■varCYj i ys) = <Pj,s^3(y i-? i'-B )2-bi,s-
Now,
var(Y]j. I ys) = E{var(Yk I Ys+j) I ys) + var(E{Y^ I Yg+j} I ys)
= ^^kjS+j^ie(suj)^i ~  ?i • £s+j^2-^i,s+j' yS + var  ^ -k  • ßs+j'
by (9.27)
= ^kjS+jl ^ies^i ~  ?i - ^ 2*^i,s+j + ?i -^ßs+j “  &)2*bi,s+j
+ E(Yj -  xj'.gs+j)2.bj s+j } + (xk A _1 xj/<pj s)2var(Yj I ys)
by expanding yj -  Xj'.ßs+j into [yj -  xj'.ß] -  x 'j.[ßg+j -  ß] for is s and 
observing tha t the cross-product vanishes by corollary 3 of lemma 9.2, and 
by corollary 1 of lemma 9.2 for the second term
=  { ^ k j S  ”  [ ? k ^ -  1X j]2/ cpj> s }  f c i€ S ( y i  — ? i  -ß ^ 2- ^ i , s + j
+ ^ie3(xj'A-l xi/(pjiS)2var(Yj I ys)biiS+j + (wj/(pj s)2var(Yj I ys)bj>s+j}
+ (x^'A-1Xj/(pj>s)2var(Yjl ys) (9.28)
by the corollary to lemma 9.1 and corollaries 1 (with k=i) and 2 of lemma 
9.2. After substituting in (9.27) for var(Yj I ys), (9.28) can be equated with 
(Pk,s^ies^yi~~'i-ä)2bi,s by (9.27). In fact the coefficients of each (yj -  x^.ß)2 
can be equated, yielding
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^i,s+j^i,s ~ ^ j ,s  Wj^j.s+j ^ves^5j A 1xv)2bv>s+j ) / 9j,s (9.29) 
after the common factor ( <Pk s -  [x^ 'A _1Xj]2/(pj g ) is removed. Since the 
right hand side of (9.29) is symmetric in s then so is b^g+j/b^ s. Thus any 
factors in b^s+j and b^s which are not symmetric in s must cancel out and 
so bj s must be of the form bpcg where is a function of i only and cg is 
symmetric in s. Then (9.29) reduces to
Cg+j = Cg + ^ jwj2 1^ ^ve s^v-by.x V)A x^j}/cpj^ g (9.30)
“ cs + fij,S
say, where g is symmetric in s. Since Cg+j is symmetric in s+j, then so is 
the RHS of (9.30). Thus, as r\j s contains the only occurrence of j in c'g+j, 
then the remaining term c'g1 must be Liegrii}S+j_i- Thus, since Cgis 
independent of j then so is Zi€ sTli and so it holds in general that rjj s is 
independent of s. Since wj and xj are quite general, this can only occur if bj 
1/wj (without loss of generality set bj = 1/wj). Equation (9.30) then becomes
cs+j = cs + 1
Thus the most general form of cs is that it be a function of n. By considering 
an arbitrary value for cs when n=2, a simple inductive argument over n 
shows that cs must be of the form l/(n+a), where a is a constant. Thus the 
form of b |?s is (w |[n+a])_1 and by equation (9.27) the theorem is 
established.■
These results allow the deduction of a unique form of solution to 
the constraints (9.1 M9.3),(9.5). This form involves the generalisation of the 
t-distribution to r dimensions given by the density function:
v+r - i
ffyr)
(7w)r/2n p i R i 1/2
(y  —S O U  (y -  B1) ,v+r)/2
( 1 + ) (9.31)
(R&S,p256). This is denoted Y  ^ ~ t(^n^,R-1,v) where = (mi,...,mr )' is 
the vector of the means of Y ,^ R is an rxr positive—definite and symmetric
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matrix and v>0 denotes degrees of freedom. The following lemmas are 
needed.
Lemma 9.3:
h2,s+C = h2,s + (y ^ -^ 'W ^ d -X ^ A ^ X ^ W ^ X y ^ -X ^ ß ) .
EeüSÜ h2,s+i;
= (ys+ ; - Xs+tBs+tf w sV; (ys+ c- x s+^ ßs+(^
= (ys+c-Xs+cß)’w s+c(ys+C-x s+;ß)
-  2[ßs+c-ß ]X s+c WS1+C (ys + r x 8+cß)
+ [ßs+rß]Xs+; w-i+c xs+c [ßs+rpj
A A A A
by substituting [ys+  ^- X s+r ßj -  Xg+£[ß8+£-ß] for ys+i; -  Xs+J;ßs+C 
= h2,s + ( y ^ ß ) ’ W? (y^-x^ß) -  [ßs+c-ß]'As+c [ßs + r gj 
since in the second term Xs+r Wg+r (ys+r—Xg+r ß) = As+r [ßs+^-ß]. The 
result follows by substituting for [ßs+^-ß] the expression given by lemma 
9.2.1
Corollary to Lemma 9.3:
h2,s+(; = h2,C + (ys -X ß ?) 'W -i(I -X A ^ X W -iX y s -X ß ; ).
Proof: By exchanging the sets s and £ in the lemma.■
Lemma 9.4: ( I -  X  ^A j^  X'^  ) = ( XrA“1 X  ^ + Wr r 1
Proof: ( I - X r  A^i-X^W^1 HXrA^X'^ + W^)
= W^XHA-1 -  Ag+fArA-1 -  Ag+ )^ X'^  + I 
= W ^X£A^{As+£ -  A^ -  A)A_1 Xr + I 
= I by (9.20).
Reversing the order of multiplication also yields I.B
Theorem 9.3: Constraints (9.1 M9.3), (9.5) yield
flß,a2|ys) « exp{-(h2)S + (ß -  ß)A (ß- ß))/(2o2)} . (a2)~<v+p+2W (9.32)
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an d
Y ^ ly s ~ t(Xr ßj(X^A_1 X r + W ^ H v /h s^ v )  (9.33)
w here v=n+a+2 and a  is the constant of theorem  9.2.
Proof: We begin by deriving a  characteristic  differential equation for Yj|ys. 
Since by (9.1) and  (9.2) Yj|ys is a m ixture of norm al random  varia tes, it  has 
a continuous d istribu tion  function. Now, p u ttin g  g(9) = g((J,G2) = yj -  xj'.ß, 
in  equation (4.1) yields
E(yj -  xj'.ßXfTyjlfca2) I ys = f(yj|ys).E(yj -  xj'.ß) I ys+j
= f(yjlys)-(yj -  ?j'-ßs+j)
= flyjlys)-(yj -  ?j'-&)wj/<Pj,s 0.34)
by corollary 2 to lem m a 9.2. P u tting  g(£S,a2) = a 2 in  equation (4.1) yields
E g2 .fly-jig, a 2) I ys = flyj|ys).Ea2 1 ys+j. (9.35)
Now,
var(Yj|ys) = E(var(Yj|ß,a2) I ys) + var(E{Yj|ß,a2) I ys)
= WjEa2 ly s + var(xj'.jjl ys)
Also, v a r(Y j|y s ) = (pj>sh 2 jS/(n + a )  by theo rem  9.2, an d  eq u a tin g  the
coefficients of wj and x'j.....xj in  each of these  two expressions for var(Yj|ys)
yields
E a 2|ys = h 2 >s/(n+a) and cov(Ü,ß'|ys) = A-1h 2 >s/(n+a) (9.36)
hence
E a2|ys+j = h 2jS+j/(n + a+ l)
= ( h 2jS + (yj -  Xj'.ß)2(wj-x'j.A-s1+j.xj)w j-2 }/(n+a+l)
by lem m a 9.3
= (h2jS + (yj -  Xj’.ß)2/(pj>s}/(n+a+l) by lem m a 9.1. (9.37)
S ubstitu ting  th is expression for EG2|ys+j into (9.35) yields
(n+ a+ l).E a2.f(yj|ß ,a2)|ys = Kyj|ys). (h2 s + (yj -  xj’.ß)2/<pj)S}. (9.38)
Now,
ö/3yj).[Ea2.fTyj|ß,a2)|ys}
= E{a/3yj.([2xw ja2]-1/2.02.exp[-(yj -  xj '.ß)2/(2wj a 2)])} I y s
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= - E ( y j - x j ’.|i).f(yjlß,o2)/wjlys
= - R y j |y s).(yj-?j'-ß)/<Pj,s by (9.34).
Thus differentiating (9.38) with respect to yj yields
f ’(yj|ys).{(pj;Sh2 ;S + (yj -  5j'-ß)2) + (n+a+3).flyj|ys).(yj -  xj'.ß) = 0.
This is a first order linear differential equation of a form known to have a 
unique solution apart from a constant factor (Boyce and DiPrima,1969,pl7). 
The solution can be seen to be
Ryj|ys) -  (9j,sh2>s + (y j - 5j'-ß)2) _(n+a+3>/2
« (h2jS+j)-(n+a+3y2. by (9.37).
The requirement that the function integrate to one determines the 
proportionality constant and the unique solution is
fty ,1 y s>
H o )  ( * • < ? ; , 3 - b 2 ,s>
hn . -(v+iy2( 1I2,s+j ^
1/2 h2
This is in fact Yj|ys ~ t(xj'.ß, v/[(pj sh 2 )SL v) as defined by (9.31) 
which in the more usual notation for a univariate t—distribution is 
(Yj-Xj'.ß)((pj>sh2 ?s/v)_1/2 ~ ty. Thus (9.33) holds for p=l.
Now, taking into account all terms involving y—values, (9.33) can 
be expressed
Ry^lys)
~  (h 2j3r r/2{ 1 +  (y  ^-  X(-ß)'( X,-A_1X^  +  W;r 1(y; - X cß)/h2s)-(''+r)/2
-  (h2,s)-r/2
.{1 + (y? -  Xcß)'W^( I -  X jA ^ W ^ X y ; -  Xcß)/h2
by lemma 9.4
-  (h2j3+<)-(v+r)/2.(h2j3)v/2 by lemma 9.3. (9.39)
Suppose now that (9.33) holds for dimensionality up to r-1. If 
{£',£") is a partitioning of £ into rV 0 and r"* 0 units respectively, then
I ys) = « y ^ ' 1 y s+£") fly^ " 1 y s)
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{h2jS+;}‘ <n+a+r+2)/2. {h2,s + c }(n+a+r"+2y2. {^2,s+c } ^ n+a+r,’+2)/2-fa 2,s}(n+a+2)/2
by (9.39)
~ (h2,s+i;)"(v+ry2-{h2>s}v/2 (9.40)
w hich is of th e  form  (9.39) and  th u s  (9.33) holds for d im ensionality  r. 
Therefore by induction (9.33) holds for all r. Furtherm ore , the  derivation of 
(9.40) shows th a t th is solution is Bayes—consistent.
From  th is resu lt, (9.32) can now be deduced. F irst, the  jo in t density  
function  of (I12 ^/r, ß,^) can be found by the  following genera lisa tion  of a 
resu lt given by R&S(p299). In  the  r-dim ensional space R r  generated  by the 
vectors y^ we can find the  volume in  which I12 ^/r and  are  constant. The 
region in  which = cq (constant) is the  (r-p ) dim ensional subspace of R r 
satisfying XrW^y^ = A^c0. W ithin th is  subspace can be constructed the solid 
h y p er-e llip se  sa tis fy in g  Zje ^(yj-Xj'.CQ)2/w j < Iiq (constan t) w hich h as 
(r-p )-d im ensiona l volume (hQ)(r_p)/2. On its  surface, which has volume «= 
(h())(r-p-2)/2dhQ, the quan tities h 2 ^ /r  and  are constant. W hen considered 
as a subregion of R r , th is  surface has volume «= (hQ)(r~P'2)/2dhQdcQ. Thus, 
from (9.39), and  considering only term s involving y^,
tfi%’h2,£/r |ys)
-  (h2>s+^)^v+r)/2(h2^ )(r_p-2)/2
~  [ l+ (y s-Xß^)'W _1(I—XAg+^ X'W_1)(y3—Xßj-)/h2 ^]_(v+r)/2 (h2>^ )'<-v+p+2)/2
by the  corollary to lem m a 9.3. (9.41)
Since the  Yj a re  independently  generated  from a N (xj'.ß ,w ja2) d istribution , 
th en  as r -> ° ° , » ß and  h 2 ^ / r  —> o2 provided A ^/r —» a finite n o n -
singular m atrix  of full ran k  p. In  the  lim it (9.41) th en  becomes
-  lim r^ J l + ( y s-X ß)'W -1(ys-X ß )/h 2 ^ )^ v+r)/2(h2ii;)^v+P+2)/2
~ exp{-(ys-Xß)'W _1(ys-X ß)/(2a2)}(a2)-(v+P+2)/2 (9.42)
Now,
(ys-X ß)'W -1(ys-X ß) = ([ys-X ß] -  X [ß-ß])' W 1 ([ys-X ß] -  X [ß-ß])
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= h2,s + (fi-ß )'A (ß -ß ) (9.43)
after expanding and observing that XW -1(ys—Xß) = 0. Substituting this 
into equation (9.42) then yields (9.32). This result can be shown to be 
Bayes-consistent.■
Thus constraints (9.1)-(9.3), (9.5) yield a family of solutions 
depending only on the parameter a. If
p=l and xj = xj j  = wj = 1 for all j (9.44)
then theorems 9.1 and 9.2 yield EYj I y s = y s and var(Yj I y s ) = 
(n+l)m 2 s/(n+a) giving
EYj21 ys = (n+1 )Zie syi2/(n[n+a]) + ys2(a - l )/(n+a). (9.45)
The desirable property that EYj2|ys °c Z\esy{2, as is the case for the EPS, can 
be achieved by setting a = l. Thus, the Normal IPS will be defined by 
(9.1 M 9.3), (9.5) and the requirement that a=l when model (9.44) holds. 
Specifying a in the special case of (9.44) determines the value of a in the 
general case.
The following lemmas and notation are needed. Consider again 
the conditional model given by equation (9.14). The notation introduced 
there will be again used: c^, ßp_i» Ap_^ and Xp_^. Define also
V i  s  Ap-iX'p-iW“1 (yS“ ßp sp),
^2,s,p—l  = s(yi-xipßp-s i,p -i • Bp-i )2/wi>
A^ p p) to be the (p,p)^ element of A“1, A j^ to be A with the row and
column deleted and Aj+p ^+p to be A with the j^1 and p ^  rows and the 
and p^h columns deleted. Thus Ap_^ = A p ^ . Let detA denote the 
determinant of A.
Lemme 9,5; A £ p) = {Cp[I-W-1Xp_1A jl1X ^ 1]W-1Cp)-1.
Proof:
(SpW-iXp.!) A ^C X ^iW -icp)
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= (CpW-1c1,...,CpW 1Cp_1).[(-D i+kdetAj+p>k+p/detApip ]
•( SpW-1 ? ! CpW-1 Cp_!)'
where the f  J-brackets denote the matrix whose (j,k)^k element is given 
within the brackets 
p~i p-i
= 2  E 5pW_1Cj.cpW_1ck.(-iP +k.detAj+Pjk+p/detApiP (9.46)
Now, detA
= Z  gpW_1gj.(-l)P+j.detAj p
by expanding det A down the pth column
p-i p-i
= SpW-1 Cp.detAp p + E  SpW_1Sj.(-l)P+i.( E CpW-15k .(-l)P+k-1.detAj+p k+p}
by expanding detAj p along the p^h row
= { CpW-1 Cp -  cpW-1Xp_1Ap1.1Xp_1W-1Cp}detAp p from (9.46).
Thus
detApp/detA = (Sp[I-W -1Xp_1A ^ 1Xp_1]W-1cpr 1.
But A ^ p) = detAp p/detA.H
Lemma ^2,s,p—1 = ^2,s + (ßp~ßp^*£p^—^  1Xp_^Ap-_^Xp_^]W 1Cp.
Proof; Xß = X p^.C ßi^.^ßp-l)' + ßpSp
= V l  Ap-1 Xp_l W 1(ys -  ßpQp) + ßpCp
by equation (9.17). Thus 
7s — ßp-p “  ^ p -1  ßp—1
= (ys -  Xß) + Xp_1Ap:1x p _ iw_1(ys -  ßpSp -  [ys -  ßpCp]) -  (ßp -  ßpjCp
by adding and subtracting Xß and using the explicit form for ßp_i 
= (ys -  Xß) + [Xp_iApl 1Xp_iW -1 -  I](ßp -  ßp)cp. (9.47)
Thus,
h2,s,p-l
= (ys ~ ßp£p — Xp_i ßp_i) W 1 (ys -  ßp Cp -  Xp_! ßp_ i)
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= h2,s + (Pp -  ßp)2Sp[W-1Xp_1A £ 1X'p_1-n W -1 [Xp_! Ap.|Xp_^ W"1 - I ] cp 
by equation (9.47) and since X'W-1(ys -  Xß) = Op implies that 
Xp_iw_1(ys-Xß) = Qp_i and SpW_1(ys -  Xß) = 0.
= h2.s + (ßp -  ßp)2cp[I -  W_1Xp_1A^.1X'p_1]W^1 Cp.B
Theorem 9.4: The Normal IPS has the unique solution given by (9.32) and 
(9.33) with v=n—p+4, and has domain given by I1 2  s > 0 and n > p.
Proof: Specifying v=n—p+4 is equivalent to specifying a  = 2—p, since by 
definition v = n+a+2. When p=l, a= l m ust always hold as this includes 
(9.44) as a special case. Suppose now th a t a  = 2—p is true for p—1 
dimensions. Now,
E(ßp -  ßp )2 | ys s  varfßpl ys)
= A(p,p)h2,s/(n+a) 0-48)
by equation (9.36). Also,
Easy's
= E(Ea21 ys,ßp} I ys 
= Eh2 ,s ,p -l/(n-P+3) 1 7s
by equation (9.36) and since the theorem holds for p-1 
= E {h2 s +(ßp— ßp)2cp’ (I-W _1Xp_1 Ap.! X’p_! IW '1 cp}/(n-p+3)|ys
by lemma 9.6
= K s+ < p) h2)S(n+a)_1.Sp,(I-W~1Xp_1AjJ.1X'p_1)W_1Qp}/(n-p+3)
by equation (9.48)
= {b2 )S +h2>s/(n+a)}/(n-p+3).
by lemma 9.5. However, by equation (9.36), E a2|ys = h 2 )S/(n+a). Equating 
these two forms for Eo2|ys then yields a  = 2—p and so v = n-p+4. Thus the 
result holds for dimension p and so by induction it holds for all p.
Equation (9.33) will give a proper density function if h 2 >s > 0. The 
matrix A will be singular if n < p. Having n > p also ensures that v > 0. 
Hence the restrictions on the domain.®
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9.2 Discussion
A simple transformation of variables applied to equation (9.32)
yields
fl&.c"2lys) -  exp{-<h2iS + (ft- ß)'A(ß- ß))/(2a2)} . (o2) ^ » 2 (9.49)
after substituting in v=n—p+4 from theorem (9.4). This is the multivariate 
Normal-gamma distribution, with parameters ( ß ,h2 s/v,A,v), the 
Bayesian natural conjugate prior for multiple regression with normal 
errors (R&S,p343). These results can be approximated in the Bayesian 
framework by choosing the prior for (ß,a-2) as Normal-gamma with 
parameters (§,5,A,4-p) where the 5 and the elements of the matrix A are 
small and positive and the elements of the vector § are small. The improper 
prior obtained by letting these all approach 0 duplicates them exactly.
It follows that
fi I ys ~ t( ß,Av/h2>s,v) (9.50)
and er2 I ys has a gamma-2 distribution with parameters (h2>s/v,v) given by 
flcr2|ys) -  exp{-h2>s/(2G2)}.(cr2)(n-P+2)/2 (9.51)
(R&S,p320).
The probability state where a2 is known can be derived directly 
from the Normal IPS. Since
flß,<r2|ys) =  Kcr2|ys) flß|ys,cr2)
then from equations (9.49) and (9.51) it immediately follows that
«ßlys,<r2) -  e x p { - (ß -ß ) ’A (ß -ß ) /(2 a 2)}.
These results can be contrasted with analogous results obtained in 
other frameworks.
If (9.44) holds then the model is one of independent identically 
distributed N(|i,a2) random variables. The marginal distribution ß I ys then 
reduces to ß I ys ~ t(ys,v/m2 s,v). In other words, (ß-ys)/(m2)S/v)1/21 ys has a 
univariate t-distribution with v degrees of freedom. If v = n-p+4 was 
replaced by v = n-p, then confidence intervals for ß would coincide
9 0
algebraically with the frequentist confidence intervals of yg.
Royall and Cumberland examined the model EYj = xj'.ß, , var(Yj) 
= WjG2 with the Yj independent, within the superpopulation framework 
(Royall, 1976 and Royall and Cumberland, 1978). This model yields 
A_1X'W_1ys as the best linear unbiased estimator of ß and h2 )S/(n-p) as an 
unbiased estimator of a2. These compare to E(Jlys = A-1X'W_1ys and 
Eg2 I ys = h2 )S/(n—p+2) in the Normal IPS. Royall and Cumberland make no 
assumption of normality and neither do the derivations of E ß l y s by 
theorem 9.1 and Eg2 I ys by theorem 9.2 and equation (9.36). The expectation 
of the finite population total T is T* = ys+Sje^Xj'. ß, identical to the 
^-unbiased superpopulation estimator of T. Also
var(T |ys) = ZZjikeg*k cov(Yj,Yk |ys) + 2j€(-var(Yj|ys )
= SZj,k e ^ k  v3r(Yj|ys) Sj A_1Xk/<Pj)S + Zje ;var(Yj|ys )
by equation (9.26)
= l'.lX^A-1^  + W^)l .h2)S/(n—p+2) *
by theorems 9.2 and 9.4, where 1' = (1,...,1). This differs from the 
corresponding ^-unbiased superpopulation estimators of var^(T—T*) only by 
the factor (n—p)/(n-p+2). The superpopulation framework is a frequentist 
framework so that these estimators are subject to fundamentally different 
interpretations.
9.3 Not ABsmmiiag Normal Errors
As mentioned above, theorems 9.1 and 9.2 required no normality 
assumption. A useful probability state would be one where normality is not 
assumed at all. For example, (9.2) could be replaced by
E£j|ß,G2 =0 and var(ejl(i,G2) = wjg2. (9.52)
Since theorem 9.1 requires no normality assumption, (9.1), (9.3), (9.5) and 
(9.52) yield EYj|ys = xj'.g. Thus a natural extension of the IPS would be to 
generalise (9.5) to
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ECYj-Xj'.ß^lyg = Stj.s^ is s fri ~  ? i-ß ^ bt,i,s Js s  (9-53)
for t = 2,...,n. It turns out however that constraints (9.1),(9.3) and (9.52) are
sufficiently strong to preclude the possibility of such a set of constraints. In 
fact (9.1), (9.3), (9.5) and (9.52) are sufficiently strong that they force the 
result that so far as the moments of Yj|ys exist, they must be the same as 
those in the solution given by theorem 9.3. (Note that the t-distribution is 
not uniquely characterised by its moments).
Lemma 9.7:
Z  WCZ \|/(t,w,z,v)
(2[t-w+l])l r(v/2-L-l) r([v-fl]/2)
2 2[t-w+i ] ( t _w + 1 )! * r(v/2) r([v+l]/2-w)
, ,, . (2[t-w+z+l])l r(v/2—t+ w -z-1)
where \|/(t,w,z,v) = ------------------------------- . --------------------------
2 2[t-w+z+i] (t-w+z+1)! T(v/2)
provided all the terms exist.
Proof: The proof is by induction over w. If w=0 the lemma is seen to hold. 
Suppose the result holds for up to w-1 where w > 2. Then
E WC \|/(t,w,z,v) = Z + W_1CZ) \|Kt,w,z,v)
z=0 z=0
where W“1C_1 = W“1CW = 0
W -1  W -1
= Z w_1Cz.\i/(t,w,z'+l,v) + Z ^02 11/^ ^ ^ ^ )
where z' = z—1
w-1 w-1
= Z W-1C . \|/(t,w—l,z',v) + Z W_1C \i/(t-l,w -l,z ,v )
z'=0 z z=0 z
since \}/(t,w,z,v) = n /(t,w -l,z -l,v ) = \|/(t>-l,w-l,z,v)
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(2[t-w+2])! H v /2 -t-l)  r([v+l]/2)
2 2[tr-w+2] (t_w+2)! * T(v/2) ’ r([v+l]/2-w +l)
(2[t-w+l])l r(v/2-t) r([v+l]/2)
2 2[t-w+i] (t_w+1)! ‘ r(v/2) ’ r([v+l]/2-w +l)
since the lemma holds for w-1. This resolves to the required expression.
Hence by induction the result holds for all w.■
Theorem 9.5: If constraints (9.1),(9.3),(9.5) and (9.52) hold then the
existing odd moments of Yj|ys are zero and the existing even moments are 
E(Yj-Xj'.ß)2t|ys = (cpj>sh2)S)t.(2t)!r(v/2—t)/{22t t!T(v/2)}.
Proof: The notation Dj>s = Y j-ys will be extended to Dj>s = Yj-xj'.ß.
Observe that for even moments the theorem can be expressed as
EDg|ys = (<pj>sh2>s)t.\i/(t—1,0,0,v). (9.54)
Now,
E D ? l\J y s = ED^{EDM|ys,Yj}|ys
= E DH, (E(Dk s+J + xk'.[ßs+j —ß])|ys,Yj}|ys 
= EDJ . I0+ xk'A-1Xj.DsJ/cpjs}|ys
by corollary 1 to lemma 9.2
= (xk'A-1xj ./cpj)S)ED ^1|ys. (9.55)
Similarly,
ED“sDk,slys = EDkj3(E(Dj3+k + xj'.[ßs+k-ß])u |ys,Yk)|ys
U
= 2  “Cv (xjA_1xk /<pk>3)u-v ED^^(EDV3+k|ys>Yk)|ys
(9.56)
by corollary 1 to lemma 9.2. The proof will be by induction over t. Theorem 
9.1 and 9.2 show that the result holds for the 1st and 2nd moments (recall 
that these theorems do not use the normality assumption). Suppose the 
result holds for up to 2t where t > 1. Consider first the moment ED2^ 1 |ys. 
Putting u = 2t and transforming the dummy variable v to w by w = v/2 in 
equation (9.56) yields
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Er,? sD g y s
t
= 2  2tC2w •ED^s'2w+19j>+k^2,s+k .V(w-l,0,0,v+l) |y s
Now, by the corollary to lemma 9.1,
w
<P*+k =  s  wCv < ?l ( - ^ k>3)''-w( x j ' A - l x k )2w-2v.
(9.57)
(9.58)
The expression (9.57) can be equated with the expression for ED2gDk S|ys 
given by equation (9.55). Observe that in both forms, x^'A_1Xj is the only 
term involving x^ and xj which cannot be separated into scalar factors 
involving only one of x^ or xj. Thus, since x^ and xj are quite general, 
coefficients of all powers of x^A -1^  must be equated. Expression (9.57) 
contains only even powers of x^A _1Xj while (9.55) contains only odd. Thus 
both expressions must be zero so that ED2^ 1 |ys = 0.
Consider now ED2^ 2 |ys. Putting u = 2t+l (and by the same 
approach that was used to derive (9.57)), equation (9.56) yields
EDj^ryyg
t
=  £  2t+1C 2 w (xj ' A - lx k /(PkjS) ^ 2 w +l  E D 2t32w+2 (pw +khWs + k ¥ (w _ 1>0i0iV +1)|y s
% |  ( 5j'A ' 1? k )2t- 2V+1(-<?j,s)V
t
.{ E 2t+1C2wwCv (-l)w(pf3+w+v-1\|Kw-l,0,0,v+l)EI)?ts2w+2h^s+k|ys }
(9.59)
after expanding (pjvs+k by equation (9.58) and interchanging the summation 
signs. Now, h 2 >s+ji = h 2 )S + Dk s/cpk,s by equation (9.37). If the h 2 >s+k in (9.59) 
are expanded by use of this, then the expression in the 0-brackets becomes
t w
Ey 2t+1C2wwCv( - l ) w <pg+w+v'1 y (w -l ,0,0,v+l) . E WCZ h£'z (p£s EDg‘-w+ z+1) |ys
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t
=  < r ^ s 1 ^  2 t+ lc 2w WCV (-1 )W y (w - l ,0 ,0 ,v + l)
w
.{ Z  WCZ y(t,w,z,v) + |ys -  y(t,w,w,v)}
since the lemma holds for up to 2t+l, and by use of (9.54)
C ’ H ?  S v ^ l c 2w wc v ( - i ) w -
(2w)! 
221* w!
(2 [t-w + l])! r(v /2-fc-l)
2 2[t-w+l](t_ w + 1 )| ‘ r (v /2 )
+  {(<Pk>sh 2>, ^ t + 1 )  . E D 2 ^ 2 | y s  -  y(t,0,0,v)}
t
.c p ^ .h ^ 1. S v2t+i C2wwCv (_ ! )w ¥(w_ i  ,0,0,v+1) (9.60)
by lemma 9.7. The first part of equation (9.60) simplifies directly to
<s+VhiHt + 1S (2t+l)!r(v/2-t-l)
v!(t-v)!22t+1 T(v/2) w=v
= h ^ ^ O A v H - l ) ^  ‘ (9.61)
by equation (5.6), where 5t_v = 1 if t-v=0 and 8 ^  = 0 otherwise. Now, the 
expression for ED?g+1Dk S|ys given by (9.59) must equal the expression for 
ED|g+1Dk>g|ys given by (9.55), which is (x^ 'A _1Xj/cpj)S) ED^+2 |ys. Again, 
powers of x^’A-1^  can be equated. Substituting (9.61) back into (9.59) yields 
only a term in x^A^xj. Substituting the second part of (9.60) back into
(9.59) yields a sum involving x^A-1^  of various powers, some greater 
than 1, which must therefore have coefficients of zero. It is immediately 
evident that this can only occur if (q  ^gh2 g)^t+1)ED2^ 2|ys-\j/(t,0,0,v) = 0 
which means that ED2t£2iys must satisfy (9.54). Substituting (9.61) back into
(9.59) and equating this with (x^A^xj/cpj^) ED2g+2 |ys also yields
EDfä+2 |yg = (cpk<sh2>3)(t+1) y(t,0,0,v).
Thus if the theorem holds for up to 2t, it must hold for 2t+l and
2t+2. Hence by induction it holds for all powers.■
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CHAPTER 10
THE RECTANGULAR IPS
10.1 a Known
Suppose each Yj in the population is an independently generated 
rectangular random variable, i.e.
where 5[a>b]^x  ^= 1 if xe [a,b] and 0 otherwise. Suppose a is known but that 
there is no further prior knowledge about the unobserved Yj. Let ymax and 
ymin denote the maximum and minimum values of ys respectively. 
Intuitively, ymax contains all the information concerning ß inherent in yg. 
This is formalised in Bayesian terms by the fact that ymax is a sufficient 
statistic for ß (Raiffa and Schlaifer, 1961, p54). Now, if there is no prior 
information with which to discern between population units, then in any 
group of r population units each unit has a 1 in r chance of turning out to 
be the group maximum. If a subgroup of only r—1 of the r units are 
observed, they will give no indication of whether their subgroup maximum 
is atypically large or not. It is therefore reasonable to assert that the 
remaining unobserved unit of the group still has a 1 in r chance of being 
the largest. This suggests the representation of vague prior knowledge of 
the Yj by setting Pr( Yj > ymax |ys,a) equal to l/(n+l), i.e.
Note that Yj|ys,a can have no discrete probability masses, since f(yj I a,ß) 
does not, so that distinctions between > and > are not made. The 
rectangular IPS (a known) will be defined by (10.1) and (10.2), for samples 
satisfying ymax > a.
f(yj I a,ß) = 5[a ß](yj)/(ß-a) for all je s (10.1 )
(10 .2)
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Theorem 10.1: The rectangular IPS (a known) has a unique solution given 
by
£tß|ys,a) = n(ym - a ) n / ( ß - a ) n+1 f o r ß e t y  , °°) (10.3)
and
I ys)
[ ’’'max ^  ^
n+r [m ax(y J  -  a  ]
n+r (10.4)
where each yj in y  ^is > a.
Proof: First choose a  < yj < ymax. Setting g(0) = 1 in (4.1) yields
fY(y.|ys oc) = E l/(ß -a ) |ys ,a 
j J '  ’
and differentiating this with respect to y; yields f 'Y(y.|ys >a) = 0 so that
J j J ~
the range [a, ymax], fY.(y.|ys °0 is constant. By (10.2) this constant must be
J J
fY.(y:lys>«) = n/([n+l][ymax- a ] )  yjs [a>ymaJ- (10-5)
J «j
Setting g(9) = ß -a  in (4.1) yields
on
h f y j y s ’ 0 ^  ■ E(ß-a)|yj,ys = E S ^ y jX y s  a
= 1 ' since a  < yj < ymax < ß
which by (10.5) reduces to
Eß|yj,ys = a  + [n+l][ymax-a ] /n .
It follows from this that if  yj > ymax then
Eß|yj,ys = a  + [n+l][yj-a]/n. (10.6)
Now choose yj > ymax. Setting g(9) = 1 in (4.1) then yields
fY.(yJys,a) = E 5[a,ß](yj)/(ß-a)iys’a
from which differentiation with respect to yj gives
f^ j iy s -“) = -  fß(yjiys>a)/(yj -  a)- (10-7)
Note that the argument of the density function of ß|ys ,ct is yj, where yj is an
arbitrary constant. Setting g(0) = ß -a  in (4.1) gives
fY/yjiys,a)-E(ß-«>iyj>ys = E V^yp'ys-“
which from (10.6) reduces to
fY/yj iys-0‘)-(yj-a )-(n+1)/l1 = 1 -  Fp(yjiys>a )-
and after differentiating with respect to yj
97
{ fY.(y-iys’a ) + (yj“«) fY.(y-iys»a ^ ^ n+i^ n = -  fß(y-iys’a )- do.8)J J J J J
Combining (10.7) and (10.8) yields
fß(y-lys>a ) = (n+i).fY.(y.|ys ,a). (io.9)J J J
Differentiating (10.9) and substituting for fy /y ^ s ’0^  fr°m (10.7) yields
(ß-oc) f ß(ß|ys,a) + (n+l)fp(ß|ys,a) = 0 (10.10)
after replacing the argument yj with ß. This differential equation is known 
to have a unique solution up to a constant of proportionality. This constant 
is constrained by the requirement that fß(ß|ys,oc) must integrate to 1 and the 
solution can be seen to be (10.3). Equation (10.4) for y  ^= yj follows directly 
from (10.5) and (10.9). The general form of (10.4) then follows by evaluating
fiy;|ys) = % ilys)-tfy2lys>yi) —  flyrlys>yi>->yr-i)
where y^  = (yv ...,yT). Bayes—consistency can be shown in a straightforward 
manner. ■
This result can be approximated in the Bayesian framework by 
choosing the prior for ß|ys,a of fß(ß|ys,a) = e8£/(ß-cc)e+1 on ße [a+8,°°) where 
e,S > 0 are small. The improper prior fß(ß|ys,ot) «= (ß-oO-1 on ße[a,°°) 
obtained by letting e,5 —» 0 duplicates them exactly.
10.2 a  and ß U nknow n
If ß were known and a unknown then by the reasoning which led 
to equation (10.2), vague prior knowledge of ß could be expressed by
FY.(y . iys ß) = 1 / (n+1) (10.11)
j min *
If both a and ß were unknown then (10.2) and (10.11) could be replaced with 
FY.(yminlys) = l/(n+l) and FY.(ymax|ys) = n/(n+l). These formulations turn out 
to be equivalent to (10.2) and (10.11) with which we shall remain. The 
rectangular IPS is defined by (10.1), (10.2) and (10.11) for samples satisfying
^max ^  ^min*
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Theorem  10.2: The rec tangu lar IPS has a unique solution given by
Ra,ß|ys) = n (n - l)  / (p -  a)n+1
on a s a n d  ßs [ymax,°°), where yr?e = ymax -  ymin and
ßy; iys)
n ( n - l )
(n + r)(n + r- l)
n -l
______________ ^rge_______________
[ m ax(yg+^ ) -  m in(yg+^ ) ]n+r 1
(10 .12)
(10.13)
Proof: Now,
f(p|ys).f(ajp,ys) = f(a|ys).flß|a,ys) (10.14)
From  (10.3), and  the corresponding form of f(cx|ß,ys) resu lting  from (10.11), 
flß|ys) .n ( ß - y min)n / ( ß - a ) n+1 = fla |ys).n(ymax- a)n / ( ß - a)n+1
on a s ( - o o >ymin] and ßs [ymax,°°)
which requ ires fta |ys) «  (ymax-  a ) 'n and flß|ys) ~  (ß -  y ^ n )- " The 
requ irem ent th a t  f(a|ys) in teg rate  to one th en  yields
flct|ya) = (n - l)  yjff. / (y^„v-  a)n on a s  (-°o ,ymin]. (10.15)
The expressions in  (10.14) equal f(a,ß|ys) and  substitu ting  (10.15) into (10.14)
4
yields (10.12). E quation  (10.13) resu lts from directly evaluating 
Jajßf(y^|cx,ß)f(a,ß|ys)da dß. F inally , B ayes—consistency can be shown in  a 
s tra ig h tfo rw ard  m an n e r.■
T aking the  proper prior f(a,ß) <*= (ß -a )-tl+el on a e ( - ° ° ,a ] ,  ße[b ,°°) 
and  ß > oc+S, and  th en  le ttin g  a —» 0 0 , b —> - ° °  and  8,5 —> 0 yields the 
im proper p rio r f(oc,ß) <* (ß— a )-1 on ß > a  w hich duplicates the  resu lts  of 
th is  section exactly (DeGroot, 1970). A prio r w ith  a,b large and  8 ,5  sm all 
will approxim ate these resu lts .
From  equation (10.13) i t  follows by direct evaluation th a t for jg s
E Y jly S =  (y m in +  ymax)/2 (10.16)
and
var(Y j|ys) = (n2 -  n  + 6) y2ge /(12[n-2][n-3]). (10.17)
By observing th a t
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E(Yk -  [ymin+ ymax]/2)iYj=yj-ys
(yj-ymax) / 2  for yj6 [ymax,°°)
■ 0 for yjStymin-ymJ
• (yj-ymin) / 2  for yjs (-°°-ymiJ
it also follows directly from equation (10.13) that for j,kg s
cov(YjYk|ys) = y^e / (2[n-2][n-3]). (10.18)
The estimator of a finite population total T is, from (10.16),
ET|ys = ys + (N -n )(ymin + ymax)/2 
and its variance is, from (10.17) and (10.18),
var(T|ys) = (N-n)var(Yj |ys) + (N-n)(N-n-l)cov(YjYk|ys)
= (N-n) (6N+n2—7n) y2ge / (12[n-2][n-3]).
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CHAPTER 11
TP1E LAPLACE IPS
11.1 8 Known
Suppose each Yj in the population is an independently generated 
Laplace, or double-exponential, random variable, i.e.
%jl0,G) = (4G)-1.exp{—I yj-0 I/(2g)} fo ra lljes . (11.1)
In all of the probability states considered so far we have attempted 
to represent no prior knowledge of the unobserved Yj. This does not always 
lead to the same constraints as those which intuitively reflect no prior 
knowledge of the unknown parameters 9.
The mathematics associated with the Laplace distribution is 
awkward. As a result, one must search farther than in previous probability 
states to find a suitable constraint to define its informationless probability 
state. For example, equation (2.3) yields no Bayes-consistent solution. In 
particular, predictive distributions flyj|ys) tend to be less tractable than 
posterior densities f(0|ys).
For these reasons the probability states which will be developed in 
this chapter will be concerned with representing no prior knowledge of 9.
Suppose now that 9 is known but that there is no prior knowledge 
about g. A property of the Laplace distribution, which can be shown by 
direct integration, is that E I Yj -  0 I |9,g = 2g. Taking expectations over g 
then yields E I Yj -  9 119 = 2Eg I 0. This suggests that no prior information 
about g can be expressed by giving its expectation as the average of the 
sample values of I yj-0 1/2. That is,
EG|ys,0 = (2n)-1.Sieslyi-0 l. (11.2)
Define the Lagrange IPS (0 known) by (11.1) and (11.2), for all possible 
samples.
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Theprem 11.1; The Laplace IPS (9 known) has a unique solution given by
flo|ys>9) =
( ^ 6 3 13T"0 1 /2 )n+1- exp{-sigg I yj—0 1/(2a)}
n! an+2
(11.3)
and
„ , m (n+r)! (Z^ es I yj-6 l/2)n+1
RyHys,e) = ------ ---------------------------------
n! 221 (2[s( g I yj-91 /2)n+r+1
(11.4)
Proof: Setting g(a) = a  in (4.1) yields
Ea.f(yj|0,a)|ys,9 = fiyj|ys,0).Ea|ys+j,0
= ^yjlys,0)-(2[n+i])-1.2:j'ie(su j) 1 y r 0  1 (11.5)
by (11.2). Since 0/9yj)f(yj|9,a) = flyj|0,a).sgn(0—yj)/(2a), differentiating 
equation (11.5) with respect to yj yields 
(n+1 ).sgn(0—yj).EfIyj|0,a)|ys,0
Setting g(a) = 1 in equation (4.1) yields Efiyj|0,a)|ys ,0 = flyj|ys,0). After 
substituting this into equation (11.6), simplification yields 
f ’(yjlyS>0)-2i€(suj) iyi-0 l = (n+2).sgn(0-yj).f(yj|ys,0)
This differential equation is known to have a unique solution within the 
ranges of yj tha t the functions (suj) I yj—Ö I and sgn(0—yj) are continuous:
tha t is, in the ranges yj<0 and yj>0. These solutions can be seen to be 
^ie(svjj) I yi-0 ' )_<n+2) up to a constant of proportionality. Since the Laplace 
distribution is continuous then f(yj|ys ,0) is a m ixture of continuous 
functions (see equation (1.17)) and so m ust also be continuous. Thus the 
constant of proportionality in the two ranges of yj must be the same. The 
requirement tha t flyj|ys,0) integrate to one yields equation (11.4) for the one 
dimensional case. By expanding fly^|ys,0) into one dimensional densities as 
follows,
this immediately resolves to the general case of equation (11.4).
Now, the density function of m^ = 2jg  ^I yj-0 I/(2r) can be derived
f‘,(yjlys>0)-2 i6(suj)| y i -01 -  ^yjlys»0)-sgn(9-yj) (11 .6)
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as follows. In the r-dim ensional space generated by the vector y^, the 
(r—1)—dimensional subspace satisfying = c0 (constant) is the surface of 
an r-dim ensional polyhedron and has area «= m^r_1 dm r. Also, by (11.4), 
within this subspace f(y^|ys,9) is constant and (Zies I y^-91 + 2rm^)"^n+r+1). 
Thus the density function of satisfies
fim -|ys>9) «  (^ e3lyi-0l + 2rm^)-<n+r+1) . m ^ 1 (11.8)
As r—>°°, -» a  and so by taking the limit equation (11.8) becomes
fla|ys,9) ~ a -<n+2)> expl-Sjgglyj-^l^a)} 
and after normalising this gives equation (11.3). Bayes-consistency can be 
established directly.■
11.2 ü  Kelowhi
Suppose now tha t a  is known but tha t there is no prior knowledge 
about 9. A constraint tha t leads to a PS with a Bayes—consistent solution is 
to set the*posterior mode of 9 to be the sample median, denoted
mode(9|ys,a) = ys. (11.9)
When n is even, the mode is taken to be the midpoint of the two middle 
observations. Although (11.9) is not a constraint th a t would be arrived at 
without trial and error, it is still untuitively uninformative.
The Laplace IPS (a known) is defined by (11.1) and (11.9), for all 
possible samples.
Theorem 11.2: The Laplace IPS (a known) has a unique solution given by 
ft6|ys>tf) 00 exp{—Eie g I yj-9 I /(2g)} (11.10)
where the constant of proportionality is a function of ys and a.
Proof: By theorem 4.1, the distribution for 9|ys,a satisfies
fI9|ys,a) -  f(ys|0,o).h(9) (11.11)
where the normalising constant is a function of ys and a. Let ys = {y1,y2) 
where yx < y2. For 9e(y1,y2) then flys|9,a) = (4a)_2.exp{(y1-y 2)/(2a)} which is
103
independent of 0. Thus by (11.11), f(9|ys,a) h(9) for 9e(y1,y2). By (11.9),
the mode of 9|ys ,a is at (y1+y2)/2. This is in the range 9e(y1,y2) where the 
mode of f(0|ys,G) must be determined solely by h(9) so that in this range h(9) 
m ust be constant. Since yx and y2 are arbitrary, this requires h(9) to be 
constant for all 9, yieldingCLl.10).
Bayes-consistency can, with some difficulty, be established by 
direct means and by observing that (11.10) satisfies constraint (11.9) for all 
ys .B
The normalising constant for f(0|ys ,a) can be found by direct 
integration. Let the yj be the ordered sample observations, tha t is y^ < y2 ^ 
... < yn . Then the normalising constant is
—l
(X+ X )2a-‘
y.(iV(2o)
• 11 1 
1= 2*+1
n—2i . {
(n-2i)yi+1/(2o) (n-2i)yi/(2a)
e - e }
ysÖ /(2o)
+ [yn - y n ]e 
—+1 —
if n is even, and has the simpler form
n exp{ }
. V  ___________ 2a
(n-2i+2)(n—2i)
if n is odd, where
yii) Xxk - X:
k=l k=i+l
and yQ = -oo and yn+1 = +oo- Denote these normalising constants by 
c(ys,a). Then f(0jys ,a) = exp{-Sigg I y^-9 I/(2a)} / c(ys ,a). The predictive 
distribution for yj is then
flyjlys>a ) = Je fiyj|ö,a).fl0|ys,a).d9
= {4ac(ys,a)}_1 J0 exp{ -S i6(suj) I yi~9 I /2a}.d0 
= c(ys+j,a)/{4ac(ys,a)}.
The predictive distribution for Y^|ys,o then follows by the same technique 
as (11.7) and gives
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fly^|ys,a) = {4a}_r c(ys+£,a)/c(ys,a).
The predictive distribution for TI ys appears to be intractable.
11.3 0 and 0  Unknown
Consider the situation when both 0 and a  are unknown. The 
probability state associated with this case follows directly from the results 
above. Define the Laplace EPS by constraints (11.1), (11.2) and (11.9), defined 
for all samples with n>l. From (11.3) and (11.10), and by noting that
f(0,a|ys) = fl0|ys,a).ftajys) = fla|ys,0).fi0|ys)
it immediately follows that
f(0,o|ys) ~ o^n+2).exp{-Zieg 1 y^-01 /(2a)} (11.12)
f(a|ys) ~ c(ys,a). cr(n+2) (11.13)
and
f(0|ys) -  ( Z .6 g | y . _ 0 | ) - < n + i ) < (11.14)
Little work appears to have been done with respect to a Bayesian 
treatm ent of the Laplace distribution. Box and Tiao (1973, chapter 3) 
consider the more general class fiyj|0,a,ß) crLexpl — I yj — 01 2/(1+P) / (2a)}
for -1 < ß <1. They suggest using h(0,a,ß) = a -1 as the non- informative 
prior (compared to h(0) = h(0,a) = a-2 implicit in (11.12) above) and consider 
some of the properties of fi0|ys,ß).
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CHAPTER 12 
THE GAMMA EPS
12.1 ß Knowm
Suppose each Yj in the population is an independently generated 
gamma random variable, i.e.
y^ .exp l-y ; / ß}
fty|a,ß) = ---------------------- yes (12.1)
J ßa.T( a)
where yj,a,ß > 0. Suppose that ß is known but that there is no other prior 
knowledge of the unobserved Yj. A sufficient statistic for a  is the geometric 
mean of the sample which will be denoted ys = (y-^yg...*yn)1/n- Since In ys = 
n-1. ! ^  In y^  the constraint
E InYj |ys,ß = n '1.Zie3lnyi (12.2)
is a natural constraint to reflect no prior knowledge of unobserved Yj.
Define the gamma EPS (ß known) by (12.1) and (12.2), for all samples where 
yj > 0 for each ie s.
Theorem 12.1: The gamma EPS (ß known) has a unique solution given by
y na i
«<x|ys>ß) = ( - ^ )  •---- r — -------  (12.3)
ß Ha) c(y3,n,ß)
where
oo
.  y  na
c(y3,n,ß) = ( — ) . ------. da
o ß Ha)
Proof: This probability state does not appear to lend itself to the techniques 
of equation (4.1). We have
E InYj |ys,ß = E {E InYj | a,ß} |ys,ß
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= E {J (In yO.y* x.exp ^ .ß ^ .H a H .d y  } |ys,ß 
o
oo
= E {r(a)-1J (In z + ln ß).za-1.exp_z.dz } |ys,ß 
o
by substituting z = y/ß
= E \\r{a) |ys,ß + ln ß (12.4)
where \|/(a) = T(a) / T(a). (Gradshteyn and Ryzhik,1965, equations 3.381.4 
and 4.352.1). Thus the property (12.2) is equivalent to
E\f/(a)|ys,ß = l n ( y g/ß). (12.5)
By theorem 4.1 any solution to this PS will be characterised by a function 
h(a) so tha t f(a I ys,ß) f(ys I a,ß).h(a), i.e.
fla|ys,ß) = (yg/ß)nct.r(a)-n.h(a) / ch(ys,n,ß) (12.6)
where ch(yg,n,ß) is the normalising constant given by
oo
ch(ys,n,ß) = ch = J (yg/ß)nct.r(arn.h(a).da (12.7)
o
which must exist for all samples. Now, for such a solution we have the 
following
OO
E \|/(cc) |ys,ß = ch_1 J \|Ka). (ys/ß)na.r(a)-n.h(a).da (12.8)
o
a=oo
(yg /ß)na.h(a).dT(a)-n
ot=0
CX=°o
= -  n-1 v 1 (y3 /ß)na Ha)-" h(a) |
a=0
+ n-1ch-1 J (yg/ß)na.r(a)_n.{ n.ln (yg/ß).h(a) + h'(a) }.da 
o
(12.9)
By (12.5) the integral in (12.8) must exist. Consider the first term in (12.9). 
The limit at a  = 00 must be zero because the integral in (12.7) exists. The 
limit at a  = 0 must also be zero for otherwise the integral in (12.8) would not
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exist (this follows from the well known identity \|/(z) = \}/(z+l) -  z-1). The first 
part of the second term in (12.9) reduces immediately to ln (yg/ß) by (12.7). 
Thus, equating the expression (12.9) to ln (ys/ß) ( by (12.5)) yields
J (ys/ß)n“ r(a)“n.h'(a).da = 0
o
This can only hold for all ys if h'(a) = 0 so that h(a) must be constant. This 
yields the unique solution (12.3). The limits at a  = 0 and a  = 00 of the first 
term  in (12.9) when h(a) is constant were shown by Damsleth (1975) to be 
zero. Thus the constraint (12.5) holds. Baye&-consistency of this solution 
follows from theorem 1 of Damsleth (1975).H
The posterior density functions of Yj|ys, Y^|ys and T|ys can be be 
found in a tractable form. The following lemma is first needed.
Lemma 12.1:
J IT*.», -
5 - z
.5 Hm)
where Z  is the region in R r where y^ + yg = T, a constant, and the yj>0 for 
all je C.
Proof: The integral on the left hand side equals 
T-ya T-y.-y! T-ys- y i ...- y ^
J • j • • • • J ( yxy2 -  yr_i(T-ys- y 1 ... - y ^ ) }  .d y ^  ... dYl
y1=0 y2=0 yr_i=0
where y^ = (y^,...yr ). Gradshteyn and Ryzhik (1965, eqn 3.191.1) give
f V_1 / vM- 1 j v+M r(v).r(ji)I x (a —x) dx = a . -----------
J r(v+p)
v,|i> o
and by successively applying this to the multiple integral it directly resolves 
to the right hand side.B
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Now,
oo
flyj|ys,ß) = J  Ryj|a,ß). fla|y3,ß ). da
-v; / ß 00 = (n+l)a
^s+j -(n+1)
Ha) da- 2 = ------ f
yj c(yg,n,ß) J ß
(n+l)a
by eqn (12.1) and theorem 12.1
—yj7 ß =
e c(ys+j,n+l,ß) 
yj c(y3>n,ß)
(12.10)
Then
fly^lys>ß) = Ryilys»ß) • fly2lys>yi>ß) —  ftyrlys.yi>.... yr_i>ß)
-y, / ß _
e . c(y ,n+r,ß)
_________________ _______________
y  ^ . c(yg,n,ß)
by (12.10). From this, with Z defined as in lemma 12.1,
(12.11)
f(T ly slß) = J « y ;|ys,ß).dy?
?csZ
-(T-y8) /ß y  „ (n+r)af  1 [ (  J S+C V  rv  ^ n+r> j  j
J . r  _  q J -r(a) -da-d?<
j
z y. • c(y3,n,ß) 0 ß
by (12.11) and the definition of c(ys ,n,ß)
r(a -l)
y?e z  -5
00 _ n a  -<n+r)
-(T -ys) / 3  r y 3 - H a ) J-  a (n+r)a =
0 ß • c(y3,n,ß) y^ z
y? • dy? • d a
since y3+?(n+r)a = y3na . y-r
_<T_ys)/ß  -  - n -  i ( T .  f ->
c(ys
—  f
.n,ß) *5 ß(n+r)“ . Ha)" . H ra)
by lemma 12.1. All of these density functions can be evaluated numerically 
without difficulty.
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12.2 a  Known
Suppose now that a  is known but that there is no other knowledge 
of the unobserved Yj. A sufficient statistic for ß is the sample mean ys.
Thus (2.3) is a natural constraint to choose, that is
EYj|ys,a = ys (12.12)
Define the gamma IPS (a known) by (12.1) and (12.12), for all samples 
where ys > 0.
Theorem 12.2: The gamma IPS (a known) has a unique solution given by
(y )no+l exp{_y /ß}
«ß|ys,a) = — ------------------5----- (12.13)
r(na+ l ).ßna+2
and
y^rfa-U _ y^na+1 _ r([n+r]a+l) 
(y3 + y?)["+* +1 . r(a)r . Hna+1)
(12.14)
Proof: EYj|ys ,a
so that by (12.12)
E{EYj|cc,ß}|ys ,a
Eaß|ys,a (12.15)
Eß|ys ,a = ys/a.
Thus, setting g(0) = ß in equation (4.1) yields
% jlys>a )-ys+j/a  = Eß.Kyj|a,ß)|ys,a (12.16)
and differentiating this with respect to yj yields
f'(yj|ys ,a).ys+j/a + flyj|ys ,a)/(a[n+l])
= E ß.{[a-l]/yj -  l/ß}fiyj|a,ß)}|ys ,a  
= [a -l].fly j|ys ,a).ys+j/(a.yj) -  f(yj|ys,a) 
by (12.16) and by setting g(9) = 1 in equation (4.1). This simplifies to
f ’(yj|ys,a).(ys + yj).yj = ftyj|ys ,a ).([a -l] ys -  [na+2] yj). (12.17)
This differential equation has the follow ing unique solution , after 
normalising so that it integrates to one:
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flyjly3.a)
oi—1 na+1yj -y3_____
B (a ,n a+ 1 ). (yg + yj)(n+1)a+1
(12.18)
By the  sam e technique as th a t used to derive equation (12.11), th is  directly 
yields (12.14). From  this,
KT I ys,a) = J Ry?|ys,«».dy^
na+1
. T ([n+ r]a+ l) jT(n+r)a+l  r (a )r r (n a + 1 ) ^
na+1 _  ra-1
y3 • (T -  y3)
(n+r)a+l ^  ,
T . B (ra,na+1)
_ r (a -l)
by (12.14)
by lem m a 12.1 (12.19)
P u t W = T / {(n+r)a}. Then
ygnCt+1 • [(n+r)aW  -  y ]m 1 . r ([n + r]a + l)  (12.20)
f(W I ys,a) = — -------------------------- ----------------------------
~ r/ n ,(n+r)a , TT(n+r)a+l
[(n+r)a] . W . T ( ra ) . T(na+1)
By (12.15), EWI y s -» Eß I y s as r  -» ° ° . Thus, by (12.1), W -»ß as r  —> °° . 
T aking  the  lim it as r  —> ° °  of (12.20) yields (12.13). This solution can be 
shown to be Bayes-consistent.H
12.3 a and ß Unknown
C onsider the  s itu a tio n  w hen bo th  a  and ß a re  unknow n. The 
probability  sta te  associated w ith  th is  case follows directly from the  resu lts 
above. Define the  gam m a IPS by co n stra in ts  (12.1), (12.2) and  (12.12), 
defined for all sam ples w ith each ypO  and ii>1. From  (12.3) and  (12.13), and 
by noting th a t
fla,ß|ys) = fta |ys,ß).f(ß|yg) = f(ß|ys>a).fla |ys) 
i t  im m ediately follows th a t
I l l
y nct.exp{—y /ß}
f(a,ß|ys) = --------------- ------------  (12.21)
r(a)n.ßna+2.h(yg,n)
to ly s)
r(na+l).yc
r(a)n.ygna+1.h(yg,n)
na
where
h(y3,n) = J H n a + l) . ys
__ n na+1
o Ha) . y
Also, flß|ys) «= exp{-yg/ ß}.ß_2.c(yg,n,ß) which resolves to
(12 .22)
«Ply«)
exp{-yg/ß}.c(yg,n,ß)
ß2.h(ys,n)
(12.23)
Expressions for the density functions of Yj I y s , I ys and TI y s also follow. 
For exsunple
ß T ly s) = J fTTI ys,a).£Ial y3).da 
0
00 — n a  rcti-1
1 f r([n+r]a+ l) - (T -y s)
h(y*’n) 0J r(ra).r(a)n T(n+r)a+1
The expression for f(a|ys ,ß) given by (12.3) is a gamcon distribution of type I 
with parameters n and ys /ß. The expression for f(a |ys) given by (12.22) is a 
gamcon distribution of type II with parameters n and yg / yg. These gamcon 
distributions were defined by Dam sleth (1975). Dam sleth suggests these 
same param eters to represent no prior inform ation and shows the 
associated improper prior f(a,ß) = ß“2 to be the limit of proper priors.
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CHAPTER 13
SOME SAMPLING APPLICATIONS
13.1 Stratification
Suppose that a population is partitioned into H strata where each 
stratum has Nh population units. Let h = 1,2,....,H denote individual strata. 
Let sh denote that part of the sample which comes from h and let sk contain 
n^ elements. Then n = and s = LJ s .^
The constraints of the IPS can be modified to apply to 
stratification in the following way.
EYjlys = y^ jeh; h=l,...,H (13.1)
jsh; h=l,...,H (13.2)
for t = 2,...,nh. These can be compared to (2.3) and (5.1). It follows that if j
and k are elements of different strata then cov(Yj,Yk I ys) = 0. These
constraints define independent IPS's within each stratum and so by
theorem 5.1 the a-coefficients all equal 1. Thus we have the estimators
H
ETI y3 = Y  Nh y3h (13.3)
h=l
and
variTI ya) -  03.4>
The form of the variance differs from the classical form by having (nh+l)-1 
in place of (nh- l ) -1.
13.2 WitMn Stratum. Ratio Estimation
An estimator commonly used in practice is the within stratum 
ratio estimator. It takes the form
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T"w = Y fhxh where fh = ~  d3 '5)
heH
where the x-values are known auxiliary variables and xh is their sum in 
stratum h. The logic of this estimator is as follows. Often auxiliary 
variables xi are direct linear indicators of the size of the For example, 
they may be the same variables as the y-values but one year prior. If the xi 
are such 'size' variables then T"w is an intutively appealing estimator 
since it allows for any disproportionality of the amount of the xh which is in 
the sample. This estimator has been discussed at length in section 1.3, but 
without considering stratification.
This estimator can be derived from the Normal IPS. Consider the
model
Yj = rh-xj +  e j jeh; h=l,...,H (13.6)
where the rh are unknown parameters and
E £j I r,«?2 = 0 varfej I ^a2) = Xj g2 (13.7)
with the I r,a2 independent, where r = (r-p....,^)'. These are a special 
case of (9.1) and (9.2) but with the relaxation of the normality of the 8j I r,G2. 
This is done because none of the results below require normality (see 
section 9.2). The vector r are population parameters, not finite population 
values. We can specify
EYj1 y3 = Y  jsh,j«ssh (13.8)
iesh
and
var(Yj I ys) = gj>Sh Y b i,sh Je h -J«sh (13-9)
iesh
for all h, where g■ is symmetric in s  ^and aj i  and bi are symmetric in
sh-i. These follow from (9.3) and (9.5). They lead to independence between 
strata so that we have independent probability states acting within each 
stratum. Thus we can apply theorem 9.1 which yields E r^ I ys = rh and
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theorems 9.2 and 9.4 which yield
2 -  fh-xp2
var(Yj I ys) = +
^  “ ieajj 1
j<=h, j«*sh (13.10)
and
xj-xk i  - v  (y , -  fh-Xi)
 ^ - i€%
cov(Yj,Yk I y.) v - nh+1
from (9.26). From these it follows that E T ! ys = TMW and
j*keh; j,ke sh (13.11)
x- x
var(T I y ) (y i - fh -Xi )y  3h i  y
f f  Xsh ' “h+1 ~  X,
(13.12)
where x^ . = xh -  xg . This formula is the same as th a t obtained by the
superpopulation model (1.11) and (1.12) (suitably adjusted to allow for 
stratification) except tha t (nh+l)_1 occurs in place of (nh- l ) -1 as can be seen 
by equation (1.13).
13.3 Across Stratum Ratio Estimation
The across stratum  ratio estimator is given by the formula
f  Nh
_ ** nh ^
A "  ■£ NV  iNh 
L — Xnh *
. X (13.13)
This estim ator, as well as the w ithin stratum  ratio estim ator, are 
discussed by Cochran (1963) (who refers to T"A as the combined ratio 
estimate). It is also commonly used in practice and comes about from the 
following frequentist reasoning. Both types of ratio estimators are subject to 
a p-bias, and TMA generally has higher p-variance than TMW. However, the 
p-bias of T"w can be severe when the n^ are small. This p-bias can be 
much less in T"A , provided the rh are similar, giving it a significantly 
lower p-mean square error. In effect the individual rh values are pooled.
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The relative merits of these two estimators can be examined in 
the observer based framework in the following way. Define the mean 
square error of the estimate T* to be E(T-T*)2 1 ys . Then, under the model 
(13.6M 13.7) given in the previous section, the mean square error of T"w is 
simply the posterior variance of T given by (13.12) (because ETI ys = T"w). 
Under the same model, the mean square error of T"A is the posterior 
variance of T plus the bias squared term (T"A -  T"w )2. This expression 
shows how much worse TMA is than T"w as an estimator for T.
Suppose now that we have reason to believe that the rh are very 
sim ilar. Then the probability state that could be used is the same as 
(13.6M 13.7) but with the stratification effects removed: the parameters rh 
could be replaced by a universal r. This is the situation in which the use of 
T"a was justified by the frequentist argument above. This model yields 
ET I ys = TM where
T" = r.x where f  = ys / x g (13.14)
the sim ple ratio estim ator discussed in section 1.3, and the posterior 
variance of T is
var(T I ys)
x- x I
3
xs n+1 I
ies
(Yi -  r.x*)
x i
(13.15)
where x - = x -  xg. This expression is the mean square error of T" since T" 
is unbiased for T. The mean square error of T"w will be (13.15) plus the bias 
squared term  (T" -  T"w )2 while the mean square error of T"A will be 
(13.15) plus the bias squared term (T" -  TMA)2. Thus, if  the rh are believed to 
be similar, it would be preferable to use T" rather than T"A.
Under the model (13.6M13.7) the mean square error of TMis the 
posterior variance (13.12) plus the bias squared term (T" -T " w)2. The way 
in  which this term (TM -  TMW)2 can be associated with either the mean 
square error of T" or TMW, depending upon which model is invoked, can be 
conceptually confusing. For example, one can reason that since the model
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where the rh are the same is a special case of the model (13.6M13.7), then 
T"w should remain unbiased. Such reasoning confuses subjective 
probability bias with p-bias (and ^-bias) and it is worth distinguishing 
between the two at this point. P-bias quantifies accumulated error over 
repeated selections. Subjective probability bias is the difference between an 
estimate and the posterior expectation of T according to the chosen model. 
If the model is taken as representing our prior knowledge, then bias is a 
measure of how much of our prior knowledge we have wasted. If we know 
that the rh's are equal, then TMW is biased because it has wasted this 
knowledge. If our prior knowledge tells us that we have no reason to believe 
that the rh's are similar, then T" is biased because it has wasted this 
knowledge. Whether T"w or T" suffers from greater bias depends entirely 
upon the strengths of our prior beliefs concerning the rh's.
13.4 Probability Proportional to Size Sampling
Suppose that the xi are still size variables but that there is no 
stratification (the results of this section can be easily extended to the 
stratification case). As can be seen from the previous sections, estimating 
the population total amounts to estimating r (or its finite population 
equivalent in the superpopulation framework). In most populations met in 
practice, observations with large (x^y  ^give a better fix on r since they tend 
to be subject to smaller relative variability. Thus intuitively better samples 
are obtained by selecting units with large x-values.
The variances given by (13.12) and (13.15) are minimised by 
purposively choosing the samples which maximise the xi. Such a sample is 
not considered valid in the design based framework as there is no 
randomisation upon which to base probabilistic statements (and it is 
generally considered unwise in other frameworks as it is not robust to 
model failure). From these considerations probability proportional to size
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(PPS) sampling was developed. It is a sampling scheme by which units 
with large values have a high probability of selection, to obtain generally 
better samples, while those with small Xj values still have a small chance 
of selection, ensuring tha t theoretical design based considerations can still 
be satisfied.
It works as follows. If a sample of size n is drawn, then on each 
selection the probability of selecting i is x^x. (This is a with replacement 
sampling scheme. Converting it to a without replacement scheme causes 
surprisingly awkward algebraic problems which will not be considered 
here). A p-unbiased estimator of T, from such a sample, is
(13.16)
since
x yk thE„T'ppo = — . n . E„ — where k denotes the k selection
p n p xk
= T
and a p-unbiased estimator of its p-variance is given by
varpCTpps) = - Z ^ - s - T ’p p s ) (1317)
ies  1
Foreman (1970).
A related estim ator can be constructed in the observer based 
framework, by the following means. Suppose we believe tha t the Yj follow 
the model
y j = r -x i + ej
where r is an unknown param eter and
E £j I r,G2 = 0 var(8j I r,a2) = x^ 2 a2 
with the 8j I r ,a 2 independent. Then the random variable Zj = Yj/xj follows
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th e  model:
Zj = r  + e * with E e^ * Ir,a2 = 0 vaKe^* Ir,a2) = a 2.
T his is one w ay of view ing the form ulation  of the  IPS, as discussed in  
section 5.3, for which i t  was argued (section 5.1) th a t  n a tu ra l constrain ts 
charac te rising  vague prio r knowledge incorporate  EZj I zg = Zg (equation 
(2.3)) and  var(Z: I ys) ZiGS(zj -  "zs)2 (equation (5.1)) where z^  = y-/x^ and z s  
=  n - 1 I i e s Zj.  From  the  re su lts  in  chap ter 5 we know th a t  th is  leads to 
var(Z j I y s ) = n_1ZiGS(z^ -  Z g ) 2 . T ran sla tin g  these  back to the  variable  Yj 
gives
EYj I ys =
w here rg = n-1.Zies(yi/xi) and
var(Yj I ys)
(13.18)
We will adopt (13.18), from which it  follows th a t
E T I y s = ys + r^.x-g (13.19)
D enote th is  by T*pps. This can be com pared to th e  classical estim ato r 
(13.16), T 'pps = r | .x .  We will, however, consider the  following more general 
constra in t on var(Yj I ys):
var(Yj I ys) = Y  ( ~  ~  ) • bij,3 (13-20)
ies *
w here the  b ^  s are  constants th a t depend only on s and  j and  are symmetric 
in  s - i  (see section 9.1). This leads to alm ost the  sam e resu lt, as shown by 
the  following theorem .
Theorem  13.1: If  constriants (13.18) and (13.20) hold, th en  the  bj^g of (13.20) 
satisfy
2  n + 1  ry
Xi . ------- . --------- 0 --------
 ^ n 2 + (n—1 )<x
w here a  is an  a rb itra ry  constant.
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Proof: Firstly, observe that
rs+k n+1 ' + xk.(n+l)
and so it follows from (13.18) that
Efg’Vk'ys = ?*
so that for ie s and kg s
E ( r -  -  fä+k ) ly , = var( -  f s+kIy_ ) + {e  ( 3 -  -  f  k ) Iy }
xi
----- 5"■ var(Yk I y j  + ( ^ - -  r * )
xk.(n+l)2 > *i
and similarly
E ( -  ^s+k) 1 ys = t t - -  z ~ 7 ~ iT  ] varfYk 1 y.) + (f s* -  fa*)xk xk.(n+l)
Now, forj^k, j,kgs
cov(Yj,Yk I ys)
= E { (Yk -  r*.xk) . E (Yj -  r*.xp I ys,Yk } I ys 
= E (y k -  f s-xk> • ( f s+k-xj -  fs-Xj) 1 yS 
= var(Yk 'y 9) from (13.21)
xj
K var(Yj I yg) by sim ilar reasoning
From these two forms for cov(Yj,Yk l ys) it follows th a t the only 
var(Yj I ys) involving j is a factor x? so that (13.20) becomes
2] X ( T  -  ?s* ) bj
(13.21)
(13.22)
(13.23)
2
(13.24)
(13.25)
term  in
var(Yj I ys) (13.26)
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Now, var(Yj I ys)
E var(Yj I y3,Yk) I yg + var( {EYj I y ^ J  I ys)
E t S ( T 1 " f» k )  *bi,s+k) 1 y3 + var<?s+k-xj 1 y3)
ie (suk)
St
var(Yk ly3) y.
2 2 
ie s  Xv (n+1)
t v. < 1 ,T] var(Yk ly3) .b ki3+k + [ ] var(Yk ly3)
( ^ - ? * )  U
xk (n+1) xk (n+1) 
from (13.23), (13.24) and (13.21)
2 ^J^i',s+k n  ,bk,s+k ^ J "r ui,s+k-1 b .  1
ies  1 (n+1) i'es
by substituting in (13.26) for var(Yk I ys). This can be equated with the form 
of var(Yj I y s) given by (13.26). In particular, equating the coefficient of 
(y/Xi -  f s*)2 yields
bi,s =  2 t  2 r bi,£Hk +  n  * \ s + k  +  1 ]  +  b i,s+k (1 3 .2 7 )
(n+1) i'es
Rewriting this in the form
Ji,s+k
bT"
 ^ ^ u bi',s4k +  n  ,bk,s+k -J
1 - (1 3 .2 8 )
(n+1)
shows th a t the term  s+k / bi s m ust be symmetric in s. Using the same 
reasoning as that which was used in theorem 9.1 just prior to equation (9.8) 
then bi g must be of the form bi.c3 where cg is symmetric in s. Substituting 
this into (13.28) yields, after some rearrangement,
2 2 
(n+1) , 2 , N1_ n + 2n L--------- + (n - l ) t \  = ---------  -  b£ (1 3 .2 9 )
where bg+k ^ie(suk) bi*
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Suppose for the  m om ent th a t bi is not independent of i. Since the 
RHS of (13.29) is sym m etric in  s+k then  so is the  LHS. This requires th a t
n+1
(n—1) bc (13.30)
and  w hen th is  form ula is substitu ted  into (13.29) for cg and cg+k it  can be 
seen th a t  (13.29) holds. Consider E (Yj — r^.Xj)2 (Yk -  r* .xk) I y s. By first 
conditioning on Yj th is  expression is seen to equal
k E (Yj -  ?3*.Xj)3 1 y3
Xj (n+1)
by (13.21). Conditioning first on Yk yields 
2
x.. f (n—l)(n+2)b . 3
(13.31)
" J  • n(n+T ) b L  ■ S  <yi -  • var(Yk I y3)
E quating  these two forms yields
(n -l)(n + 2 ).b s 2(n+2)
i  n  + 1 -  •
n .be } •^S.k.s - n -b3+k ' ^ ^ ,3
(13.32)
(13.33)
w here fs = -  2 ies(yi -  f s*.xi).bi . var(Yk I y s)/xk2 w hich is independen t of k 
and  Hgj s = Xj_ 3 .E (Y j -  r g*.Xj)3 I ys . Since the  LHS is independent of j then  so 
is iq3j  g- Thus Hg k g is independent of k. Thus the  only occurences of k in  the 
LHS are in  bg+k. As a  resu lt, since the RHS is independent of k  then  so m ust 
be b g+k. (If the coefficient of b ^  is zero the equation can be seen to not hold). 
T hus in general bs is independent of s and  so the assum ption  th a t  bi is not 
independent of i leads to a contradiction.
W ithout loss of generality  p u t bj = 1. Then (13.29) resolves to
n(n+2) cs
n+1 ’ n + l+ n .c (13.34)
Thus cg+k is independent of k  and so cs is independent of s so th a t in  its most 
general form cs will be a function of n. Induction shows th a t  the  fam ily of
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solutions to (13.34) is given by
c _ P-+1 ____ cc____
3 n 2 + (n -l)a
where a  is an arbitrary constant. ■
(13.35)
We can now define the following probability state appropriate to a
PPS sampling scheme: constraints (13.18), (13.20) and the requirement that
the estimators resolve to those of the IPS in the event tha t all the xi are
identical. This final constraint requires a  = 1 whence cs = n“1 and
2
varOTj I y3) = X  ( V ) (13.36)
ies *
The posterior expectation for TI yq has been already given by (13.19) and the
posterior variance resolves to
var(T I y )
2
x-( M i K i l ( i - v ) (13.37)
by (13.25).
A sim ilar resu lt can be obtained in  the superpopulation 
framework by the following model:
E^Yj = r.Xj (13.38)
var^(Yj) = g2.Xj2 (13.39)
where the Yj are independent. The ^-BLUE (best linear unbiased estimator) 
is the ^-unbiased linear estim ator T which achieves the minimum 
E^Ep(T-T) of all linear ^-unbiased estimators, for all possible sampling 
schemes, under the given model. The ^-BLUE estim ator for the model 
(13.38), (13.39) is that given by (13.19) (Royall and Herson, 1973) which has 
^-variance given by a 2.{ x-2/n + Sjg- x^ 2 } which has a ^-unbiased estimator 
given by (13.37) but with (n+1)-1 replaced by (n-1)-1.
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13.5 M ultistage Sam pling
A sampling technique often used in practice is that of multistage 
sampling. For a discussion of this technique see for example Cochran 
(1963). Basically, it is a sampling technique which allows greater efficiency 
per unit cost. The population is divided up into a partitioning called first 
stage units from which a random sample is taken. These selected first 
stage units are also partitioned into second stage units from which a 
random sample is taken. This process can be continued indefinitely. The 
ultimate units of selection may be single population units or 'clusters' of 
units which are completely enumerated.
Since each stage of selection can employ any random selection 
scheme, it is difficult to generalise how the observer based approach can be 
applied to this technique. In this section we will analyse in some detail a 
particular sampling scheme which has been treated by Foreman (1970) 
from which the design based properties given below were obtained. This 
scheme has been instrumental in the development of the Monthly Labour 
Force Survey, run by the Australian Bureau of Statistics.
Consider the following three stage sampling scheme. We will use 
ij  and k to identify l s ,^ 2nc* and 3rc* stage units respectively. The population 
is divided into M first stage units, the i^ *1 first stage unit containing 
second stage units, i = 1,...,M. The second stage unit, j = l,...,Qj, 
contains Njj third stage units. The third stage units are single population 
units. If N is the population total then N = Zi Zj Ny. Associated with the i ^  
first stage unit is the size variable x^ . Associated with the ij^h second stage 
unit is the size variable xy and x = Si x^  = 2^  Lj x^ *.
The sample is selected as follows. From the M first stage units we 
select m, the probability of selection being proportional to x /^x for each 
selection, with replacement. From each of the m selected first stage units, 
n second stage units are selected, the probability of selection being
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proportional to xy/xj for each selection, with replacement. From each of the 
selected second stage units, ny third stage (i.e. population) units are 
selected by SRSWOR. The number ny is determined by the formula
“a
f.x.Ny
(13.40)
Define n = Si Ej ny. While the first two stages of selection are with 
replacement, in practice this would not be the case. However, allowing for 
without replacement PPS sampling makes the development of design based 
estimators quite difficult. This sampling scheme is self-weighting which 
means that every unit in the population has equal probability of selection 
(strictly speaking, because the scheme is with replacement in the first two 
stages, every unit has an equal expected number of times that it is selected) 
for
Pr( selecting ijk^1 unit)
= Pr(selecting i).Pr(selecting k I i selected).Pr(selecting k I ij selected)
x i * ij f x= m — . n —  . ---------x xi m n Xjj
= f.
This property allows a very straightforward p-unbiased estimator. For ije s 
put yy = Zkes yyk- For ie s put yj = Ije3 yy. Put ys = Zjes yp the simple total of 
the sample observations. Similarly define Yj to be the total of the population 
units in the i ^  first stage unit, Y y  the total of the N y  population units in 
the ijth second stage unit. Then T'MS = ys/f is a p-unbiased estimator for T 
for
e pt 'ms 7-EpYEYyyk
ie s  je s  kes
T (13.41)
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by (13.40). Observe that this sampling scheme has a variable sample size 
since the n^'s vary according to the first and second stage units that 
happen to be selected. This is not taken into account by T'MS which scales 
up the simple total ys according to the expected sampling fraction f.
The p-variance of T'MS is
Y; V 2 ^ Ä  , Y;i Y; 2
m r r  x- x m n tt T T  j x,-, x.i=l j=l
M Qi N« -i_ y y (y. _y )
f  * Ä  4^ N„ - 1  Ä  V YiJk YiJ ^
Lij
Nij
(13.42)
where Y -  = Yij/Nij. This has p-unbiased estimator
värp(T'Ms) i - . - i - . y  (m m-1 "
m.yi
~ T*ms) (13.43)
This formula illustrates a remarkable result th a t occurs in multistage 
sampling: th a t the variability deriving from all stages of selection are 
estimated by the variability between the estimates of T derived from each of 
the selected firs t stage units. Equation (13.42) shows clearly the 
contribution to the p-variance from the three stages of selection. In (13.43) 
the quantities my^/f are all p-unbiased estimators of T and their variability 
reflects all three components of (13.42).
We will now consider the observer based approach estimators. 
For all selected second stage units, ije s, we can consider that there is no 
further prior knowledge to distinguish between units within ij: i.e. an IPS 
is appropriate. (This is reflected by the use of an SRSWOR sampling 
scheme within each ije s). Thus
EYij I ys = NijYij = Yjj (13.44)
where y j^ = yy/n^j. Consider a second stage unit ij* where i is selected in 
the sample but j* is not. We can next get the posterior expectation of Yy*. If 
all the population elements in the selected second stage units were 
enumerated, then each Y^iije s would be known. Estimation of the Y^*,
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j*e s, would then resolve to a PPS situation, motivating the use of the 
constraint (1.3.18). Thus
EYjj* 1 ys = E (EYjj* I {Yjj:je s}) 1 ys 
= E (xjj*/n).ZjesYjj/xjj 1 ys from (13.18)
= (xjj*/n).2je s Yjj /xjj 
= Yjj*
Then for all ie s
Qi
from (13.44) (13.45)
E Y i i y 3 =  2 * Y y. ,
j=i
= y | (13.46)
Similarly if i*g s the posterior expectation 
considering the situation where the Y^ie s are 
EYj* 1 ys = E (EYj* 1 {Yj:is s}) 1 ys 
= E (xj*/m).£ie 3Yj/xj 1 ys
of Yi+ can be 
known:
from (13.18)
obtained by
t
=  (xi*/m).2^es Yj/xj
= y \*
from (13.46) (13.47)
so that our final estimator for T is 
M
ETI y3 = X Yi’
i=l
(13.48)
where jX - = X  V  “ d a*fi = X  V '
i*€s j*«s
This estimator is quite different from the frequentist estimator T'MS = yg/f 
discussed above.
Similarly the variance estimator can be obtained by finding the 
posterior variance. For ije s, again using the IPS,
vaKYjj I ys) ( 1 - T r ) 7TT X  (y« -
N ü n + 1  k ,s
(13.49)
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Now, if  ije s and  ij0e s w ith j*jo then
covfYy.Yy I ys) = 0 (13.50)
since from (13.44), E Y y^lys ,Yy = EYy I ys = Njj yfj > and  sim ilarly for 
i,i0e s and  i*i0
cov(Yi ,Yio I ys) = 0 (13.51)
from (13.46), (13.45) and  (13.44). I f ie s
var(Yj I y s) = E vaiKYj I {Y^je s) I ys + v ar ( [ EYj I (Yij:je  s}] I ys )
j*<2 s jes TJ -  j0£ S 
,X.- _  Y
+ var( ^ Y y  + X  ^ 7  1 y3 )
je s  j0es
(13.52)
from (13.37) and (13.19). Now, if  ije s  then
F I y , v Nü yjj m . n
xü ~3 ny ’ xij f -x yy
(13.53)
by (13.44) and (13.40). Hence
Y
tt 1 V  ij I 1 V  m -n  m
n “  X-- Z3 n  —  f.x ^  ~ f.x
JGS O
(13.54)
jes
so th a t
je s  o j0es ^
jes j0€3 x ij n  jo£S Xij„
j0*j
- ^ ]2var(Y« 1 + ys) + [f - ] 2(nyi r y»)2}
j0esj£3 Xij nX ij
by (13.50)
n—! V  Var(Yij1 y«}
n 2.U 2 +  ^ f_x  ^ yO (13.55)
where y  ^= y^/n. Thus (13.52) resolves to: for ie s,
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varlYj I ys)
( +  X 4 *  1- ~ r - X var(Y.j1 ysv4 + ( ^ “) X (y .j- yi)2)
j* e s j e s
)X.- 2
+ ^  ( 1 + — “ ) var(Yij1 yg)n.X:, 1J
j€S ^
by (13.55) and (13.50). We now have 
var(T I ys)
= Evar(TI(Yi:i6s})lys + var ( [ ETI {Y^ies}] I y3 )
(13.56)
E{JÜ + H )  1
m “  * m+1 x- m x,
1 io €  S Jo
m+1
1 * 6  S 16 S
+ var
E 9 i^ES
by (13.37) and (13.19)
+ X ^ l - ^ Y - E - t ^ H ^ Y i ' y s )  + ( t 1- -  )
Y; ’ 2-
i*6 s
m+1
i e s  mx- x- m —  x.1 lo € S  Ac
+ var<Yi 'y 3)
i e s  ^
(13.57)
which is derived in the same way as was (13.56) and by use of (13.51) and 
(13.46).
Equations (13.49), (13.56) and (13.57) define the variance formulae 
which allow the calculation of var(TI ys).
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CHAPTER 14 
PARADOXES
14.1 Introduction
The Bayesian foundations are free of the paradoxes that 
affect the frequentist foundations to statistics. As such they represent a 
theoretical basis to statistics that can challenge the dominance of the latter. 
However, as discussed in chapter 2, there are paradoxes that can arise in 
the Bayesian framework when attempting to represent vague prior 
knowledge. It was also argued there that the representation of vague prior 
knowledge is of fundamental importance, especially in large samples from 
finite populations. It is therefore important, if Bayesianism is to mount a 
realistic challenge to frequentist statistics, that it address these paradoxes. 
We will now examine how the modification to the Bayesian foundations 
presented in this thesis, the observer based foundations, copes with these 
paradoxes.
14.2 Kolmogorov's Axioms
It is understood that in the observer based foundations, the 
axioms of probability cannot be violated. This has been the case in all of the 
probability states presented in this thesis.
However, the results of this thesis have, in many instances, 
duplicated the posterior properties that can be attained by the use of 
improper priors. Therefore, it could be argued that the violation of the 
axioms is merely disguised. Indeed, theorem 4.1 shows that in a broad 
class of modelling situations a solution to a probability state will be 
characterised by a function h(0). This function is algebraically identical to 
the (sometimes improper) prior for 0 which achieves the same posterior 
results as the probability state.
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The observer based foundations do not include a disguised 
violation of Kolmogorov's axioms. In fact, the opposite is probably true: a 
Bayesian using an improper prior would probably never in terpret the 
'prior' as a density function. Rather, it would be interpreted as being 
symbolic of some other probabilistic concept which, for convenience, 
remains labelled as a prior density function.
In the cases when the distributional form of random variables is 
known, the observer based foundations provide a formal means by which 
h(0) is longer interpreted as a density function. In this way Kolmogorov's 
axioms are not violated. In the case where there is no distributional form 
(for examples the IPS and the probability states of chapter 13), and hence 
there is no associated h(0), the axioms are also obeyed.
14.3 The Marginalisation Paradox
One of the basic precepts in the Bayesian framework is that prior 
knowledge of an unknown can always be quantified by a prior density 
function of th a t unknown. This requirem ent is sometimes eased to the 
extent that the prior density can be improper. The marginalisation paradox 
occurs when a multivariate improper prior leads to a marginal posterior 
density function on one of the variates, for which there is no possible 
univariate prior, proper or improper.
The observer based foundations do not include this basic precept. 
Thus, by definition, the marginalisation paradox does not constitute any 
logical inconsistency.
14.4 Strong Inconsistency
The observer based foundations do not overcome the problem of 
strong inconsistency. However, the general philosophy behind the 
representation of vague prior knowledge which has been presented in this
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thesis allows a somewhat more palatable interpretation of strong 
inconsistency.
Firstly, it will be made more clear just why strong inconsistency 
is so damaging. Consider again the example due to Stone (1976). If Yj I 9 ~ 
N(0,1) and the improper prior for 9 is « e4e.d9, then 9 I yj ~ N(yj + 4,1) so 
that Pr(0 > yj + 2 lyj) = 0(2) = .98 while Pr(0 > Yj + 2 I 0) = 0(-2) = .02. 
Suppose a statistician accepts this probabilistic model. Suppose further that 
0 and yj are both realised and written down on a piece of paper, but are 
unknown to the statistician who is interested in betting on whether or not 9 
> yj + 2. He or she may reason that were he to look at the value of 0 he 
would then assess the probability that 0 > yj + 2 as 2% as shown above. 
Since this will hold regardless of 0, he therefore need not look at 9 to 
conclude 2%. By similar reasoning, he need not look at yj to know that 98% 
is the chance. Thus logical reasoning leads to wildly contradictory 
conclusions.
It behooves the author to point out that one need not stray from 
classical statistics to be confronted with paradoxes of this kind. Consider 
the well known Petersburg Paradox (see for example Feller, 1968, p251). In 
it, a player continually throws a true coin until it falls heads. The player 
receives 2ra dollars, where the head occurred on the mth throw. The 
paradox concerns the true value of such a game which is easily shown to be 
infinite. Consider the following variation. Suppose the game has been 
played twice and the resulting payoffs written on separate pieces of paper 
marked A and B. A player may choose one of the payoffs but must do so 
before looking at them. Which should he choose? He may reason as follows. 
If he were to look at result A it would be finite. The expected return of payoff 
B would still be infinite and so he would therefore have a better expected 
return by choosing B. Since he can reason this in advance, he need not look 
at A in the first place to know that B is by far the better choice. He could by
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similar reasoning conclude that A is the better choice.
An argument raised against the validity of this paradox is the 
following. No gambling house can offer such a game because it would need 
an infinite bank on which to draw. Since this is impossible it is a 
nonsensical situation. If one accepts this counter argument one must 
reject a lot of statistical theory as being nonsensical. This will include, for 
example, anything involving the use of the normal distribution, for normal 
variates can take indefinitely large values. Many of the theoretical 
properties of normal distributions depend crucially on their behaviour as 
their argument approaches ± <». It is no more nonsensical to talk of an 
infinite money supply than it is to consider a random variable which can 
have an infinitely large outcome.
Returning to the examination of strong inconsistency, it appears 
that the occurence of strong inconsistency is related to the existence of 
pivotal quantities. These are central to the fiducial argument (see section 
1.7) and will now be discussed in more detail. Seidenfeld (1979) gives an 
extensive discussion of pivotal quantities and the fiducial approach.
A pivotal quantity is a function of Ys and § which has known 
distribution before any y-observations are made. This property occurs 
because pivotal quantities are independent of 9 when they are conditioned 
on 0. For example, in Stone's example the pivotal quantity is Yj-0, for it is 
easy to see that
Yj — 010 ~ N(0,1). (14.1)
Because this holds independently of 0 it follows that Yj-0 ~ N(0,1). It can be 
seen that this pivotal quantity is instrumental in causing strong 
inconsistency since it leads to the statement Pr(0 > Yj + 2 1 0) = 0(-2).
Pivotal quantities are essential in fiducial inference. Such 
inference begins with relations such as (14.1). The key fiducial step is to 
assert that after observing Yj, Yj -  9 I Yj ~ N(0,1) holds. Fiducial inference
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is constrained to situations where pivotal quantities exist.
We will now generalise the concept of pivotal quantities to define a 
pivotal characteristic. A pivotal characteristic is a characteristic of a 
function of Xs and 9 which is known to hold before any y-observations are 
made. For example, if the Yi are independent, identically distributed and 
continuous then P(Yj < Yt) = 1/2 holds before any sample observations are 
made. Pivotal characteristics, which include pivotal quantities, are 
instrumental in strong inconsistency, as the following examples show.
In the IPS we can consider the Yj to be independently generated 
random variables with mean p and variance a2 (previously denoted p2 in 
section 5.3). That is, EYj I p,a2 = p and E(Yj-p )2 I p ,a2 = a 2. It then 
follows that
E £  X  CYj ■- Y3)2 I h,02 = E i  X  ('V H  -  7  E (Y k-n ))2 I M-,02
ie s ie s ke s
= (n-l) 02 / n (14.2)
after expansion. Also, if j£s then by the same technique
E (Yj -  Ys)21 |i,02 = (n+1) 02 / n (14.3)
The expression in (14.3) exceeds that in (14.2) regardless of the values of p 
and a 2 (provided only that o2 > 0). We therefore have the pivotal 
characteristic
E { 7  X  (Yi -  Ys)2 -  (Yj -  Ys)2 } < 0 (14.4)
ie s
However, by theorem 5.1 of the EPS, this expression when conditioned on ys 
is equal to 0 (provided that m2 s > 0). It can be seen that this is a situation of 
strong inconsistency. Observe that the unconditional expectation of the 
expression in (14.4) is -2a2/n so that the inconsistency is of order n-1.
We will examine two other probability states which exhibit strong 
inconsistency. Consider the gamma IPS (a known). We have
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flys la,ß)
so that by the use of lemma 12.1 we get
fiys io,p) =
n(a-l) -y^ ß
y3 -e
0na .nß T(a)
(14.5)
na-l -y^ ß
y3 -e
a na __. vß .r(na)
(14.6)
and if we define z = y/ß then a transformation of variables yields
fiz I <x,ß)
na-l -z
z .e
T(na)
(14.7)
Thus z is a pivotal function (since a is a given constant). Examples of 
strong inconsistency which derive from this are, if n = 1, Pr( y- < ß I a=l ,yp 
= 1 -  2.6-1 = .26 by (12.13) while Pr( Yj < ß I a=l,ß) = 1 -  e '1 = .63 by (14.7). 
Also, Pr(Yj < yi I a=l ,-y^  = 3/4 by (12.14) while Pr(Yj < Yi I a=l) = 1/2.
The fiducial solution to this example, which overcomes these 
examples of strong inconsistency, is obtained by setting fiz I a,ys) equal to 
the right hand side of (14.7), whence by transformation
na - y
«ßla,yJ rtna+l .ß .r(na)
(14.8)
From this it follows that, for examples, Pr( yj < ß I a=l ,yj) = .63 and 
Pr(Yj < yi I a= l,yi) = 1/2. Equation (14.8) can be compared to (12.13). The 
fiducial approach gives solutions algebraically equivalent to using the 
improper prior flß|oc) ß-1, compared to fiß|a) «= ß~2 for the observer based 
solution. However, the fiducial solution also suffers from strong 
inconsistency. For example, EYj I y^,a is infinite, so that the quantity 
Yj — Yj is always zero when conditioned on ß but is always infinite when 
conditioned on yj.
Finally we will consider the Normal IPS with (9.44) applying so 
that the Yj I ji,a2 ~ N(p,a2) and are independent. Define the three functions:
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z1 = nm . -  , Z2  = n'™2’3 and z3 = (14.9)
a z2
These can all be shown to be pivotal functions. The normal IPS yields z11 ys 
~ N(0,1), z21 ys ~ Xn+ 3  and (n+3)1/2.z3 I ys ~ tn+3. The fiducial solution has 
been given by Fisher (1960) and is zx ~ N(0,1), z2 ~ %2+1 and (n+l)1/2.z3 ~ 
tn+1. The fiducial approach gives solutions algebraically equivalent to using 
the improper joint prior fip,G2) (g2)^1, compared to f(|i,G2) «= (g2)-3  for the 
observer based solution. Again, the disparity with the fiducial solution 
causes strong inconsistency in the observer based solution. Again, also, the 
fiducial solution suffers from strong inconsistency from considerations of 
EYj I yi.
We will consider now the implications of strong inconsistency in 
solutions to probability states.
It has been emphasised in previous sections that the running of 
large and complex surveys involves producing the most cost effective 
methodology. At the selection stage, this gives a practical justification for 
randomisation, as discussed in 1.6. At the estimation stage, this gives a 
practical justification for applying equation (2.3) within strata, as 
discussed in section 2.2. Neither of these features are actually necessary to 
enable valid inferences. One can, in principle, purposively select a robust 
and balanced sample. One can also, in principle, hand-fit proper Bayesian 
priors to every strata.
The constraints which have been used to define probability states 
should therefore be seen as approximations to states of prior knowledge. 
One would then expect such approximations to yield numerical 
inconsistencies, not unlike simple rounding errors. What is of interest is 
their magnitude. One should determine the uses to which such 
approximating models are put and then assess whether their accuracy is 
acceptable for such uses.
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The primary aim of large surveys is to establish estimators of 
population quantities and to enable confidence intervals of those quantities 
to be constructed. Strong inconsistency impacts on the validity of confidence 
intervals.
Consider the impact on the IPS. For small samples, although the 
posterior variance is known, confidence intervals cannot be established 
since the central limit theorem does not take effect. For large samples, 
when approximate confidence intervals can be given, the strong 
inconsistency effect was shown, through equation (14.4), to be of order n-1. 
It is reasonable to suppose that if one accepts the approximate nature of the 
central limit theorem, then one can accept a further approximation error 
of order n_1.
Consider now the gamma IPS (a known) example. For this, as 
for a broad class of confidence intervals, it turns out that the inconsistency 
can be overcome. The following theorem is needed.
Theorem 14.1: Suppose Yx and Y2 are two random variables of known
density functions, with no discrete point masses. Let ye (0,1). Suppose 
further that F1_1(y) < F2_1(y) and F^Kl-y) < F2-1(l-y), where Fx(.) and F2(.) 
are the cumulative density functions of Yx and Y2 respectively. Then there 
exists an interval (a1,a2) which is a 100(1—y)% confidence interval for both 
Yx and Y2.
Proof: The random variable Yx will have various 100(1—y)% confidence
intervals : {(yj,yu)}. Plot the collection of points Kypyu)} with y^  on the 
horizontal axis and yu on the vertical axis. They will form a continuous line 
(since Yx has no point masses) asymptotic as -> -  <» on yu = F1“1(l-y) and 
as yu -» on yT = F1"1(y). Similarly the endpoints {(y1,yu)} of the 100(l-y)% 
confidence intervals for Y2 will form a line asymptotic as y^  —> -  «» on yu = 
F2_1(l-y) and as yu —> »  on yj -  F2-1(y). By an obvious extension to the mean
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value theorem, at some point the lines must intersect. Such an intersection 
will be a 100(l-y)% confidence interval for both Yj^  and Y2.B
The posterior density function for T given by the solution to the 
gamma IPS (a known) is given by equation (12.19). The fiducial solution 
can be shown to yield
na /m Nra-1
ys .(T-ys)
frriv .a ) = —-------- 2------- (14.10)
 ^ _(n+r)aT .B(ra,na)
These two density functions satisfy theorem 14.1 so that contiguous 
confidence intervals for T can be established which conform to both the 
observer based and fiducial solutions.
Consider now the normal IPS example discussed above. For the 
pivotal function zv  there is no discrepancy. For z2, theorem 14.1 provides a 
remedy to the discrepancy. For z3 the discrepancy cannot be overcome. In 
this case the discrepancy in the relative lengths of confidence intervals is 
also of order n"1. This can, for example, be compared to the error 
introduced by assuming normality in the model.
It is argued that since the probability states presented here give 
intuitively good estimates and acceptably accurate confidence regions, that 
they are therefore appropriate for the needs of finite population sampling 
theory. This does not mean that they are appropriate for all uses. Suppose, 
in the case where the Yi are independent identically distributed gamma 
random variables (with a known) that one were interested in estimating 
percentiles of unobserved Yj. Then it would be appropriate to define the 
probability state by (12.1) and
Pr(Yj<yi lyi) = 1/2 for all i^j. (14.11)
It can be shown that this probability state leads to the fiducial solution 
given above.
This addresses the often discussed question of whether there is
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some universally acceptable way of expressing vague prior knowledge. It is 
argued in this thesis that there is not. The formulations presented here are 
specifically aimed at satisfying the primary needs of finite population 
sampling theory. As such, they may be entirely inappropriate for other 
uses (as for example in percentile estimation). Many approaches have been 
developed to establish ground rules for the universal construction of vague 
prior knowledge. Bernado (1979) provides an extensive list of references. 
While specific comparisons will not be made here, suffice to say that the 
different approaches yield different solutions, and the probability states 
presented here provide another set of solutions.
14.5 Transformations of Random Variables
In the previous section it was argued that there is no universally 
applicable representation of vague prior knowledge. A specific aspect of 
such universality is whether an intuitively appealing formulation of vague 
prior knowledge of Yj is also intuitively representative of vague prior 
knowledge of a transformation of Yj.
This cannot be achieved in the Bayesian framework (see Efron, 
1973 and the discussion in section 2.1). This is because random variables 
are taken to be of a known parametric form, so that any known property of 
Yj I ys can be translated into a known property of g(Yj) I ys, and by suitable 
choice of g(.), this latter property can be made to look informative. This is 
the case for all the parametrised probability states of chapters 6 to 12.
Recall the point that the observer based probability states are 
simply approximations which are considered appropriate for the purposes 
of finite population sampling theory. When the untransformed Yj are of 
interest, as is almost always the case, these approximations can be seen to 
be appropriate, since they are intuitively uninformative with respect to the
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N ev erth e less , the  IPS  is a p robab ility  s ta te  w hich achieves 
in tu itiv e  un in fo rm ativeness for all transfo rm ations of Yj. T his has been 
outlined  in  deta il in  section 5.4. This is able to be achieved because no 
p aram etric  form is assum ed for the  random  variables. This is a d istinc t 
advantage over the  B ayesian approach, w here a param etric  form is needed 
so th a t  priors can be a ttribu ted  to the param eters.
14.8 Am U nB ayesian  Bayesiana T echnique
The d iscussions above have d em o n stra ted  the  costs in cu rred  
w hen  a n  im p ro p e r p r io r  is u sed . S tro n g  in co n s is te n cy  a n d  th e  
m a rg in a lisa tio n  paradox  canno t occur from  p ro p er p rio rs . H ow ever, 
poste rio r densities w hich re s u lt  from  im proper p rio rs a re , in  general, 
a rb itra rily  close' to m any posterior densities resu lting  from proper priors. 
('Close' can be easily defined by m any su itab le  m etrics). T here is a belief, 
re s u ltin g  from  th is , th a t  a  p ro p er-p rio r B ay es ian  a n a ly s is  can  be 
perform ed w hich yields e stim ato rs  and  inferences a rb itra r ily  'close' to 
those of an im proper-prior B ayesian  analysis. In  th is  way the  advantages 
of im proper priors can be obtained w ithout the  associated paradoxes.
This is not true. Given an  im proper p rior fig), suppose we observe 
a sam ple yg. We can then  identify a proper prior, f^g ) say, which yields the 
posterior f^ g  I ys) which is very close to fig I y s). However, had  a different 
sam ple, ys*, been observed th en  f^ g  I ys*) will not necessarily be a t all close 
to fig I y s*). In  o ther words, the  selection of the prior fx(g) cannot be m ade 
un til ys is known.
This violates the  likelihood principle and  is therefore  d istinc tly  
unB ayesian. The likelihood principle, discussed in  section 3.2, says th a t  all 
th e  in form ation  in  a sam ple th a t  can be used  for in feren tia l purposes is 
co n ta in ed  in  the  likehood function  f(y s I g). To have th e  p rio r for g 
depending on ys clearly violates this.
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CHAPTER 15 
DISCUSSION
15.1 General
This thesis has attempted to develop statistical foundations which 
may better serve the needs of finite population sampling than those which 
currently exist.
It began by critically examining the foundations which hold the 
g rea test influence: the design based approach and the frequentist 
superpopulation  approach. Most docum ented paradoxes of these 
frameworks stem from conflicts between formal probability structures and 
the ir in tu itive in terpretations: frequentist probabilities describe the 
properties of repeated realisations while the statistics user wants to infer 
things from the actual sample. Countless examples where this leads the 
user astray have been thrown at the design based approach, particularly by 
adherents of the superpopulation approach. Here lies a paradox within this 
battle of paradoxes: the frequentist superpopulation approach suffers from 
precisely the same problem, but, for reasons suggested in section 1.3, this 
is never mentioned.
This debate within the area of finite population sampling theory 
carries on fairly oblivious of the general debate in statistics between 
frequentists and Bayesians. An attem pt to explain this insularity has been 
made in section 1.4.
The difficulties of the Bayesian approach were discussed. In the 
context of finite population sampling theory the main problem is as follows. 
A strict application of Bayesian methods (that is, the avoidance of improper 
priors) leads to inappropriately complex methodology for large survey 
samples. The use of improper priors, on the other hands, leads to a
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collection of paradoxes as damaging as those of frequentist methods.
This thesis has attempted to find a solution to this, by the following 
approach. Firstly, the principles of the Bayesian approach have been 
altered by not requiring prior density functions and not requiring a unique 
posterior density function. In this way vague prior knowledge can be more 
easily form ulated. Secondly, logical consistency is imposed by the 
requirement of Bayes-consistency, defined in section 3.2. The framework so 
resulting is called the observer based framework. Finally, it is assumed 
that certain intuitively compelling estimators are the posterior expectations 
of quantities of interest. From this starting point, it turns out that further 
very detailed properties of the quantities of interest can be deduced.
This approach was then applied to many different situations. 
Those situations treated in chapters 6 to 12 have population units generated 
from a known param etric form. With the exception of chapter 11 (the 
Laplace IPS) intuitive estimators which reflect vague prior knowledge of 
unobserved population units were used. The intractability of the Laplace 
distribution m eant th a t a posterior expectation reflecting vague prior 
knowledge of the unknown distributional param eters had to be used 
instead. This la tte r approach has been more commonly used in other 
attem pts to quantify vague prior knowledge and explains some of the 
differences between them and the results obtained here: this thesis has 
emphasised the needs of finite population sampling as opposed to the 
modelling of hypothetical infinite populations.
The IPS of chapter 5 and the sampling applications treated in 
chapter 13 do not rely on parametric forms (except in the sense tha t the 
population units are generated from a distribution  which can be 
param etrised  by its  moments). These particu lar examples develop 
estimators for situations very common in survey sampling.
We will d istinguish  between the following five sta tistical
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frameworks: Bayesian restricted to proper priors (BP), Bayesian including 
the use of im proper priors (BI), design based (P), frequen tis t 
superpopulation ( Q  and observer based (O).
15.2 Tike Impact of Paradoxes
Firstly  we can consider how they cope with paradoxes and 
internal inconsistencies. This is summarised in table 15.1.
TABLE 15.1
PARADOX FRAMEWORK
BP BI 0 § p
Interpretation of Estimator ✓ ✓ ✓ X X
Strong inconsistency ✓ X X ✓ ✓
M arginalisation paradox ✓ X ✓ ✓ ✓
Kolmogorov's axioms ✓ X ✓ ✓ ✓
Petersburg-type paradox X X X X X
A tick indicates th a t a framework does not suffer from the 
paradox. These paradoxes have been discussed in chapter 14. The first 
paradox is tha t discussed in section 15.1 which arises from interpreting 
repeated trial properties as relating to a realised sample. It should be 
pointed out tha t while % suffers from this problem it has far less impact 
than in P. None of the subjective probability frameworks have this type of 
paradox. Consider the example of the paradox arising in £, from the model 
(1.14),(1.15) which has been discussed in section 1.3. The corresponding 
model in 0 , (2.3) and (6.1), yields the variance formula (6.6) which has been 
seen, in chapter 6, to be free of this paradox. Since subjective probabilities 
are conditioned on sample realisations such paradoxes cannot arise. The 
marginalisation paradox and violations of Kolmogorov's axioms arise only
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in BI as a direct consequence of improper priors. The Petersburg type of 
paradox can be constructed in any framework where there are random 
variables which can take indefinitely large values (see section 14.4).
By the criterion of the avoidance of paradox, BP arguably provides 
the best foundations to statistics.
Against this we can consider the practical impact of paradoxes. In 
chapter 14 the impact of strong inconsistency in 0  was discussed at length. 
In the examples considered there, the inconsistency was shown to be of 
order n"1. The view was expressed that the aspects of O which differ from 
BP can be considered as approximations, and that the effects of paradoxes 
can be viewed simply as approximation errors. The question is then 
whether such approximation errors are outweighed by the advantages.
Such a way of looking at strong inconsistency begs the question of 
whether the interpretational paradoxes of the frequentist approaches can 
also be viewed as approximation errors. The answer, in the author's 
opinion, is no. The reason is that the practical application of the frequentist 
approaches requires some fundamental misinterpretations whereas O 
does not.
It is true that frequentist methodology can, with sufficient 
ingenuity, yield estimators whose logical inconsistencies are of small 
practical importance. For example, while the design based estimator of the 
p-variance of the ratio estimator, given by (1.10), is inferior to the 
corresponding £ estimator (1.13), this can be reduced to insignificant 
proportions by stratification.
However, such solutions to the practicalities of frequentist 
estimators do not overcome the problems of interpretation. It is not, among 
the majority of frequentist statisticians, considered acceptable to formally 
interpret a frequentist confidence interval as being a statement about the 
variability of the unknown quantity of interest. (In section 1.7 it was
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discussed how such a fiducial-type interpretation is necessary in practice 
but that it is left to the user to do it in a covert manner). Furthermore, the 
design based approach also confuses the true role of randomisation (see 
section 1.6).
Thus frequentist methodology has inherent misunderstandings 
and confusions. One the other hand, the strong inconsistency of O is very 
straightforward and its impact can be assessed in an unambiguous 
manner.
Judged against the impact of paradoxes it is suggested that the 
subjective probability approaches are preferable to the frequentist 
approaches. Within the subjective probability approaches, BP is most 
preferable with BI least preferable.
15.3 Versatility
.k
As discussed in chapter 2, the disadvantages of approximations 
such as equation (2.3) can be outweighed by their practical advantages. The 
methods of O and BI yield simpler estimators than BP. While in principle 
BP estimators will make more efficient use of prior knowledge, the 
practical differences are negligible. As a result, the methodology of 0 and 
BI can be significantly more cost effective.
In chapters 6 to 12 are developed estimators which are obtainable 
by Bayesian techniques by the use of improper priors. Some, and probably 
all, can be derived in § but with a factor differing by order n*1. They cannot 
be derived in BP or P.
The developments in chapters 5 and 13 cannot be derived, or even 
closely approximated (see section 14.6), within BI or BP. Again, it is very 
likely that they can be produced in  ^but with a factor differing by order n_1. 
They are unobtainable in P.
While these developments cannot be produced in P, P methodology
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derives its own corresponding estimators. Their comparison is typified by 
the discussion in section 1.3 where it was argued tha t P estimators are 
inferior. As mentioned above, however, with ingenuity they can be made to 
be quite satisfactory in practice.
It is suggested that judged by the criterion of versatility, 0  and £ 
are equally preferable. BP and BI are distinctly weaker as they cannot 
produce intuitively compelling estimators such as in the IPS. P is weaker 
as the estimators of chapters 6 to 12, where there is a known parametric 
form, cannot be derived: by relying solely on the selection process for 
randomisation they cannot make full use of the param etric forms. An 
example is the variance estimator of the ratio estimator which is a special 
case of the results of chapter 9. While in principle P is weaker, in practice it 
can be made quite workable.
15,4 C ondLusio el s
This thesis has not produced a framework free of paradoxes. It 
has, however, produced a framework arguably advantageous over the 
frameworks currently in use for finite population sampling. Such a 
conclusion depends upon the relative importance attached to the issues 
discussed in this chapter and upon the individual's intuitive feelings about 
the nature of probability.
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